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ABSTRACT
This study attempts to systematically analyze the determinants of state participation in
International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). The study focuses on two core elements: (i)
IEA characteristics; and (ii) state characteristics. Hypotheses for state participation in IEAs are
formulated based on the two main International Relations theories dealing with cooperation –
Realism and Liberalism. The study presents five different models for state participation in IEAs.
The first model analyzes the influence of treaty variables, while the remaining four focus on state
variables. The second and third models analyze the influence of Realist and Liberal variables
respectively. The fourth model specifically focuses on variables which reflect the various socioeconomic, political and logistical constraints of developing countries. The fifth model presents
an integrated analysis of participation based on the previous models. Results of the study show
that participation can be understood in terms of both the Realist and Liberal variables, and that
there can be no rarefied partitioning of those factors on participation. More specifically, the study
empirically demonstrates that state participation in IEAs is influenced by the following four main
factors: (i) the impact of domestic and international institutions (ii) human development; (iii)
power motivations; and (iv) IEA design. Policies proposed to increase participation in IEAs
therefore have to enhance any positive influence exerted by these parameters, and mitigate their
negative influences, if any.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On 2 December 2003, Russia announced that it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol (KP)
to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), following
suit to USA’s earlier decision in 2001 to withdraw from the treaty. While Russia eventually
altered its stance and ratified the treaty on 18 November 2004, thereby allowing the KP to come
into force on 16 February 2005, the USA is still not a party to the KP, though it has ratified a
host of other international environmental agreements (IEAs). Moreover, despite the reluctance of
the USA (and initially of Russia) to participate in the KP, there are around one hundred and forty
countries worldwide which have ratified the treaty.
Indeed, states’ participation1 in IEAs can be characterized by its non-uniformity, either
spatially or temporally. For example, the US, despite its status as a major superpower and it
being a major member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), has ratified far fewer IEAs than other developed nations such as Germany, Finland,
France, or Italy. Based on data compiled from the Environmental Treaties and Resource
Indicators (ENTRI) database of the Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC) and
the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN),2 the US has ratified
fifty-five global3 IEAs, whereas Germany has ratified seventy-eight of such treaties. Smaller
nations such as Belgium, Greece or the United Kingdom have ratified more IEAs than the US.

1

Participation is defined as country ratification (or other technical terms deemed equivalent to ratification – such as
accession, approval or acceptance) of the IEAs. For more details, see Section 1.2.
2
This database is accessible online from www.sedac.ciesin.org/
3
This study is concerned solely with global IEAs as opposed to bilateral or regional IEAs. See Section 1.2.
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Further, Chile, a developing nation, has ratified fifty-seven global IEAs, and Brazil is almost at
par with the US, having ratified a total of fifty-four global IEAs. On the other hand, there are
other nations such as Angola and Eritrea, which have ratified only eight global IEAs.
What factors can explain this differential participation in IEAs? What can account for the
low participation of Eritrea or Angola as compared to that of Germany or Finland? Is a country’s
participation in IEAs aided by its level of economic development, or is it constrained by social
and development challenges such as poverty and corruption? Does power matter? Why is the KP
subject to such great controversies, while other treaties (e.g. the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)) manage to sustain a high level of international
participation without much contentious international debate? Does the legal content of IEAs
influence the level of participation sustained by the IEAs?
Despite the tremendous growth in IEAs since the 1970s, systematic empirical research
into the determinants of state participation in IEAs has been scant. While studies on
environmental regime formation have been rife, not much empirical work has been done on why
(i) countries participate differentially in IEAs; and (ii) why specific treaties command a higher
level of participation than others. This research aims to bring empirical and theoretical
contribution to the study of the determinants of participation in IEAs by focusing on both
country and treaty variables. In the next sections, I provide a definition of the terms ‘IEA’ and
‘participation.’ I then present an overview of the emergence of participation as an independent
element of investigation within the field of international environmental cooperation (IEC). I
thereafter delineate a conceptual model to establish domestic country characteristics and treaty
variables as potential determinants of participation in IEAs. Finally, I present an outline of the
models of this study.
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1.1 Definition of terms
International Environmental Agreement (IEA)
According to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
treaties are a primary source of international law4 (Slomanson 1995 p. 9). The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),5 adopted by the United Nations Conference on the
Law of Treaties on 23 May 1969, establishes treaties as an important source of international law
and “as a means of developing peaceful cooperation among nations, whatever their constitutional
and social systems.”6 Article 2, paragraph 1(a) of the VCLT defines a treaty as:
“an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation.

The same definition holds for an IEA because in the jargon of international law, terms
such as convention, protocol, accord, covenant, pact, agreement, charter, statutes or regime are
commonly used to denote a treaty. The only difference between an IEA and other international
treaties lies in the subject matter; otherwise, an IEA, very much like any other treaty, is an
agreement which is “governed by international law.”
In this study, no distinction is made between the terms international agreement, protocol,
convention. The term IEA thus refers to a written legal document, arising out of international
negotiations and governed by international law, reflecting international or regional concern over
a specific environmental issue, and embodying general and specific commitments to enhance and

4

Other sources include: “…b. international customs, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d…judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.”
(Slomanson, 1995 p. 9, quoting Article 38.1 of the Statute of the ICJ).
5
Full text available online at www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/viennaconvention.pdf . While the 1969 VCLT governs
treaties concluded between States, a 1986 version of the VCLT was negotiated to govern treaties between States and
International Organizations or between International Organizations. The 1986 Vienna Convention is not yet in
force. For more information, see http://untreaty.un.org
6
Paragraph 2 of Preamble of VCLT.
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improve the environmental situation. Normally, these provisions may include the following, inter
alia: (i) a general framework for cooperation and collaboration; (ii) specific measures to address
the specific environmental problem; (iii) provisions for scientific, technological, and technical
cooperation; (iv) provisions for dispute settlement; (v) provisions for ratification, accession, and
entry into force; (vi) sanctions in cases of violation; and (vii) monitoring and reporting
requirements.
IEAs can be bilateral, regional and global, depending on the scope of the environmental
problem or on the scope of membership. A global IEA is normally open to membership from any
sovereign country, while a regional IEA is limited to a specific group of countries in a particular
region. Bilateral IEAs, as the name suggests, is an agreement between two countries. The present
study is concerned solely with participation in global IEAs.
According to the principles of International Law, characterized by the lack of a
supranational authority for enforcement and a general lack of compellence, states have to
willingly enter into IEAs. However, once a state has ratified a specific IEA, the IEA is governed
by the articles of the VCLT, which bestows certain legal characteristics to IEAs. The most
important legal characteristics of IEAs, under the provisions of VCLT, are as follows: (i) IEAs
can be made by every independent state (Article 6); (ii) IEAs must be honored by the states
entering into them (Article 26); (iii) IEA enforcement is not subject to the internal laws of the
parties (Article 27); (iv) an IEA is non-retroactive (Article 28); (v) an IEA does not create either
rights or obligations for a third State7 (Articles 34-37); (vi) an IEA can be amended by agreement
between the parties (Article 39); (vii) an IEA may be declared invalid in case of error, fraud,
7

The VCLT makes the following distinction between the States (Article 2, paragraph 1): (i) A ‘negotiating State’ is
a State which took part in the drawing up and adoption of the text of the treaty; (ii) A ‘contracting State’ is a State
which has consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force; (iii) ‘Party’ is a State
which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force; and (iv) ‘Third State’ means a
State not a party to the treaty.
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corruption, coercion, use of force, or conflict with Jus Cogens (Articles 48-53); and (viii) a
material breach of an IEA by one of the parties entitles the other parties to suspend the operation
of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it (Article 60).8
Participation
The VCLT provides for various means for states to express their consent to be bound by a
treaty. While Article 11 of the VCLT enumerates ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession
as legal and valid means of signifying consent to be bound, it leaves the final mode for signifying
such consent to the treaty-makers. Thus, based on the intent of the negotiating states and the final
treaty text adopted, mere initialing or signature may signify that a state is legally bound under
International Law to abide by the provisions of the treaty (VCLT, Articles 11, 12); otherwise,
such consent may be expressed by ratification, acceptance, approval or accession (VCLT,
Articles 2(1)(b), 14, 15, 16).9
However, in normal parlance, treaty commencement normally involves the following five
steps: (i) initialing; (ii) signature; (iii) ratification; (iv) accession; and (v) coming into force
(Hingorani 1972). These various steps embody a gradual procession from agreement on the
treaty text to final consent to be bound by the treaty. Unless otherwise to be gathered from the
intent of the treaty negotiators or specifically spelled out in the treaty text, under customary
practice, initialing “is merely an indication of approval of the text for subsequent signature”
(O'Connell 1965 p. 230 as cited in Hingorani, 1972 p. 14). Signature of an IEA, on the other
hand, means that the negotiating states have agreed to the general wording of the text of the final
draft of the treaty (Slomanson 1995).

8

The relevant articles of the VCLT referred to above are given at Table 1, Annex 1.
Also, see United Nations Treaty Collection. Treaty Reference Guide.
http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.asp#acceptance
9
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Ratification, in International Law, is the main step taken by states to signify their consent
to be bound by the treaty once the treaty has been opened for signature. Treaties which require
ratification have no legal validity until they are ratified. In between the signature and ratification,
the signatory states are bound to obey Article 18 of VCLT, which prevents signatories from
engaging in “acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.” Accession, as per Articles
2(1)(b) and 15 of the VCLT, is considered at par with ratification in signifying a state’s consent
to be bound by a treaty. Accession is normally an act of a state which has not participated in the
initial drafting process leading to the making of the treaty (Hingorani 1972 p. 23; Slomanson
1995). Accession can only be made in cases where the treaties provide for accession (Hingorani
1972 p. 23), and accession normally does not require ratification, unless otherwise specified by
the treaty. Once a state has acceded to a particular treaty, it is considered as a full-blown member
of the treaty, on the same level as those which have signed and ratified the treaty (Hingorani
1972 p. 23).
A state is considered to be a participant or party member of an IEA if it has either
ratified, acceded to, approved or accepted the treaty (as opposed to merely initialing or signing
the treaty) (VCLT, articles 2(1)(b); 14(1); 16). Participation is thus equivalent to ratification,
accession, approval, or acceptance.
1.2 Participation as an emerging field of study
In view of the national sovereignty of states of the world, international cooperation has
traditionally been heavily premised on agreements between countries. These agreements serve
primarily as an embodiment of the agreed upon rights and obligations to secure the required level
of commitment and cooperation. Voluntary participation in these treaties is therefore of
paramount importance in securing and thereafter sustaining the desired level of cooperation.

7
In the field of IEC especially, IEAs have become a tool of major importance in enlisting
the cooperation of the international community in committing to specific measures to protect the
global environment, as attested by an upsurge in the number of IEAs adopted internationally
since the 1970s. IEAs take on primal importance in view of their positive role in diffusing
potential conflicts and tensions arising out of the natural tendency of states to free-ride on the
efforts of others or of fulfilling their national priorities at the expense of neighboring states. In
situations characterized by environmental, economic or socio-political asymmetries, for example,
IEAs serve as a useful tool to bring equivalence to the relationships among concerned parties.
IEAs can, for example, promote a mutual resolution of complexities arising from transboundary
transport of pollutants, thereby catalyzing a framework of cooperation for both the ‘guilty’ party
and the ‘victim.’ By legally codifying common standards and rules, IEAs thus form “the juridical
basis for creating rights and obligations between the parties” (Levi 1991), especially so in cases
of the global commons, which by definition, are not amenable to any particular national
jurisdiction.
In view of the crucial role played by IEAs in enhancing IEC, environmental economists
have long been concerned with the theme of treaty participation and alliance building. Economic
analyses have been conducted to estimate the likelihood that countries would sign and implement
IEAs, the types of countries that are most likely to sign the treaties, and the kinds of treaties that
are most likely to be signed (e.g. Congleton 2001; Congleton 1992; Murdoch et al. 1997).
Researchers within the econometrics field have also typically focused on the optimal size for an
IEA, the cost-effectiveness of IEAs, and the design of instrument choices to attract high
participation, often commonly referred to in the literature as the “incentive compatibility” of
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IEAs for enhanced cooperation (e.g. Carraro 1999a; Downs 1998; Helm and Sprinz 2000;
Schmidt 2000 p.4).
The theme of IEA participation has been receiving increasing interest from outside the
field of environmental economics as well. Drawing from the insights provided by general
theories bearing on international cooperation, several researchers have recently attempted to
provide a quantitative determination of the factors influencing state participation in IEAs. This
line of research has typically tried to empirically link states’ varying levels of participation in
IEAs to their domestic characteristics such as their levels of democratic governance, trade
openness, economic parameters, pollutant emissions, demographics, or land area, inter alia (e.g.
Dietz and Kalof 1992; Dolsak 2001; Frank 1999; Fredriksson and Gaston 2000; Neumayer
2002a; Neumayer 2002b; Recchia 2002). In the most recent of such endeavors, Roberts et. al.
(2004) have relied on the perspective of world-systems theory to analyze the participation of 192
nations in twenty-two treaties.
This non-economics-based interest in participation also focuses on treaty design as a
potential determinant of state participation in IEAs. Among the emerging studies in that domain
is DeSombre’s (2001 p.190-228) investigation of the influence of specific treaty clauses or
“participation mechanisms” on participation in IEAs. The clauses studied include the following:
presence of economic sanctions; provision of environmental aid; differential obligations; and the
creation of club goods.
Unfortunately, as detailed in the next section, the present state of research into the field of
IEA participation is not well advanced and there is scope for contribution, both theoretically and
empirically.
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1.3 Limitations of current studies and scope for further study
The present status of the research agenda on IEA participation can be deemed to be still
in its infancy, with no well-developed theories and no large-scale empirical foundation. As
expounded in more detail in Chapter Three, the studies dealing with participation in IEAs
typically suffer from three main lacunae: (i) lack of large IEA sample size; (ii) lack of a clear
association between the formulation of hypotheses and basic International Relations (IR) theories
dealing with international cooperation; and (iii) lack of systematic quantitative analysis of the
influence of variation in treaty design or in country characteristics on state participation levels in
IEAs.
Overall, many of the conclusions relating to participation in IEAs are specific to the cases
studied and cannot be generalized over the broader range of IEAs adopted internationally or of
different types of political regimes worldwide. These studies therefore do not provide a
systematic explanation of the influence of the heterogeneity of states, or of the variation in treaty
provisions, on states’ participation levels in IEAs. From a theoretical standpoint as well, many of
the hypotheses being tested in the quantitative cross-national analyses mentioned above do not
logically stem out from an application of the basic postulates of the main IR theories governing
international cooperation.
Since participation in IEAs is a sine qua non of IEC premised on inter-state agreements,
an understanding of the determinants of IEA participation becomes necessary for successful
formulation and implementation of IEC. This study therefore proposes to enhance the research
agenda on IEA participation by contributing empirical and theoretical insight into determinants
of state participation in IEAs. The driving question of this research is as follows: Which state or
treaty characteristics exert an influence on states’ participation in IEAs? In addressing this
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question, this study aims to fulfill three main objectives: (i) to formulate hypotheses for state
participation in IEAs based on the theoretical underpinnings of IR theories; (ii) to provide a
quantitative analysis of the influence of country characteristics on IEA participation; and (iii) to
empirically analyze the influence of treaty variation on state participation levels in IEAs. The
next sections delineate the research design and the implications of this study.
1.4 A Conceptual Model of State Participation in IEAs
A state’s decision to participate in a particular IEA can be influenced by numerous
factors, the most prominent being: (i) the science of global environmental change and the nature
of the issue area; (ii) the state of the global environment; (iii) the dynamics of world politics and
the nature of international negotiations pertaining to the IEA; (iv) the textual characteristics of
the IEA adopted; and (v) the domestic conditions or characteristics of the state.
The level of scientific knowledge governing a particular issue area determines the
salience of the issue area in both domestic and international politics and the strategies eventually
arrived at for addressing the particular environmental problem. Numerous researchers have
argued that scientific consensus and the involvement of effective epistemic communities tend to
strengthen international commitments to relevant IEAs by sharpening agenda-setting and by the
clear articulation of desired goals and objectives (Haas 1989 p. 398; Kolk 1996 p. 31; Krasner
1982 p.510; Weale and Williams 1998 p. 85).
The dynamics of international negotiations clearly impact the form that the IEA
eventually takes. For instance, ‘who’ is negotiating ‘what’ is very important in shaping the nature
and outcome of negotiations. The qualities and level of expertise of international negotiators
have been deemed important in determining whether negotiations proceed smoothly or get mired
by deadlocks and preventable delays (e.g. Citron 1989; Grunert 1989; Lundstedt 1989). Many
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studies have been conducted on international environmental negotiations and researchers have
recommended various negotiating strategies to secure wide participation in the instruments
finally adopted by the negotiating group (e.g. Arend 1990; Barrett 1992a; Botteon and Carraro
1998; Carraro 1997; Chasek 2001; Dupont 1994; Laws 1990; Mautner-Markhof 1989; Susskind
1994; Tussie 2000a; Underdal 1998). Researchers have often broken down the negotiations
process into various phases – a process often referred to as phased process analysis (Chasek
2001 p. 35). While many phases have been postulated in the literature (for a summary, see
Chasek 2001 pp.38-49), a simple one is that provided by Porter and Brown (1991), who consider
that the development of multilateral negotiations involves the following four processes: issuedefinition, fact-finding, bargaining, and regime strengthening. Porter and Brown (1991) have
further categorized negotiating states into four groups, depending on their stance and moves
during international negotiations.10
In delineating the conceptual model underlying this study, I argue that the state of the
world environment, the dynamics of world politics, the science of global environmental change,
and issue area characteristics can be considered as inputs to the processes of international
environmental negotiations, effectively impacting upon the bargaining strategies adopted and the
compromises struck, and thereby determining the content of the final text adopted. Successful
negotiations will result in positive codification of the consensus reached, with stronger

10

Based on Porter and Brown’s definitions, a ‘lead state’ demonstrates a strong commitment to foster international
action on a specific issue, initiates the process of negotiations, makes proposals for an IEA and tries to enlist the
support of other states. A ‘supporting state’ can demonstrate strong commitment during the initial phases of
negotiations or it can be relatively non-committed in the beginning and subsequently moves towards stronger
support. A ‘swing state’ generally lacks enthusiasm for a particular IEA and, as such, often requests for significant
compensation before it supports the cause of the IEA. Finally, a ‘veto state’ is a state which opposes the IEA either
through inflexibility during the negotiations or by failing to respect the treaty clauses during the implementation
phase. Porter and Brown (1991) have documented in detail the different roles played by various countries in the
negotiations pertaining to eight main areas – viz. acid rain; ozone depletion; whaling; trade in ivory from African
elephants; international toxic waste trade; Antarctic minerals; global warming and destruction of tropical forests.
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agreements among the negotiating group resulting in strong clauses and contentious debates
resulting in weak or ambiguous provisions. The content of IEAs, therefore, reflect, more or less,
the parameters governing international environmental negotiations, merely by virtue of the fact
that IEAs are essentially a product of international environmental negotiations.
Since the content of IEAs reflects the dynamics of international negotiations preceding
the adoption of the IEAs, rules governing model-building allow me to make certain assumptions
and simplifications for isolating the determinants of state participation in IEAs. Considering the
IEA as a negotiation outcome and the clauses of the IEA as reflective of the nature and dynamics
of negotiations, I treat as exogenous the various inputs that directly impinge on and determine
the processes of international environmental negotiations, and focus on the end-product of
international environmental negotiations – viz. the IEA as adopted by the international
community. Through this process, I isolate two possible types of explanations for the varying
participation levels in IEAs. The first deals with the structure of the IEAs, and the second relates
to country conditions (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model for Participation in IEAs

This study seeks to provide answers to the following questions: (i) Which state
characteristics can account for the variation observed in the level of state participation in IEAs
worldwide? and (ii) Which treaty clauses act as incentives (or disincentives) for state
participation in IEAs? The dependent variable is ‘participation in IEAs,’ where participation is
defined as ratification, accession, approval, or acceptance (as in Section 1.2 above). This
research is not focused on delineating why states participate in particular IEAs or why IEAs take
on different forms. Rather, the study aims to provide an understanding of why some states
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participate in IEAs to a greater (or lesser) extent than other states, and whether the various legal
forms of IEAs influence the level of participation sustained by the IEAs. As I later discuss in
more detail in Chapter Four, I propose five models to capture the potential relationships, as
detailed below (Figure 1).
In order to delineate the influence of potential determinants of state participation in IEAs,
I make use of basic concepts governing international cooperation to formulate hypotheses
relating a state’s level of participation in IEAs to its domestic characteristics. Using the premise
of Realist and Liberalist theories on international cooperation, especially those strands which
emphasize the national-international linkages (e.g. Bueno De Mesquita et al. 1991; DeSombre
2000; Leeds 1999; Owen 1994 p.926; Putnam 1988; Solingen 1994; Sterling-Folker 1997), I
posit specific associations between identified potential determinants and participation in IEAs.
The first model, the legal-incentives model, is meant to capture the influence of variations
in treaty design on participation levels in IEAs. This model relies on the literature on IEC
dealing with the design and structure of IEAs. This model predicts that IEAs which secure higher
participation rates are those which: (i) are more flexible, (ii) have weaker provisions, (iii) have
provisions for capacity-building, and (v) are transparent. Moreover, since it has generally been
postulated that the legal provisions of IEAs exert a differential impact on developing countries as
compared to developed countries, this model will empirically verify the conditions (e.g. presence
of financial transfers) under which this statement is validated (or contested).
The second model, the power-interest model, reflects arguments made by the Realist
school of thought that states enter into treaties only if the latter enhance their power potential or
reduce their threats and insecurities. This general line of thought predicts that a state will
participate in more IEAs if it (i) has a high level of industrial production and economic
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development; (ii) is politically stable; (iii) has small natural resource base and small extent of
raw materials; (iv) has a high level of environmental vulnerability; and (v) a low military power.
The third model, the liberal-interdependent model, relies on neoliberal institutionalist
literature pertaining to interdependence and institutionalism and focuses on the influence of
global economic trade flows, the role of civic engagement, and the domestic political and
institutional structures of countries as variables influencing their international behavior. This
model predicts that a state will participate in more IEAs if it: (i) is democratic; (ii) has a high
quality of life; (iii) has a liberal economy; (iv) has strong environmental institutions; (v) has
high volumes of trade; and (vi) has a high level of civic environmentalism.
Scholars contend that the current development paths of developing countries imply that
the latter will be the greatest contributors to global environmental problems in the future, and
hence there is a need to enlist their participation for success in implementing global
environmental protection measures. While the importance of securing the participation of
developing countries in IEAs is easily acknowledged, there is no comprehensive empirical work
done to analyze the dynamics of developing countries’ participation in IEAs. Why do some
developing countries participate in more IEAs than others? Are there structural constraints
endemic to the developing countries which prevent them from participating in IEAs? The fourth
model, the developing-logistics model, further deepens the framework of second image
theorizing by focusing specifically on the domestic constraints influencing the participation of
developing countries in IEAs. This model is deemed necessary in view of the fact that
developing countries face special challenges such as high dependence on foreign aid and high
levels of malnutrition, which typically are not present in the developed world. An analysis of
variation of participation among developing countries can thus provide insight into which of
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such socio-political or economic challenges exert overriding influence on the levels of
participation of developing countries in IEAs. This model predicts that the developing countries
which will participate in a greater number of IEAs are those that: (i) have a low level of
corruption; (ii) suffer from a low level of social challenges such as malnutrition, poor sanitation,
or infant mortality; (iii) are more democratic; and (iii) have a low amount of dependence on
foreign aid, inter alia.
Finally, this analysis hopes to move beyond the confines provided by an exclusive focus
on either the Realist or the Liberalist framework, and aims to arrive at an integrated explanation
for participation in IEAs, based on the various models delineated above. Can we explain
participation in IEAs merely from the realist or liberalist framework, or is it subject to an
interactive framework, whereby both realist and liberalist determinants interact? Can the subject
of IEA participation function as a bridge between realist and liberalist concerns? The fifth model
of this study, the interactive model, attempts to bring crucial factors from the power-interest, the
liberal-interdependent, and the developing-logistics models together to arrive at such an
integrated and synthesized understanding of state participation in IEAs.
As explained in further details in Chapter Five, the design of this study follows a
quantitative approach, relying on the technique of multiple linear regression to determine
associations between the dependent and independent variables. For model I, the unit of analysis
is the IEA, and the dependent variable is the total participation rate sustained by the IEA.
Further, to investigate whether treaty design impacts developing country participation
differentially from that of developed countries, the model is also run with two other dependent
variables: the total participation rate from developed countries, and the total participation rate
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from developing countries. For models II, III, IV and V, the unit of analysis is the state, with the
dependent variable being the total number of global IEAs in which the state has participated.
Data for this study was compiled from the ENTRI database of SEDAC/CIESIN. The
ENTRI database provides basic information for 464 treaties. However, not all the treaties can be
classified as ‘environmental’ and many of the IEAs are regional in scope. The database was thus
parsed out to delineate the global IEAs from the regional ones. 110 of such global IEAs were
identified, spanning the period from 1921 to 1998 (see Annex 2). The level of participation of
each country across these IEAs, as compiled from membership data available for each of the
treaties, provides the dependent variable for the models. The total number of countries included
in the dataset for this study is 196, with 152 developing countries and 44 developed nations.
Model I relies on extensive content analysis for the coding of the IEAs based on specific
treaty characteristics. Content analysis of the full range of the 110 identified IEAs was beyond
the scope of this present study. In view of the time and resources constraints governing the
present study, a sample of the IEAs was selected for Model I. In order to maximize the
probability of having a normal distribution for the multiple linear regression analysis, a total of
thirty-one IEAs was selected (Annex 3). Selection bias was minimized by choosing roughly the
same number of IEAs dealing with various issue areas, and including an almost equal number of
framework conventions and protocols (see Section 5.3).

18
1.5 Implications of study
This research consolidates previous efforts made to determine the factors that tend to
enhance (or decrease) states’ participation in IEAs. In this sense, this study directly addresses
the following stipulations of Agenda 21:11
“To identify and address the difficulties which prevent some States, in particular developing countries,
from participating in or duly implementing international agreements or instruments…
To promote and support the effective participation of all countries concerned, in particular developing
countries, in the negotiation, review and governance of international agreements and instruments…”

This research will be immediately useful for its contribution in providing empirical
validation (or contest) of many general and unsubstantiated statements which have been made
regarding countries’ participation in IEAs, and to identify variables, hitherto not investigated,
which impact participation in IEAs. Undertaking this study will also help to fill gaps in the
literature (as identified in the introductory section) dealing with participation in IEAs, and
addresses the calls for future research into IEA participation, as made by Breitmeier (1996),
Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994), Keeley (1990), Helm(2000b) and Carraro (1999), inter alia, by
providing a systematic large-n analysis of both country and IEA characteristics.
Since IEAs function as a primary instrument which allows nations to cooperate on
international environmental matters, a study on participation in IEAs can therefore contribute to
our understanding of the dynamics and determinants of IEC. Moreover, apart from being an
important precursor of IEC, participation in IEAs also acts as an important indicator of the
success of IEC, and several researchers have utilized participation in IEAs as a proxy for
international environmental commitment (Dolsak 2001; e.g. Neumayer 2002a p. 146; also
Neumayer 2002b). Participation in IEAs can thus capture the success of IEC and provide an
indication of the commitment of nation states to a particular set of rules and regulations directed
11

Agenda 21 is a document that was adopted during the Rio Conference in Brazil in 1992. Source of quote: Sections
39.3(a) and 39.3(c) of Agenda 21, accessible online at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21chapter39.htm
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towards a particular aspect of international environmental protection. Especially in this era where
global environmental change is occurring at an unprecedented rate (as further expounded in
Chapter Two), understanding the determinants of IEC remains imperative.
As discussed later in Chapter Two, I also argue that participation in IEAs should also be
significant for the effectiveness of international environmental policies. There can be no
compliance and ultimately no implementation of the international strategies embodied within
IEA texts if there is an inadequate level of international participation in IEAs. An understanding
of participation incentives can thus link directly with the possibility of compliance, and hence
ultimately, on treaty effectiveness. My argument is that if there are domestic structural
constraints which prevent a state from participating in an IEA, the same variables will, in all
likelihood, negatively impact on the implementation and hence effectiveness of the IEA. The
logic is simple enough: if we do not have widespread participation, we cannot hope for
widespread implementation and therefore strong effectiveness. Participation lies at the
foundation of any desired level of implementation and effectiveness.
Furthermore, the successful implementation of new market mechanisms within some
recent IEAs (such as the Montreal Protocol (MP)12 or the KP) rests heavily on the meaningful
participation of both the developed and developing countries. In the case of the KP, for example,
the success of the ‘clean development mechanism’ (CDM), whereby developed parties can earn
emission credits through emission reduction programs in developing parties, is premised on the
participation of the latter. Without the willingness of developing nations to open their production
processes to the modalities of the CDM, overall global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
will not be successfully (and perhaps significantly) reduced, while developing nations will
continue on their unsustainable paths of development. As provided by the KP, the CDM not only
12

Full title: Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer.
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allows for the reduction of GHGs in developing nations by developed states, but it also allows
for developed nations to provide the necessary know-how and technology transfer for developing
nations to implement more environmentally sustainable paths of development.
Though it is not within the scope of the present study to fully test and develop a general
theory governing IEC, it is hoped however that the present study will aid towards the
development of such a theory in later research activities. This study hopes to catalyze the process
by identifying crucial variables from the two main IR theories on international cooperation viz.
Realism and Liberalism, and to integrate these determinants in an integrated model which views
IEC as emanating from both power and institutionalist concerns.
This study will also have important implications for policy prescriptions regarding
international environmental policies as it will empirically verify the influence of key state
variables on a state’s decision to participate (or not) in a particular treaty. Variables acting to
reinforce participation in IEAs can be considered as an ideal set to be achieved globally for
optimal global environmental protection. Global environmental strategies may thus need to be
integrated with policies aimed at improving domestic conditions such that the ideal set of
domestic variables is achieved worldwide. Similarly, variables acting as constraints need to be
managed such that they no longer exert their constraining force on participation in IEAs. This
may likely require policies aimed at strengthening political development, resolving social
challenges, altering the modalities of international transactions to make them more
environmentally friendly and more conducive to promoting international environmental
cooperation, or empowering domestic groups, inter alia.
Finally, this research will be valuable to treaty negotiators and drafters who are interested
in carving out treaty texts that will be most acceptable to as wide an audience as possible. With a
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full understanding of which treaty clauses act as incentives and disincentives for participation,
negotiators can strike out the right balance, through protracted and positive discussions, for
unwilling parties to commit to the codified environmental standards. Such balance may be
achieved, for example, by the right mix of financial and technology transfer, capacity building,
and trading of emissions, inter alia.
1.6 Conclusion
The study of participation in IEAs is still an under-studied field, suffering from the lack
of rigorous empirical analysis as well as from insufficient theoretical construction for the various
determinants of participation. In this chapter I have expounded the research question for this
study, which is as follows: Which country or treaty characteristics exert an impact on a state’s
participation in IEAs? I have established a general conceptual model to understand the various
interactions that can exist among the factors influencing participation. I have also proposed five
different models to analyze the influence of specific country and treaty variables on IEA
participation.
I provide in the next chapter an overview of the reasons why my dependent variable,
participation in IEAs, is legitimate and relevant as an element of investigation and why the topic
of participation needs to be taken seriously in analyzing IEC. In Chapter Three, I provide a
literature review of the research status in the field of IEA participation. Based on the literature
review and relying on the main theories governing international cooperation, I formulate in
Chapter Four the general hypotheses underlying this research. Chapter Five expounds on the
research design, the analytical templates and a general discussion of the results of the study.
Chapter Six presents a general conclusion of the study.

2. WHY STUDY PARTICIPATION IN IEAs?
Increasing participation in treaties concluded by the international community has always
been deemed “desirable.”13 Participation in IEAs was a constant theme in the 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), commonly referred to simply
as the Earth Summit, or the Rio Conference. Agenda 21, a forty-chapter Plan of Action for
global environmental protection adopted during UNCED, recognizes the “essential importance
of the participation in and the contribution of all countries…to treaty making.” 14
The importance of securing wide participation in IEAs has also been underlined by
Maffei et. al. (1996). In the preface to their book Participation in World Treaties on the
Protection of the Environment, Maffei et. al. (1996) note that “[t]oday, wide participation in
international treaties for the protection of the environment – and in particular of developing
countries – is perhaps even more important than the conclusion of new treaties.” Furthermore,
from an International Law perspective, a high level of participation is important since it increases
the probability that the specific treaties may “take on the stature of customary law” (Vig 1999
p.25) or may “generate customary international law upon coming into force” (Carr and Scott
1999 p. 314).
The purpose of this chapter is to explicate the reasons why I consider that participation in
IEAs needs to be studied. In the following sections, I argue that participation is important in view
of its association with several other crucial variables of IEC and global environmental protection.
13

Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifteenth session, May 6-12July 1963. ILC Report,
A/5509 (A/18/9), 1963, Chapter III, paragraphs 18-50. Also available at www.un.org.
14
Agenda 21. Chapter 39. International Legal Instruments and Mechanisms. Section 39.1(c)
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21chapter39.htm
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More specifically, I advance that there are four main reasons which make an analysis of
determinants of state participation in IEAs necessary. First, I argue that participation in IEAs is
important because of the urgent need to address environmental change which is occurring at an
increased rate and on an enlarged scale. Second, I consider that the complex and
interdependent nature of global environmental issues requires that participation in IEAs be
optimal. Third, I posit that the evolution of the dangers posed to our security through the
processes of environmental degradation and environmental scarcity mandate that the
international community cooperate globally to address the impending dangers. Fourth, I argue
that participation is important for the successful operation of IEAs (see Figure 2). Further details
on these issues are presented in the next sections.

Figure 2: Link of Participation in IEAs with other Variables
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2.1 Rapid and Expansive Onset of Environmental Change
At a very basic level, the upsurge in the number of IEAs over the past few decades can be
related to our greater understanding of global environmental processes and risks, and to the
phenomenon of global environmental change. On the international political agenda today,
discussions about global environmental change normally pertain to such issues as global
warming and climate change, deforestation, stratospheric ozone depletion, desertification, loss of
biodiversity, marine water pollution, and acid rain, inter alia.
Though environmental change per se is not a new event, with the present structure of the
world being completely different from that which existed some 300 million years ago (Kutzbach
1989; Mannion 1999 pp. 1, 11; Williamson and Liss 1996 p.29), what is of concern today relates
to three dimensions of the processes of environmental change – namely, (i) the pace of the
change; (ii) the scale of the change; and (iii) the agent of the change. Environmental change in
this era is occurring at an increased pace, with a shift in gear from ecological or geological time
to ‘human time.’ Whereas environmental change was happening over the span of geologic time
in the past, nowadays the time duration can be counted only in centuries or decades, and it is
impossible to adapt to such tremendous changes over short time intervals. According to Hidore
(1996), plant and animal species are becoming extinct at a rate of 24 to 400 species a day and we
may be losing as many as 6000 species of plants and animals a year. As cited in Wood (2000), a
1999 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) report considers that the world has lost thirty per cent of its
natural wealth from 1970 to 1995. In his book Climatic Change and Human Society, Ian Whyte
(1995) states that since the early nineteenth century, carbon dioxide levels have risen by around
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25 per cent from around 280 ppmv15 to about 355 ppmv, a figure which has not been reached in
the last 160,000 years.
The scale dimension of environmental change relates to the impacts of such change,
which have the potential of being reverberated throughout the whole planet. In other words, the
impacts are global or “systemic” (Turner et al. 1990 quoted from Kasperson, 2001 p. 2),
implying that environmental change in one particular area has the capability of influencing
environmental conditions throughout the whole global system. It is for these reasons that global
climate change or ozone depletion is considered to be looming threats for the whole planet (see
Section 2.4 below).
The third dimension of environmental change pertains to the source of the changes. One
of the main characteristics of contemporary global environmental problems is that they can
mostly be classified under Hidore’s (1996) concept of “anthropogenic change,”16 which alludes
agency to human activities (Blowers and Leroy 1996 p. 259; also DeFries and Malone 1989).
For example, though global climate change can occur from several natural processes (e.g. from
the changes in Earth’s rotation around the Sun or from the changes in oceanic circulation – see
Mannion 1999 p. 29), it is generally acknowledged that the release of carbon dioxide from
anthropogenic activities is the major driving force for the increased levels of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere (e.g. IPCC 1995).17 Loss of biodiversity has also been related to anthropogenic
activities resulting in the destruction, alteration and loss of the natural habitats of species (Wood
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i. e. parts per million by volume.
Hidore (1996) classifies global environmental change into the following categories, based upon the various time
duration: (i) persistent change, which takes place steadily for millions of years – for example, the slowing of the rate
of rotation of the Earth and the resulting longer days; (ii) rhythmic change, such as the changes produced by the
revolution of the moon about the earth; (iii) cyclical phenomenon, such as droughts which recur at regular intervals
and with varying intensities; (iv) short-lived events, such as lightning, earthquakes, landslides and avalanches; and
(v) anthropogenic change, resulting mostly from the explosion in human population and from the tremendous
progress made in technology.
17
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
16
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2000 p.5). Blowers and Leroy (1996 p. 259) thus aptly describe the processes of “environmental
globalization” as emanating from the anthropogenic “diffusion of sources,” which relates to the
spread of pollution through industries, technologies, and export of hazardous wastes, inter alia,
as well as through the natural processes of the “unevenness of impacts,” which occur naturally
through air, water and the atmosphere. Blowers and Leroy (1996 p. 259) also point out that
events which seem to be ‘natural’ at first sight often end up as being of anthropogenic origin on
closer examination.
This general consensus on human agency as a main impetus for global environmental
change has resulted in a critical look at man’s production and consumption patterns, with special
focus on the possible repercussions on the carrying capacity of the planet, the ecosystem impacts
of economic policies, and the implications for the health and the survivability of the human
species on the planet (see Section 2.4).
2.2 Complex and Interdependent Nature of Environmental Issues
It is almost uncontentious to state that problems such as ozone depletion or global climate
change require a systemic approach and a global focus for effective global environmental
protection. Researchers routinely agree that there is need for a holistic perspective in carving out
strategies to address global environmental issues. This need for a global commitment strategy is
engendered primarily by the nature of the world environment and of the global environmental
problems. Typically, global environmental problems demonstrate such characteristics as global
interdependence, transboundary impacts, synergistic effects between various issue areas, and the
international corollaries of domestic policies, inter alia. The world environment in fact performs
as one big interdependent system, where the air and water masses mix and interact with each
other. Kupchella and Hyland (1986) say it best:
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…“Without labels and national boundaries it is easier to see that the world is one big system, one thin layer of
atmosphere, one enormous ocean into which all rivers drain, one resource of minerals that all living beings
must share.”

Global interdependence, in so far as environmental issues are concerned, has been amply
manifested by the transboundary impacts of air or water pollution. The 1986 Chernobyl accident
demonstrated irrevocably that pollution is not restricted by jurisdictional or geographical
boundaries. Radioactive fallout spread across former Yugoslavia, France, Italy, Germany,
Scandinavia, and even North America (Cunningham and Saigo 1990). The pervasive nature of
environmental pollution was also tragically established by the 1984 Bhopal disaster, which
claimed thousands of lives in Bhopal, India, through the accidental leakage of the poisonous gas
methyl isocyanate from a Union Carbide pesticide plant operating in the area. And of course,
modern problems such as global climate change or stratospheric ozone depletion will not be
restricted to any one particular region, but will affect the whole Planet. As noted by Harris (2001
p. 26), “global environmental change is one of the most profound manifestations of
globalization.”
Environmental problems are also typified by close interlinks and mutual interactions
among each other. Global warming, for example, is influenced both by the severity of
deforestation and the levels of stratospheric ozone depletion, the latter mostly because
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), an ozone-depleting substance (ODS), also act as a GHG (Barrett
2000 p.123; Schmidt 2000 p. 16). Global warming, on its part, with its manifestation in a rise in
sea level and an increased frequency of extreme weather, can cause nefarious impacts on aquatic
ecosystems and population, such as the Atlantic salmon population.18 Salmon stocks can also be
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negatively impacted through the acidification of the salmon habitat.19 Further, deforestation can
catalyze processes of soil degradation and biodiversity loss (Ross 1996 p. 166).
This close-knit interaction among various elements of the environment is further
strengthened by the fact that domestic policies in a remote area can potentially exert an impact
on the global environment. Several researchers have attempted to elucidate the various
interconnections that exist between domestic environmental policies and global environmental or
economic conditions (e.g. Carraro and Metcalf 2001 p.8). Nash (2000 p.241-249), for example,
has detailed the interrelationships that exist between domestic transport policies and regional
acid rain problems or global warming. Likewise, Barrett (2000 p. 123) has established
interconnections between policies relating to land use or forestation and the extent of climate
change.
Given this interlinked nature of environmental issues, sporadic regional implementation
strategies or selective participation in IEAs may not serve the basic purpose of global
environmental protection and conservation, even though the participating countries may be
highly committed to resolving the issues. However, due to the different stringency levels of
national environmental regulations, the different levels of economic and industrial development,
and the varying extent of natural resource endowments, securing the participation of a specific
country or a specific group of countries may prove crucial for the success of a particular IEA. If
the majority of states participate in an IEA while the greatest contributor to the specific
environmental problem shies away, the efforts of the majority may not be sufficient to
effectively address the environmental problem. For example, the non-participation of US in the
climate change regime means that around 23% of the global emissions of carbon dioxide (the
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share of US’s carbon emissions) will remain outside the purview of the control measures of the
climate regime.
This difficulty has not gone unnoticed by IEA negotiators. In order to cater to this
problem of potential hold-outs from countries which matter most in addressing a specific
environmental problem, some IEAs (e.g. MARPOL 73/7820 or the KP21) specifically require that
stakeholders having significant leverage in the environmental issue become parties to the IEAs
before these can enter into force. However, though some treaties require participation from major
stakeholders before entry into force, the participation of lesser contributors to the environmental
problem will still need to be promoted. Most countries are on a path of material progress which
relies on high levels of industrial development and which, in the process, generate high levels of
pollution. Even though some countries may matter more than others in some specific issue area
for the present, the situation will likely change in the future decades. As the environment is
always in flux, adopting a short-term perspective, whereby only those states which matter most
right now are given attention, is bound to lead to ineffective global environmental protection
policies. To prevent future deterioration of the global environment, a proactive stance needs to be
adopted to mitigate and abate future sources of environmental pollutants emanating from
countries which do not matter right now, but which will in the future. A global strategy is
therefore mandatory to address environmental problems which are global in scope.

20

MARPOL 73/78 required ratification from at least fifteen States, the combined merchant fleets of which would
constitute at least 50% of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant shipping, before the convention could enter into
force.
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Article 25(1) of the KP reads: “This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which
not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at
least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited
their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” Text of the KP is available online at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html.
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2.3 Environmental Security
In recent years, several researchers have called for a reconceptualization of ‘security’ in
view of the potential for the eruption of conflict generated by environmental scarcity or
environmental degradation (e.g. Birnie 1988; Bjorkbom 1988; Brock 1991; Gleick 1993; Hauge
and Ellingsen 2001; Homer-Dixon 1991; Mathews 1989; Matthew 2000; Von Moltke 1988).
According to Brunnee and Toope (1997), scarcity of resources, especially ones which can easily
be degraded or exhausted, has the potential of causing subnational conflict or of negatively
impacting on governmental structures and the lives of citizens. This links with Ullman’s (1983
p.133) definition of a ‘security threat’ as constituting a potential for degradation of the quality of
life and a limitation on available policy choices.
Apart from the above conflict-related concept of environmental security, environmental
degradation also poses risks in terms of the survivability of life on the planet. Official institutions
are increasingly recognizing this survival-based concept of environmental security. A July 2000
report of the Army Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI) recognizes that environmental security
is not restricted to the prevention of damage from war, but also includes threats induced by
ignorance or mismanagement of socio-economic activities, terrorism, migration and natural
disasters. The report lists thirty-two examples of environmental security threats, among which
feature: ozone layer depletion, global climate change, biodiversity loss, deforestation,
desertification, soil erosion, radioactive waste management, oil spill, and water scarcity.22 Other
potential triggers of environmental dangers identified in the literature include, inter alia,
transborder flows of hazardous substances; transboundary air or river water pollution; health
impacts from toxins in food chain; decline in natural capital base (e.g. timber, oil, genetic
22
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diversity, water); and the phenomenon of environmental refugees (Barnett 2001 pp. 68, 69;
DeSombre 2002 pp. 32, 33; Kolk 1996 p. 25; Matthew 1999 p.156).
Starting from the other end of the spectrum, some scholars have analyzed the
environment-security nexus from a peace perspective, which postulates that environmental
cooperation can generate international peace. This falls in line with the general finding regarding
the inverse relationship between war occurrence and participation in treaties. Quoting the study
conducted by Faber and Weaver (1984) on European politics from 1815 to 1915, Vasquez (1998
p. 305) notes that the occurrence of war was found to be inversely related to states’ participation
in conferences and treaties. In the same spirit, Brock (1991 p. 408) notes that the environment
has become “a firmly established item” on the agenda of peace research, with environmental
change regarded as a factor spurring international cooperation and thereby reducing conflicts.
Brock (p.413) sees environmental cooperation as “a means to build peace,” similar to the Baltic
Sea regime, which was instrumental in strengthening East-West cooperation. Brock (p.414) in
fact establishes “a functional equivalence” between war and environmental depletion, with
environmental degradation having the same potential as war in terms of causing loss of lives, and
“negating the claim of national integrity and self-determination.” The idea that IEC can bring
about peace has been further elaborated by Conca (2001 pp. 230-245), who considers that
environmental cooperation can trigger and solidify peace through reducing uncertainty,
promoting “diffuse forms of reciprocity,” strengthening the ‘shadow of the future,’ creating new
forms of interdependence, promoting new norms, strengthening transnational civil society, and
increasing transparency and accountability of governmental institutions (also Conca and Dabelko
2002).
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Based on the arguments presented above regarding the security risks posed by
environmental scarcity and degradation, a cooperative framework for international
environmental protection seems promising as a way to save lives and promote peace. IEAs, by
virtue of their ability to generate and sustain IEC, stand out as a major tool for enhancing global
environmental protection. Widespread participation in IEAs therefore has implications for peace
promotion. As per a 1999 report of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on
environmental security:23
Taking preventive action on environmental stress thus is the most appropriate approach to preventing
environmental conflicts. Such preventive action is needed at all levels, but given that environmental
stresses tend to be rooted in transboundary, regional and global environmental problems, international and
regional environmental agreements play a particularly important role in preventing environmental conflict
[emphasis added].

2.4 Operation of IEAs
2.4.1 Effectiveness of IEAs
International negotiators and treaty drafters usually devote lots of attention and energy to
ensuring maximum participation in the treaties being negotiated. Implicit in such endeavors is
the notion that participation matters for the ultimate effectiveness of the treaties. Ensuring near
global participation in IEAs is the first necessary step towards guaranteeing widespread IEC and
effective implementation of international environmental policies. Participation thus acts as a
necessary precursor for the successful implementation of international environmental strategies.
As stated by Barrett and Stavins (2003 p. 350), “successful implementation requires effective
promotion of compliance and participation [emphasis added].”

23

NATO. Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society. 1999. Environment & Security in an International
Context. Report 232. Brussels, Belgium. Quoted from Joe B. Sills, Jerome C. Glenn, Theodore J. Gordon, and Renat
Perelet. July 2000. Environmental Security: United Nations Doctrine For Managing Environmental Issues In
Military Actions. Volumes I. Army Environmental Policy Institute. AEPI IFP 0700A. Page 9.
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In the IEA implementation time-frame, participation directly influences the effectiveness
potential of IEAs. In realization of this, many treaty secretariats regularly emphasize the
desirability and often, the necessity, of securing maximum participation in the relevant treaties.
As stated by the Secretariat for the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of
Wild Animals (CMS): 24
Agreements concluded under its [CMS] auspices will show positive results only if a large number of
countries whose borders are regularly crossed by migrating animals are bound by common conservation
commitments. For this reason, the conference strongly encouraged more countries to join the Convention, in
order to assume their share of the global responsibility for conserving migratory wild animals [emphasis
added].

The Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
regularly encourages states to ratify or accede to the various treaties falling under its aegis.25
Similarly, the Conference of Parties (COPs) or other regular meetings of treaty bodies often
function as an avenue for treaty bodies to call for increased participation in the relevant treaties.
During the 1992 COP of the Basel Convention26 in Uruguay, for example, the Conference
invited “all States who have not done so to become Party to the Basel Convention.”27 Likewise,
in an attempt to ensure greater participation in the Ramsar Convention,28 the COP negotiated a

24

Source: UNEP/CMS Secretariat. Governments Reinforce Species Conservation Efforts. Bonn Convention World
Conference Highlights serious threats for the survival of migratory animals. Also see: UNEP/CMS Secretariat. 24
March 1997. Review of Article IV: Agreements Concluded Or Under Development. Report presented at the Fifth
Meeting of the Conference of Parties of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,
Geneva 10-16 April 1997. UNEP/CMS/Conf. 5.9.
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See, for example, the 22nd session of the UNEP Governing Council, held in Nairobi, Kenya from 3-7 February
2003, during which delegates were invited to ratify or accede to the Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions. (Source:
UNEP Governing Council takes a number of chemicals-related decisions. ENB Linkages,
www.iisd.ca/recent/recentmeetings)
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Full Title: Basel Convention On The Control Of Transboundary Movements Of Hazardous Wastes
And Their Disposal (22 March 1989, Basel). Text available online at http://www.basel.int/text/con-e.htm
27
Decisions Adopted by the First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention in Piriapolis,
Uruguay on 4 December 1992 Decision I/17 ( http://www.greenpeace.org/~intlaw/baseldec.html 11/6/97)
28
Full title: Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar, 1971).
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protocol29 to the main treaty to include French as authentic language (apart from English) so that
France may be enticed to ratify the treaty. The protocol reads:
The Contracting Parties,
CONSIDERING that for the effectiveness of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
especially as Waterfowl Habitat, done at Ramsar on 2nd February 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Convention”), it is indispensable to increase the number of Contracting Parties, AWARE that the addition
of authentic language versions would facilitate wider participation in the Convention…” [emphasis added].

Participation also enhances IEA effectiveness by reducing the vulnerability of the IEA to
the potential negative impacts on the IEAs caused by the behavior of non-participants (see
Section 2.5.3 for the related problem of free-riding). A concrete example of the negative impacts
of non-participating states’ behavior on the sustenance of a regime is provided by the case of the
North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO). In 1990, NASCO had to develop
special protocols for adoption by non-Contracting parties as the latter were fishing for salmon in
the Convention Area, thereby undermining the conservation efforts of NASCO parties.30
Finally, as mentioned in Section 1.6, the effectiveness of many new market-based
incentives within the most recent IEAs relies on the participation of both the developed and
developing nations. There can be no successful implementation of the CDM of the KP without
commitment to the process by developing nations. Apart from the CDM, the KP also provides
for two other market-based incentives: Joint Implementation (JI) and emissions trading. Both JI
and emissions trading provide for developed nations to earn or acquire credits through emission
reduction programs within other developed nations. Without the participation of the majority of
states in these three market mechanisms, effective implementation of the KP will be substantially
arrested.
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Protocol to Amend the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat
known as the Paris Protocol, adopted at the Extraordinary Conference of the Contracting Parties, Paris, France, 2-3
December 1982. http://www.ramsar.org/key_paris_protocol.htm
30
NASCO. Ten Year Review of the Activities of the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization, 1984-1994.
Page 4.
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2.4.2 Overlap and interdependence among treaties
Wide participation in IEAs is rendered crucial by the fact that many treaties often
regulate the same environmental parameters – especially those for the protection of fauna and
flora, or marine water protection. For example, the importation and exportation of protected
fauna is regulated under both CITES (Articles III-V) and the Convention on Nature Protection
and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (Article IX). Bird protection is ensured
under both CITES and the International Convention for the Protection of Birds. Likewise, the
dumping of organohalogen compounds, mercury, cadmium and their compounds, inter alia, is
prohibited under both the London31 and Oslo32 Dumping conventions. Hence, if a state is party to
one specific treaty but not to another which is closely related, the success of implementation
strategies may not be fully realized.
The above is especially true if the effective implementation of one specific treaty is
dependent on the implementation mechanisms set out in other closely related treaties. For
example, successful implementation of the African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbird Agreement
(AEWA)33 is dependent on the protection of wetlands and the safeguard of biodiversity in these
habitats.34 Hence, domestic implementation of the terms of AEWA is also dependent on the
implementation of the clauses of both the Ramsar Convention and the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD), which deal, inter alia, with the protection of wetlands and the protection of
biodiversity respectively. Ideally, therefore, we would want the same groups of nation states to
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Full title: Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, London,
1972. See Articles 1 and 4.
32
Full title: Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, Oslo, 1972.
See Articles 5 and 6.
33
This agreement, adopted on 16 June 1995, is concerned with the protection of around 172 species of birds which
are ecologically dependent on wetlands for at least part of their annual cycle.
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UNEP/CMS Secretariat. 24 March 1997. Review of Article IV: Agreements Concluded or Under Development.
Report presented at the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of Parties of the Convention on the Conservation of
Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Geneva 10-16 April 1997. UNEP/CMS/Conf. 5.9.
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commit to all of these treaties to facilitate integrated implementation and close coordination of
strategies.
In increasing recognition of these interconnections among various IEAs, it is a common
feature nowadays to witness treaty bodies endeavoring to link and coordinate their strategies in
order to better resolve the relevant environmental problems. For example, a 1996 report of the
Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) established the Baltic Sea Area (delineated under Article 1 of
the 1992 Baltic Sea Convention35) as a Special Area under Annex I of the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (also known as MARPOL 73/78). The
report further issued a call for close coordination of policies and collaboration among countries,
stating: 36
…Since none of the States alone can establish and keep in preparedness the necessary resources of vessels,
personnel and equipment to cope with major oil spills, cooperation and mutual assistance between States is
necessary.

In the same fashion, during the twelfth session of the Global Biodiversity Forum, held
during the 1998 meeting of the COP to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
(CCD), discussions pertained specifically to the synergies between the CCD and the treaties
relating to biodiversity protection.37 Linkages have also been established between climate
change, biodiversity and desertification.38
2.4.3 Problem of free-riding and the economic implications of participation
The global environment can be characterized by its property of ‘non-excludability’
(Barkin and Shambaugh 1999 p.5; DeSombre 2002 p. 21), which means that every state is free to
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Full title: Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (Helsinki, 1992). Full
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Source: HELCOM. April 1996. Protection of the Baltic Sea – results and experiences. Page 24.
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GBF 12-Dakar. Linking the Biodiversity and Desertification Agendas, 4-6 December 1998. Dakar, Senegal.
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World Resources Institute. www.wri.org/wri/wri/biodiv/gbf
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consume it or to enjoy the benefits accruing from increased global protection measures
implemented by other states. In the case of IEAs, free-riding becomes a persistent problem due
to the fact that it is impossible to prevent countries which do not participate in the IEAs to freely
benefit from an enhanced global environment emanating from the protection measures
implemented by the parties to the IEAs. Finus (2001 p.14) thus rightly considers that IEAs are
“typically plagued” by free-riding. This free-riding has the potential of thwarting the efforts of
others committed to protecting the resource, and is considered to be among one of the factors
that tend to prevent full participation and compliance (Barrett and Stavins 2003 p. 350).
Moreover, if enough states decide to free-ride, the whole regime may collapse (DeSombre 2001
p. 191). According to Desombre, this tendency to free-ride makes participation in IEAs “more
important than in some other situations of international cooperation” (DeSombre 2001 p. 190;
DeSombre 2002 p. 21).
Less than full participation in IEAs also entails economic implications. Within the
context of the UNFCCC, for example, the “number and identity” of participating countries have
an influence on the costs of emission reductions (Carraro 2002 pp. 5, 14), with a higher
participation rate resulting in reduced implementation costs for all party members as well as
increased abatement emissions. Carraro (2002 p. 14) therefore argues that “strategies that
increase the size and the number of participating countries also increase the environmental and
cost-effectiveness” of agreements. Barrett and Stavins (2003 p.351) also recognize that for “costeffective implementation” of IEAs, full participation is required so that marginal costs can be
equally distributed across all countries (also Barrett 2000).
Incomplete participation also hampers trade and increases transaction costs (Barrett 2000
pp.123-139). If we consider as example the KP, less than full participation can give rise to what
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is known as the “leakage problem” (Barrett 2000 p.133; Barrett and Stavins 2003; Hoel 2001 p.
178), which refers to an increase in emissions in non-Annex I39 countries due to a fall in prices of
carbon-intensive fuels as participating countries reduce their emissions and cause prices of these
fuels to fall. In this sense, less than full participation works against the effectiveness of the KP.
Moreover, lack of worldwide coordination of environmental regulations can become “a
source of trade distortion” if some countries decide to use their environmental policies as a
“hidden trade barrier” (Gabel and Folmer 2000 p. xxiv). For enforcement measures such as trade
restrictions to work, there need to be enough participants for the threat to be credible. In Barrett
and Stavins’s (2003 p. 365) words, “[t]he greater is the rate of participation, the more credible is
the threat to restrict trade.” Sand (1991 p. 247) has documented the initial difficulty faced by the
OECD while negotiating a regional treaty to control for the transboundary shipment of hazardous
wastes. While the OECD succeeded in securing a higher level of cooperation and consensus than
would be possible under an international framework, it was also evident that the regional treaty
would have “an undesired spillover effect, reorienting trade flows to countries outside the region
that were unlikely to abide by OECD-imposed regulation.” The OECD finally had to accept a
weaker agreement in the form of the 1989 Basel Convention, which was open for participation
by all sovereign states of the world.
2.5 Conclusion
In the introductory paragraphs of this chapter, I posed the question: Why is there a need
to study state participation in IEAs? I have proposed four main reasons why participation
matters. I have argued that participation is important because of: (i) the increased pace and the
extensive scale of global environmental change; (ii) the transboundary and global nature of
39
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environmental issues; (iii) the operation of IEAs, which relies on wide participation for the
effective implementation of IEA provisions, the reduction of free-riding and the coordination of
strategies for highly interdependent IEAs; and (iv) the economic implications of less than
optimal participation. Having established the legitimacy and need of studying participation, I
now move forward to review the literature governing the current state of research into the field of
participation in IEAs. The next chapter provides such a review.

3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON PARTICIPATION IN IEAs
In Chapter One, I formulated the main thesis of this research: to analyze the potential
determinants of state participation in IEAs by focusing on state and treaty variables. The purpose
of this chapter is to review the literature on state participation in IEAs and to provide an analysis
of the limitations of current research in the field. A look at the various studies conducted on
participation in IEAs shows that several determinants of participation have been identified by
researchers. Most of the analyses have been conducted within the framework of environmental
economics, which has heavily relied on applications of game theory to explain state participation
in IEAs. Despite the predominance of the game-theoretic framework, the study of state
participation in IEAs has also benefited from other approaches.
However, in view of the ad hoc way in which the theme of participation has been
approached, due mostly to a reliance on a set of very broad and general theories, it is not possible
to organize this review section based on the various theories governing IR. In the sections that
follow, I have therefore organized the literature in such a way as to highlight the various
potential determinants of participation identified in the literature. In some instances, studies
pertaining to states’ international environmental commitments have been included in view of the
fact that participation in specific IEAs was used to operationalize the international commitments.
As I go about discussing the identified variables, the various theoretical frameworks are
addressed in an interdependent fashion as they arise. Moreover, to facilitate the discussions, I
divide this chapter into two parts: Part I dealing with state variables; and Part II dealing with IEA
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variables. I conclude this chapter with a critique of the current state of knowledge into IEA
participation and provide a synopsis of the contribution to be brought about by the present study.
3.1 Part I: State Characteristics
3.1.1 Structure and Stability of Political Structures
Various studies have pointed to the fact that domestic political structures have an
influence on the level of states’ international commitments as well as on the substance of
multilateral regimes. According to Congleton (2001 p.253), different types of political structures
command varying demand levels for domestic and international environmental regulations.
Democracies and dictatorships are deemed to differ in their preferences for environmental
standards, with authoritarians preferring lower environmental standards than their democratic
colleagues who are considered to be motivated by the median voter.40 Further, liberal regimes are
also more “likely to find international agreements along similar lines [i.e. stringent
environmental standards] to be in their interest” (Congleton 1992 p.412). Thus, Congleton (2001
p. 258) concludes that, ceteris paribus, “[d]emocracies will be more inclined to sign and
implement environmental treaties than dictatorships,” with the latter requiring positive
inducements (e.g. direct cash or in-kind transfers) to participate in the IEAs. Based on these
findings, Congleton (1992 p. 421) predicts that IEAs will attract a higher level of participation as
the number of democratic regimes increases worldwide.
Several other studies have similarly posited a positive relationship between democracy
and treaty ratification. Based on their analysis of states’ ratification delays of the UNFCCC (used
40
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want to attract a majority.”
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as a proxy for a state’s level of commitment to the UNFCCC provisions), Fredriksson and
Gaston (2000 pp.347, 357, 361) conclude that nations with greater civil liberties ratified the
treaty sooner than those with low civil liberties. Neumayer’s (2002a p. 156) study on the
influence of democracy on international environmental commitments also proves that there is
“strong evidence” that “democracies exhibit stronger international environmental commitment
than non-democracies,” even though, as per Neumayer, the link between democracy and
environmental outcome (e.g. soil degradation or carbon dioxide emissions) may not be as clear.
Based on this finding, Neumayer (2002a) predicts that a vulgarization of democratic ideals
around the globe will result in increased international environmental commitment, echoing
Congleton’s (1992) reflection on this issue, as mentioned above.
Payne (1995) has attempted to provide a rationale for the ways in which democracy can
be beneficial for the environment. Payne argues that democratic countries tend to favor
environmental protection because of (i) various types of freedoms guaranteed by democracies
viz. freedom of citizens to lobby their governments; freedom of the press; freedom of speech;
freedom to gather and disseminate information; and other types of political liberties; (ii) regime
responsiveness and regime accountability, as ensured through the electoral process; (iii) political
learning engendered through the free flow of information and global market forces; (iv)
internationalism marked by participation in international institutions and the freedom of
transnational pressure groups to freely carry out their activities; and (v) open markets.
However, Payne’s hypotheses are mostly based on conjecture and anecdotal evidence,
with no empirical testing. Midlarsky (1998 p. 344) has questioned this “hypothesized positive
relationship” between democracy and the environment. Midlarsky (1998 p. 344) contends that
Payne’s thesis represents an “idealization of democracy that ignores the rough and tumble of

43
actual decision-making within the legislative and executive branches of government.” Based on
his multivariate analysis of several environmental variables (e.g. carbon dioxide emissions, soil
erosion by water and chemicals, protected land area, and freshwater availability, among others)
on three different measures of democracy (viz. Gastil, 1988; Bollen, 1993; and Jaggers and Gurr,
1995), Midlarsky (p. 358) finds that “there is no uniform relationship between democracy and
the environment.” Although Midlarsky’s choice of environmental indicators all pertain to the
domestic domain, the result is enlightening in that it establishes that democracy does not
necessarily lead to better environment. Thus, if we use Congleton’s (1992 p. 412) earlier
argument that states choose international environmental standards more in line with their
domestic ones, it is not necessarily evident that democracies will want to participate in IEAs
which are legally mandating higher environmental standards than their domestic ones.
Other researchers have focused on the structure of the governmental system as an
explanatory variable for a state’s level of environmental commitment. Dolsak’s (2001 p. 426)
analysis on states’ commitment levels to mitigating global climate change shows that
parliamentary systems face lower “political costs of environment/energy tradeoffs” than
presidential systems. Recchia’s (2002) analysis of the participation of nineteen democracies in
fifteen IEAs tests four different theories viz. structural constraint theory, political institutional
theory, idea-based theory, and interconnectivity theory, to determine causal factors for the
varying levels of international environmental commitments of stable democracies. Recchia finds
that the “value orientations of the citizenry” and “executive dominance” – key elements of the
idea-based theory and the institutional theory respectively – provide the strongest explanations
for the international environmental behavior of the countries analyzed. Moreover, Recchia (pp.
487, 488) finds that states with a higher pollution load do not necessarily participate in more
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IEAs, while states with “strong executive-centered ratification power” stand more chance of
participating, especially when “citizen’s demands for international environmental protection are
solid.”
The political stability of a regime has also been deemed crucial for a state’s ability to
sustain international cooperation. According to Maoz and Russett (1993 p. 908), the political
stability of a state is associated with the “persistence of its regime in years” and the longer that a
political regime exists “without fundamental change,” the more likely that norms of political
conduct will develop that will “form and influence the foreign policy codes of conduct of the
regime.” It is common wisdom that political contestation occurring within the shadow of
impending elections is typically characterized by politicians who notoriously focus on policies
with short-term benefits, with no regard for the long-term horizon. As stated by DeSombre (2000
p. 152), “[t]rading uncertain future harm for certain current benefits is a common political
choice.” Thus, changes in government may induce policy reversals which may renege on prior
commitments to international environmental cooperation (Caldwell 1988 pp. 13-28).
Major political destabilization brought about by political corruption or civil wars is also
significant in impairing the state of the environment or in constraining choices for effective
implementation of environmental policies. The predominance of civil wars in Africa has been
identified as a causal factor for the ineffective implementation of natural resources management
policies (Brinkerhoff and Cage 2002 p.101; Mallya and Talbott 1990; O'Keefe et al. 1991).
Morrell and Poznanski (1985 p. 165) contend that widespread corruption in many developing
countries prevents the latter from implementing effective strategies for environmental protection.
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3.1.2 Level of Development
It has generally been noted that the level of economic development is related to the
environment (e.g. Asthana and Shukla 2002 p. 271; Evans 2000 pp. 42-63; Hurrell and
Kingsbury 1992; Von Prittwitz 1990), with the general notion that developed countries have
stronger environmental protection policies than developing states. Young (1982 p. 739), for
example, considers that the incidence of “negotiated orders” is greater in “advanced
industrialized societies” which are “highly developed and not severely constrained in functional
terms.” According to Desombre (2000 p.2), countries with “advanced environmental protection
policies” are more involved in internationalizing their domestic environmental regulations –
which implies that the developed countries (e.g. EU countries, Canada, Norway, US) will more
likely participate in IEAs than the developing ones.
Income levels are deemed to be related to environmental quality through the notion that
environmental quality is a ‘luxury’ or ‘superior’ good (e.g. Schulze and Ursprung 2001b pp. 27,
42). The richer and developed countries of the North are considered to value environmental
quality more than the developing countries (Schulze and Ursprung 2001b p.28), whereas low
incomes have been associated with a “high degree of tolerance to environmental hazard” and a
low willingness to pay for improved environmental quality (Rauscher 2001 p. 148). This line of
reasoning also argues that the population in developed countries exert greater pressure on their
governments to enforce environmental protection (Ervin 2001 p.85; Sage 1996). Fredriksson and
Gaston (2000 p. 357) find that though larger economies tend to have higher total pollution levels,
they exhibit shorter delays in ratifying the UNFCCC due to greater internal or external political
pressure to ratify the treaty. Neumayer (2002a; 2002b p. 823) has also shown that per capita
income has a positive relationship with a country’s willingness to ratify or sign IEAs. Focusing
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on a world systems theoretical perspective, Roberts et. al. (2004 p. 56) have demonstrated that
“larger, wealthy, “core” countries tend participate in more IEAs than do very small and/or poor,
“peripheral” countries.”
The relationship between income levels and environmental quality has also been
analyzed through what is generally known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), based on
Kuznet’s research on income inequality across developing countries, which posits that as per
capita income rises, income inequality initially rises, and then subsequent falls (Jha and Whalley
2001 pp. 228-230; Schulze and Ursprung 2001a). The EKC hypothesis suggests the following
relationship between demand for environmental quality and per capita income: as per capita
income rises, pollutant levels (e.g. sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, carbon
monoxide, carbon dioxide, CFCs, etc.) per capita rise, and then fall after a threshold level is
reached, yielding what has been widely termed as the ‘inverted U-relationship’ (Perrings 2001
p.321). However, there are many researchers who have contested the applicability of the EKC
hypothesis, arguing, for example, that “there appears to be nothing automatic about this relation”
(Jha and Whalley 2001 p. 230), or that the hypothesis applies only to certain air pollutants (e.g.
sulfur dioxide emissions) and not to other environmental problems such as deforestation (for
critiques see Jha and Whalley 2001 pp. 228-230).
It is widely acknowledged that the developed and developing nations face different
aspirations where environmental protection is concerned (e.g. Wells 1996), an asymmetry often
reflected in the North-South (N-S) 41 conflict in international environmental negotiations. At the
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root of this N-S divide, according to some analysts, lies the fact that the nature of environmental
problems in developing countries is not the same as that in the developed countries (e.g. Jha and
Whalley 2001 p. 217). Protecting the environment in the developing countries is viewed, most
often than not, as a struggle between the environment and meeting immediate socio-economic
needs for daily subsistence (Atkinson 1991; Ledec 1985; Miller 1991). Barbier (2001 p. 242)
notes that whereas environmental problems in the developed world are understood mostly in
terms of “conventional pollution problems” such as pollutant discharges or emissions, in the
developing world, environmental problems tend to be associated with “uninternalized
externalities” and environmental ‘degradation,’ which carry different economic and
environmental implications than those from emissions or pollutant discharges. Such
‘degradation’ problems include deforestation, desertification, soil erosion, congestion, depletion
of fisheries stocks, improper solid waste disposal, urban congestion, and environmental and
health problems such as infectious diseases, poverty, untreated water, low sanitation, and
watercourses polluted with untreated sewage discharges, inter alia (Barbier 2001 p. 242).
Tussie (2000b p.1) also makes such a distinction when she differentiates between the
“Northern” or “green agenda” characterized by issues such as climate change, biodiversity, and
fisheries, and the “Southern” or “brown” agenda dominated by drinking water, poverty
alleviation, trade, market access, technology transfer or flows of development assistance. Tussie
(2000b) further considers that the concept of sustainable development connotes different
meanings for the developed and developing countries, with the former associating it with
“meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs,” and the latter equating it to poverty alleviation and future
economic development. Rosenberg (1994 pp. 129,130) suggests that poverty in the South,
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coupled with the “fiscal austerity and protectionism in the North,” has resulted in the fact that the
“sustainable development bandwagon has thus far been characterized by inaction and more than
a little hot air.”
3.1.3 Power of States and Environmental Vulnerability
Within the field of IEC, the overall power potential of a state has to include
considerations of the level of vulnerability to transboundary environmental and ecological
disturbances. Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1998 p. 13) have used a combination of the concept of
maximization of self-interest and the game-theoretic framework of a unitary rational actor model
to build an ‘interest-based theory’ of international environmental regulation. Sprinz and
Vaahtoranta (p.14) focus on two domestic factors to explain nations’ support for international
environmental regulation: a country’s level of ecological vulnerability towards pollution, and the
economic costs of pollution abatement. They argue that countries which are ecologically
vulnerable and have low abatement costs tend to participate more in IEAs than those with low
ecological vulnerability and high abatement costs. Similarly, Helm (2000a p. 134) considers that
non-signatories of the Helsinki Protocol tend to be countries which “are either substantial net
emission exporters or have a low ecological vulnerability.” This ties in with Recchia’s (2002 p.
483) finding that polluted democracies do not necessarily ratify more treaties. Similarly, Mitchell
(2003 p. 449) considers that countries with high ecological vulnerability and low adjustment
costs tend to participate in more IEAs than those that have low vulnerability and high costs
The traditional association of state power with military prowess is reshuffled in the
domain of IEC. Researchers often talk about a new form of power – viz. the “power to destroy”
(DeSombre 2002 pp. 15, 181; Downie 1999), where large developing countries become
‘powerful’ in the sense that they muster the power to potentially destroy the environment due to
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their future development paths. Due to this new “power to destroy,” developing countries can
dictate the terms of their participation in IEAs. Developing states also become ‘powerful’ in the
sense that they possess resources which the international community is intent on protecting, and
thus they can prescribe the terms of access to these resources or the international protection
strategies being envisaged (DeSombre 2002 p. 181).
The effects of population growth have been linked to increased environmental
degradation triggered by the greater pressures on land and other resources, and an erosion of the
environmental carrying capacity (Markandya 2001 p. 198). On the other hand, low population
density implies less vulnerability since there are less people affected by environmental problems
(Rauscher 2001 p. 148). However, the exact role of population growth in engendering
environmental degradation has often been contested, with some scholars (e.g. Markandya 2001
pp. 198-200) contending that population growth can result in increased productivity. This is
often known as the Boserup hypothesis, which argues that with scarcity of land relative to labor,
there ensues an intensification of agriculture and increased productivity per unit area (Boserup
1965 quoted from Markandya, 2001 p. 198).
3.1.4 Non-state Actors
It is well-established that non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have an influential role to play in raising environmental awareness among the public, in
agenda-setting at either national or international levels, and in the various stages of regime
formation (e.g. Bramble and Porter 1992; Feld et al. 1994; Handl 1991; Lindborg 1992;
McMahon 1993; Porter and Brown 1991; Princen and Finger 1994; Raustiala 1997; Rittberger
2000; Stairs and Taylor 1992; Wapner 2000). The influence of NGOs in the field of state
participation in IEAs has been studied as well. Roberts et. al .(2004 p. 28), for example, use the
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total number of NGOs as a proxy for the strength of a state’s civil society and for the level of
environmental pressure brought to bear on the state. Their results show that the total number of
NGOs (among other factors such as the narrowness of national export base and the voice and
accountability of citizens) in a state has a significant influence on the state’s participation in
IEAs (Roberts et. al. p. 39). They thus conclude that “institutional and grassroots
democratization” are important for commitment to IEAs (p. 45). Gulbrandsen and Andresen
(2004 p. 57) also find that NGOs can play important roles in supporting and calling for
ratification of treaties. Similarly, Raustiala (1997 p. 731) assigns the role of ‘facilitators of
ratification’ to NGOs.
3.1.5 Trade Openness
It has been argued that trade openness is “good for the environment” and that it can foster
IEC (e.g. Antweiler et al. 2001 p. 878). In his analysis of the effect of trade openness on IEC,
Neumayer (2002b p. 830) finds that there is “some evidence that general trade openness
promote[s] multilateral environmental cooperation.” However, though trade liberalization can
provide benefits to the environment, this relationship does not happen “automatically” (Brack
1995 p. 501). According to Brack, appropriate policies will need to be implemented to make
trade regimes more conducive to environmental protection.
Moreover, the relationship between trade openness and increased potential for IEC is not
straightforward either. The expansion of trade can have negative environmental repercussions
such as higher release of air or water pollutants, the introduction of invasive plant and animal
species which can negatively impact local species, or to the depletion of natural resources, inter
alia (Brack 1995 p. 499; Copeland and Taylor 1994; Ervin 2001 p.85; Tussie 2000b p.1).
Copeland and Taylor (1994 pp. 756, 757, 781) have further demonstrated that the effects of
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economic growth on pollution are not the same in an autarky and in a free trade regime. They
find that “economic growth in autarky has no effect on pollution levels, but economic growth in
a trading environment can raise pollution levels” (p. 756).
Developing countries are often considered to be more vulnerable to the negative impacts
of trade liberalization (Ervin 2001 p. 94). It has been commonly stated that bigger and more
powerful countries can significantly influence world prices “through their trade and
environmental policies” while smaller economies take these as “given” (Schulze and Ursprung
2001b p.17; Steinberg 1997 p. 232). It is also often feared that free trade might result in
“environmental dumping,” which refers to the possibility that all countries might relax their
environmental policies and standards in order to gain competitive advantage in the promotion of
their products (Carraro 2001 p. 348; Schulze and Ursprung 2001a p.45). According to Schulze
and Ursprung (2001b p. 42), trade liberalization may “decrease the welfare of the country with
high preferences for environmental quality.” The trade-environment debate also includes
arguments suggestive of the relocation of industries to those countries with lax environmental
standards, dubbed as ‘pollution havens,’ in order to maximize competitiveness (Carraro 2001 p.
348; Esty 2001 p. 121). However, the evidence for this ‘race to the bottom’ is widely considered
to be ‘mixed’ or unconvincing (e.g. see Esty 2001 p. 124; Schulze and Ursprung 2001a p. 61).
Finally, the trade-environment debate brings contention pertaining to issues of fairness
and equity. As epitomized in Rauscher (2001 p. 148), if we accept the logic of trade combined
with economic theories pertaining to the law of comparative advantage, toxic wastes should be
stored or treated where the environmental costs are low – that is, in poor and under-populated
areas (Rauscher 2001 p. 148). Terms such as ‘toxic colonialism’(Hilz and Radka, 1990) have
indeed been used to refer to industrialized countries’ strategies of dumping their toxic wastes in
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developing countries, which often might not have the means or facilities to manage these
hazardous wastes safely (also Dasgupta and Maler 1994). Perceptions of inequities and
unfairness certainly accounted for the failure of the Basel Convention in enlisting the
participation of the majority of developing countries, who ultimately negotiated their ‘own’
hazardous waste treaty in the form of the Bamako Convention.42
3.2 PART II: IEA Design
Regime Design Matters. This title of Mitchell’s 1994 article clearly captures the general
recognition in the literature on IEC of the importance of the design of IEAs as a “crucial”
determinant of participation in IEAs, as well as a significant factor influencing the “stability and
global efficiency” of the environmental coalition (Finus 2001 pp. 236, 238; Helm and Sprinz
2000; Helm 2000b p. 164; Sand 1992; Schmidt 2000). In the case of the UNFCCC, for example,
Barrett and Stavins (2003 p. 366) note that the architecture of the climate change regime can
influence both participation and compliance.
The current state of research into IEA design points to the following factors as being
most influential in impacting state participation: (i) the flexibility of the agreements; (ii) the
strength of the IEA provisions; and (iii) participation incentives. Moreover, various researchers
have analyzed the influence of the minimum ratification clause, also commonly known as the
threshold number, on the level of participation in IEAs. Details on each of these potential
determinants of participation are provided below.

42

Full title: Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement
and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Bamako, 1991.
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3.2.1 Flexibility of the IEA
Most IEAs provide party members with the possibility of entering into reservations, of
opting out of certain clauses, or of completely withdrawing from the treaties. It is generally
agreed that allowing reservations tends to favor participation because it increases the flexibility
of the IEAs (Harvard Law Review 1992). On the other hand, disallowing of reservations, while
effective in maintaining the desired strength of the IEAs, may nevertheless work against high
rates of participation by being inflexible and by not meeting the needs of potential party
members. As stated by DeSombre (2002 p. 11):
Although many complain about opt-out provisions in regulatory treaties, the fact that no state can be bound
by international law against its will makes them a necessary evil. Without them few states would agree to
regulation created by less than unanimous voting.

Similarly, encouraging flexible means of dispute resolution (e.g. through negotiations)
tends to appeal to a wider audience than strict requirements for recourse to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). The 1963 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes, negotiated under the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage,
succeeded in securing only two parties as at September 2003, compared to the thirty-two parties
to the parent treaty.43 Under the Optional Protocol, all disputes arising under the parent treaty are
to be dealt “within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice” (Article 1),
unless the parties agree to alternate measures within a period of two months after notification of
the dispute.44 The low rate of participation in the Optional Protocol may be due to the general
unpalatability within the international community of submitting disputes to the ICJ, or due to the
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Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development. 2003/2004.
http://www.greenyearbook.org/agree/nuc-saf/civillia.htm
44
Text of the parent treaty and the optional protocol available online at
http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/acrc/ProtVienna.txt.html or at the IAEA site at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1996/inf500.shtml.
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inflexible language of the text of the Protocol, connoted, for example, by the word
“compulsory.”
3.2.2 Strength of IEAs
Several researchers have argued that the stricter the requirements of an IEA, the less
likely it is that countries will participate in the IEA (e.g. see Schmidt 2001 p. 214), and freeriding incentives will prevail (Finus 2001 p. 279). Carraro (1999b p. 9), for example, notes that
those treaties which are “rather empty in terms of quantitative targets and/or deadlines” tend to
enlist greater participation than those with precise commitments. Likewise, Finus (2001 p.314)
considers that more countries sign IEAs which are meant to “achieve little.” In his analysis of the
UNFCCC, Barrett (2000 p. 119) considers that the UNFCCC benefited from earlier ratification
and entry into force than the KP because it did not require any “particular target by any particular
date.”
3.2.3 Participation Incentives
Recently, calls for increased membership in IEAs have been further qualified to include
specific encouragements for developing countries to participate in the treaties. Two types of
incentives are mentioned in the literature: positive incentives, such as side-payments and
financial or technical assistance; and negative incentives such as external threats and trade
restrictions (Barrett and Stavins 2003 pp. 361-367; Underdal 1998 p. 106). Many IEAs do
recognize the fact that the special needs of developing countries need to be taken into
consideration, and that developed nations need to provide financial and technical assistance to
allow the developing states to comply with their international environmental obligations without
jeopardizing their development needs (Caldwell 1988; Chasek 2000; Evans 2000).
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Principle 9 of the Stockholm Declaration45 recognizes that conditions of
underdevelopment and natural disasters lead to environmental deficiencies which can be
improved by rapid development fostered by the transfer of financial and technological assistance
to supplement the domestic effort of the developing countries. The most recent IEAs (e.g. the
MP, the UNFCCC, and the CBD)46 contain special provisions for financial assistance,
technological transfer, technical support and scientific collaboration. Both the UNFCCC and the
CBD mention that the extent to which developing countries succeed in implementing their
commitments under the conventions depends, in the first instance, on the developed countries’
fulfillment of their obligation to provide financial and technological assistance. Developed
countries are held responsible for the proper implementation of the CBD by the developing
countries, thus attesting to the worldwide acceptance of the necessity for compensating the
developing world for their efforts to preserve and conserve their natural resources.

45

Principle 9 reads: “Environmental deficiencies generated by the conditions of under-development and natural
disasters pose grave problems and can best be remedied by accelerated development through the transfer of
substantial quantities of financial and technological assistance as a supplement to the domestic effort of the
developing countries and such timely assistance as may be required.” Text of the Declaration is accessible online at
http://www.unep.org.
46
Further details on the provisions are as follows: (i) the Montreal Protocol (1987) - Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2
of the Protocol allow developing countries a moratorium of ten years to comply with control measures and
implement the quantitative targets and also allow them quick access to alternative technology; moreover, the MP
requires the developed countries to disburse funds to meet the incremental costs incurred by the developing world in
adapting technology to reduce the emissions of ozone-depleting substances (ODS); (ii) the Convention for the
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution (Barcelona, 1976) recognizes that priority needs to be given
to the developing countries in the Mediterranean region for provision of technical cooperation in the field of marine
pollution.( Re: Article 12(3)); (iii) the Climate Change Convention - Article 12(7) requires the Conference of Parties
(COP) to arrange for the provision of technical and financial assistance for reporting requirements and for
implementing projects and measures adopted under Article 4 of the Convention;46 and (iv) the Convention on
Biological Diversity recognizes the special needs of developing countries for research and training, exchange of
information, technical and scientific cooperation for implementing the Convention. The Convention also includes
special provisions for the participation of developing countries in biotechnological research activities and for access
to the results and benefits of biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided by the developing countries
(Article 19, paragraphs 1, 2). Article 20 also stipulates that developed parties shall help developing countries meet
incremental costs incurred to them in the implementation of the obligations of the Convention.
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3.2.4 Minimum Ratification Clause
The minimum ratification clause, often also called the threshold number or the n-rule
(Black et al. 1993 p. 281), normally specifies the total number of ratifications that are needed for
a treaty to enter into force. The minimum ratification clause has been considered as an “internal
stabilization” instrument, making participation “contingent” on the participation of others
(Schmidt 2001 p. 220). Black et. al. (1993) have analyzed the threshold number “as an
instrument to create incentives” for IEC, and they report that the threshold number helps to
increase participation in IEAs while deterring free-riding (also Barrett 2000 p. 137; Carraro et al.
2003). In this sense, the threshold number is seen as being important in making cooperation more
profitable (e.g. Black et al. 1993) and more stable by decreasing the number of free-riders and
increasing the number of signatories (Carraro et al. 2003). However, Schmidt (2001 p. 220)
warns that “the more successful the minimum ratification clause is in making a large number of
countries sign the agreement, the greater are the incentives to breach it afterwards.”
3.3 Critique of current state of research and proposals for advancement of knowledge
As mentioned in Chapter One and as detailed in the preceding sections, environmental
economics has had much to contribute to the field of state participation in IEAs. The gametheoretic framework has been used extensively to explain environmental coalitions and
participation in IEAs. These economic analyses have focused on country characteristics as well
as on the structure and design of IEAs as potential determinants of participation.
However, though these econometric analyses have contributed positively to our
understanding of IEC, they suffer from several limitations, many of which have been recognized
by the environmental economists themselves. The econometric explanations, for example, often
“rely on ad hoc arguments rather than on scientific and empirical foundations” (Finus 2001 p.
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105), and most of the research is deemed to be ‘theoretical’ rather than relying on ‘observation’
or empirical insights. Moreover, the econometric models are highly “stylized,” being based on
“simplifying assumptions” to apply two-player models to large N situations, or to extrapolate
findings based on the homogeneity of countries to heterogeneous countries (Finus 2001 p.12;
Helm 2000a p.2). These far-ranging assumptions often diminish the utility of the analyses since
the findings are not directly transportable to the general field of global environmental policy
formulation. As rightly noted by Jeppesen and Andersen (1998 p. 80), while the games used in
Game Theory (e.g. Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken Game) may be useful as “analytical and
theoretical instruments,” they are nevertheless “distant from reality” when it comes to actual
negotiation and cooperative processes. The final results of econometric analyses often therefore
necessitate disclaimers on the applicability of the results to actual policy formulation, an example
of which is Schmidt’s (2000 p. 193) following statement:
The results of this analysis have been derived using highly stylized models. In the light of the various
simplifications there clearly are limitations to the scope of the present study. The findings therefore cannot
be directly applied to real-world political decision-making and have to be interpreted with some caution.

Another example is Barrett’s (1994 p.879) following listing of his assumptions for his
study on self-enforcing IEAs:
By necessity, the analysis imposes a number of restrictive assumptions, and the above result must be seen
in the light of these. The most important assumptions are: (1) that all countries are identical; (ii) that each
country’s net benefit function is known by all countries, and known to be known by all countries; (iii) that
the choice instrument is restricted to pollution abatement; (iv) that abatement levels are instantly and
costlessly observable; (v) that the pollutant does not accumulate in the environment; and (vi) that the cost
functions are independent.

The applicability of Barrett’s findings are therefore of little relevance for the purpose of
environmental policy formulation in view of the fact that: (i) not all countries are identical; (ii)
there is no transparent system or international information-sharing for all cost-benefit settings;
(iii) pollution abatement does not figure as the sole instrument of choice in international standard
setting; (iv) abatement levels are neither instantly nor costlessly observable; (v) pollutants
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accumulate in the environment; and (vi) cost functions are not independent. Thus, in real case
scenario, all of the assumptions are violated, which renders a direct application of the results to
actual policy-making illegitimate.
Moreover, econometric analyses of why countries support or veto specific IEAs have
been mostly case-specific, and have tended to be restricted to one particular type of IEAs – viz.
emissions-based IEAs. Many researchers have, for example, focused almost exclusively on IEAs
pertaining to global warming, ozone depletion, or acid rain (e.g. Finus 2001; Helm and Sprinz
2000; Hoel 1992; Kaitala and Pohjola 1998; Murdoch and Sandler 1997; Murdoch et al. 2003;
Schmidt 2000), with the almost complete failure to address other types of IEAs, such as those
dealing with natural resource protection, biodiversity, and water resources. Also, such analyses
have generally relied mostly on two or three-player models. In his attempt to provide a general
model for the “forms of international cooperation,” Morrow (1994) based his analysis on a twoactor game-theoretic model to demonstrate the usefulness of leadership and institutions in
helping actors engage in cooperation. Schmidt’s (2000) analysis on the design of IEAs also
focused on two or three countries. In several other investigations, researchers have either
assumed identical or symmetric countries (e.g. Barrett 1994; Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Finus
2001), or have focused on two groups of countries that can act as single agents (Endres and Finus
1998; also Hoel 1992).
In view of the above constraints, many researchers from within the econometrics field
have called for further research on participation in IEAs. Carraro (1999b), for example, solicited
more empirical analysis to test whether theoretical results derived from the assumption of
symmetric countries still hold when the heterogeneity of countries in terms of size, natural
resource endowments, and development stages, inter alia, is taken into account. Finus (2001 p.
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234) and Helm (2000b p.166) have called for further research into the design IEAs. Sprinz and
Vaahtoranta (1994; 1998 pp. 36, 41), in their presentation of the “interest-based approach” to
international environmental regulation pertaining to ozone depletion and acid rain,
acknowledged that future research on international environmental negotiations needed to focus
on “a few additional domestic factors.”
Many of the cross-national analyses of state participation in IEAs conducted outside the
framework of game theory suffer from several lacunae as well. As stated in Chapter One, these
analyses present three main problems – viz. they do not benefit from a rigorous theoretical
foundation, and they have a small sample size for either the IEAs or the countries analyzed. For
example, though Roberts et. al. (2004) consider treaty engagement among 192 countries, the
number of IEAs tested in the analysis amounts to only twenty-two treaties. Dietz and Kalof’s
(1992) analysis considers only twelve treaties, while Dolsak’s (2001) and Fredriksson and
Gaston’s (2000) studies analyze participation only with respect to the climate change regime.
Recchia’s (2002 p. 479) study falls short in terms of the sample size of countries analyzed.
Recchia’s study focuses only on nineteen states which have been “continuous democracies for at
least 20 years.” By resorting to the ‘most similar comparative approach,’ the analysis fails to
consider variation in participation levels among “authoritarian regimes, poorer economies, and
non-Western countries.” Smaller democracies (e.g. the Bahamas) are also not included in the
analysis as these are considered not to be active participants in the international negotiations
preceding the enactment of the treaty (Recchia 2002 p. 479).
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Similarly, Neumayer’s study on the influence of democracy or of trade openness on
participation tests the formulated hypotheses only with regard to four47 and six48 IEAs
respectively (Neumayer 2002a; Neumayer 2002b). Further, Neumayer (2002b p. 819) fails to
make the technical distinction between signature and ratification (see Section 4.6.2), even though
he concedes that “[t]here is a disadvantage connected to analyzing signature rather than
ratification” since “[s]ignature is not a formal commitment.”
From a theoretical standpoint, many of the hypotheses being tested in the quantitative
cross-national analyses mentioned above do not logically stem out from an application of the
basic postulates of the main IR theories governing international cooperation. For example, while
Roberts et. al. (2004 pp. 25-29) have provided a good overview of realism, constructivism, and
institutionalism in explaining IEC, their analysis lays greater emphasis on world-systems theory
and on the impacts of the “colonial history” of states on their levels of IEA ratification, without
any adequate application of the postulates of theories reviewed. Similarly, Neumayer’s (2002a)
analysis does not provide adequate theoretical justification for the selection of the variables used
in the analysis. For example, though the reasoning behind the influence of democracy on
international environmental commitment is provided, there is no definition provided for the term
‘importance’ as used in the analysis to determine the importance of the states, nor is there
adequate theoretical justification provided for the use of the proxy variable of ‘population size’
to determine the ‘importance’ of states (see Neumayer 2002a p. 150). Fredriksson and Gaston’s
(2000 pp.350, 353-356) selection of specific variables for country characteristics also suffer from
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viz. the KP, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (Rotterdam Convention), and the Copenhagen
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol.
48
viz. CITES, the MP, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the KP, the Rotterdam Convention, and the
Cartagena Protocol.
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a lack of theoretical justification, with most of the arguments for such selection centering solely
around considerations pertaining to maximization of self-interest or minimization of costs.
Finally, the analysis of the influence of treaty design variations on IEA participation
suffers from a clear lack of quantitative determinations. In his discussion of treaties relating to
non-proliferation, Keeley (1985 p.103) notes that though treaties have been used as “indicators
or points on measurement scales,” “as independent variables,” and as “guides to state interaction
patterns,” what is missing is a “close quantitative analysis of the contents of treaties.” Among
the very few studies that have focused on systematic design analysis is DeSombre’s (2001 p.190228) investigation of the influence of specific treaty clauses or “participation mechanisms” on
participation levels in IEAs, as stated in Section 1.2. The clauses studied include the following:
presence of economic sanctions; provision of environmental aid; differential obligations; and the
creation of club goods. However, this study remains a qualitative undertaking, focusing only on
a handful of IEAs,49 and providing only anecdotal evidence (based on the case of the MP mostly)
that financial assistance helps to increase participation in an IEA. DeSombre concedes that it is
difficult to compare among the various approaches because of the varying contexts of the
treaties. She states (page 221):
It is not simple to draw conclusions across mechanisms. There is no real way to do a controlled study that
would examine which mechanisms work best under which circumstances, since they are not all tried in
analogous situations, or even independently. Some agreements, like the Montreal Protocol, make use of all
of the mechanisms examined here to some extent; others use only one or two, but in vastly different
situations.

49

e.g. CITES, the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, the Whaling Convention, the
Montreal Protocol (MP); and the UNFCCC, inter alia.
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3.4 Conclusion
Present research into the field of IEA participation has shown that several variables are
important in determining state participation in the IEAs. Some of these variables include political
stability, economic development, the level of environmental vulnerability, and the strength,
flexibility or participation incentives offered by the treaty provisions. However, many of the
conclusions reached on the theme of participation in IEAs are specific to the cases studied and
cannot be generalized over the broader range of IEAs adopted internationally or of the different
types of political regimes worldwide. These studies therefore do not provide a systematic
explanation of the influence of the heterogeneity of states, or the variation in treaty provisions,
on states’ participation levels in IEAs.
Moreover, many of the analyses conducted on IEA participation suffer from the lack of a
good theoretical treatment, especially from the perspective of IR. What is the role of power on
participation rates in IEAs? Are non-state actors important? What is the influence of a state’s
acculturation to international norms and standards on its participation level in IEAs? These
questions have not been addressed in any systematic fashion and they are open for investigation.
This current state of affairs presents scope for both theoretical and empirical contribution to the
study on participation in IEAs. The present study aims to fill the gaps in the literature by
generating hypotheses based on the main IR theories on international cooperation and by
enlarging the IEA and country sample size, as further detailed in Chapter Five.
In the next chapter, I provide an overview of the main IR theories governing international
cooperation and thereafter expose the hypotheses governing this study based on an application of
the IR theories to the field of IEC.

4. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
The literature reviewed in Chapter Three provided a map of the factors that have been
identified as potential causes for state participation in IEAs. In particular, I highlighted specific
state characteristics such as level of development, political stability, or environmental
vulnerability, and IEA characteristics such as strength and flexibility. Furthermore, I have
pointed out the need to generate hypotheses which better reflect the main strands of IR theorizing
and which better validate the choice of variables to be associated with states’ participation levels
in IEAs.
In this Chapter, I put forth the rationale for the hypotheses to be tested in the present
study and introduce the models guiding the analysis. In attempting to link possible causal
variables of state participation in IEAs to IR theories, I focus on the main theory governing IR,
viz. Realism, and its major contender, Liberalism. Both Realism and Liberalism explain the
general patterns of international cooperation that is sustained in the international system. For
example, while Realism emphasizes the role of power and relative gains, Liberalism focuses on
the role played by international institutions and the maximization of absolute gains.
However, the pattern and mode in which this maximization of gains (whether relative or
absolute) occurs is preponderantly determined by the inherent domestic structures of the states.
Calculations of costs and benefits, and hence the final strategies adopted for the maximization of
gains, cannot be dissociated from the domestic configurations of states. Starting from the
premise that domestic parameters are important in determining IEC, I apply basic postulates of
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Realism and Liberalism to the domestic conditions of states to propose hypotheses for a
state’s propensity to participate in IEAs. In the next section I present a brief note on this
“domestification of International Politics” (Caporaso 1997). I subsequently introduce the models
and put forth the hypotheses of this study.
4.1 Consideration of Domestic Factors in IR
While many scholars would argue for a systemic analysis of IR, there has been growing
recognition in the literature of the need to consider both domestic and systemic factors in an
integrated framework to better understand states’ international behavior. Moravcsik (1993), for
example, favors the inclusion of domestic factors in IR studies in order to overcome the
indeterminacy of “pure” IR theories. Similarly, Gourevitch (1978) has proposed the “second
image reversed.” According to Leeds (1999), domestic variables need to be considered when
analyzing international cooperation as they influence leaders’ calculation of costs and benefits of
engaging in specific international acts. As stated by Wendt and Friedheim (1995 p.691),
“systemic theories cannot explain all of world politics, since much state action is driven by
domestic politics or leader psychology.” Thus, it seems that there is a need to open the “black
box” of the state (Owen 1994 p.926). Moreover, favoring systemic factors at the expense of
domestic ones, or vice versa, creates “inaccurate homogenization” (Singer 1961 p. 839),
resulting in only a partial understanding of the full range of determinants of international
behavior.
Though traditionally IR theories have relegated domestic conditions to being merely the
discarded “second image” of Waltz’s (1959) postulate on IR, or as “constraints” to international
cooperation (Knopf 1998 p. 677), there has been a resurgence of interest in this very second
image due to the fact that extant theorizing has failed to account for many important domestic
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determinants of international behavior, especially in the field of foreign relations and
international political economy (e.g. Barnett 1990 p.529). IR and domestic politics are now seen
as “interrelated,” implying that they should be “analyzed simultaneously, as wholes” (Gourevitch
1978 p.911). Some researchers have therefore called for more research into “linkage politics”
(James and Rioux 1998 p. 783; Lamborn 1997 p. 201) in order to thrash out the interconnections
between international and domestic politics. Similarly, Knopf (1998 p. 692) has illustrated,
through quantitative analysis, that citizen activism played a role in US’s willingness to engage in
arms cooperation with the former-USSR, thereby showing that domestic pressure could directly
influence a state’s preferences for international cooperation.
In line with this emerging focus on the consideration of domestic components of
international politics, this research focuses of the domestic determinants of states’ participation
in IEAs. The models are developed mostly through a reliance of “second image theories,” which
focus on the role played by specific domestic constraints on the international behavior of states.
However, reliance on these second order analyses does not necessarily mean that we can
overlook the fact that the states are all intricately involved in, as well as determining, the
international structure of the world system. I argue that the international structure is not an entity
which self-generates – rather, it is generated through the international configuration of states,
which predominantly reflects the various domestic conditions and their individual national
capabilities. Thus, factors which underlie the theory of Realism, such as relative power
considerations, can play an important part in the calculations of states when deliberating on
possible participation in IEAs. Similarly, international institutions can play a significant role in
making a state more open to the adoption of international norms and standards. This analysis
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therefore uses Realism and Liberalism as a core premise to generate possible hypotheses
governing the participation of states in IEAs.
4.2 Models and Hypotheses for the Analysis of State Participation in IEAs
4.2.1 Analysis of treaty characteristics
(i) Model I: The Legal-Incentives model
The first model, the Legal-Incentives model, is formulated to capture the influence of
variation in treaty design on state participation in IEAs. This model relies on the literature on
international environmental cooperation dealing with the design and structure of IEAs.
Hypotheses for this model are formulated mostly based on the premise of previous work done in
the area, as summarized in the literature review (Section 3.3). The specific hypotheses
formulated for this part of the study are detailed below.
Hypotheses
Researchers have stated that certain positive incentive structures, such as financial
transfers and Research and Development (R&D) cooperation, tend to enlist greater participation
in IEAs, especially from developing countries (e.g. Barrett 1992b; Barrett and Stavins 2003 pp.
361-367; Carraro 1999a; Helm and Sprinz 2000; Schmidt 2000; Underdal 1998 p. 106).
Financial transfers may seem attractive to both the developed and developing countries in view
of the added benefits to be accrued therefrom. For the developed countries, the possibility of
providing financial assistance may likely imply some control over how that money is to be used
within the developing economies, which also often imply control over the use of technology and
processes. Thus, disbursing funds may be of benefit to local industries within the developed
world. Similarly, the availability of funds for implementation of IEA provisions may be seen as
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attractive by developing nations as this would mean financial empowerment to address
environmental concerns and to improve production processes. However, ceteris paribus, while
financial mechanisms within IEAs may be favored by both the developed and developing
nations, it is likely that such financial transfers may be more influential on the decision of
developing countries to participate in IEAs or not, due mostly to the fact they are normally less
empowered economically than their developed counterparts. This argument leads to the
following hypotheses:
H1a1: The inclusion of provisions for financial assistance in IEAs tends to increase
participation in IEAs.
H1a2: The inclusion of provisions for financial assistance in IEAs tends to increase
participation from developing countries.
Many IEAs also provide for the possibilities of technical training and capacity-building,
especially for developing party members which do not have the necessary technical and
technological infrastructure for the implementation of the IEAs. Developed countries especially
may prefer to provide technical training and capacity-building rather than having to disburse
funds for developing countries to implementation the IEA provisions. For developing countries,
possibilities for benefiting from technical know-how and much needed training can prove to be
an attractive package for participation. I can thus formulate the following hypotheses:
H1b1: The presence of clauses allowing for training and capacity-building tends to
increase participation in IEAs.
H1b2: The presence of clauses allowing for training and capacity-building tends to
increase participation from developing countries.
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It has also been suggested that the minimum ratification clause (or the threshold number)
acts as an incentive for enhanced IEC by minimizing opportunities for free-riding, and by
providing more instances for additional benefits (e.g. Barrett 2000; Black et al. 1993; Carraro et
al. 2003). Further, states’ concerns with preventing loss in their relative or absolute power, and
their interest in preventing loss of control on their national sovereignty may incite them to
participate in IEAs only if they can be sure that a good enough proportion of the international
community is committing to the same obligations and constraints stipulated within the relevant
treaty texts. A high threshold number can therefore have a positive influence on participation in
IEAs.
H1c: The higher the threshold number, the greater is the level of participation in an IEA.
While negotiating the texts of IEAs, there is always a concern with resolving the tension
between IEA strength and IEA flexibility. It is critical to strike the right trade-off in order to
secure maximum participation in the relevant IEAs. Several mechanisms have been utilized to
increase the flexibility of IEAs viz. (i) the permissibility of reservations; (ii) the allowing of
withdrawals from the treaty; and (iii) the provision of flexible dispute resolution methods. It is to
be expected that countries prefer to sign flexible IEAs – for example, those offering the
possibility of reservations (e.g. Birnie 1988; GAO 1992; Granda 1990; Hurrell and Kingsbury
1992; Sand 1992). Flexibility helps to provide a reassurance mechanism that states can still
maintain their own control over their political and socio-economic decision-making and they can
always find means to ‘get out’ if the IEAs prove to be too costly to them. This suggests that we
can expect IEA flexibility to exert a positive effect on participation level. Thus, the following
hypothesis can be postulated:
H1d: The more flexible an IEA is, the greater the level of participation in the IEA.

69
Closely related to the above argument is the fact that countries tend to prefer less binding
commitments (Carraro 1999a). Strong IEA clauses clearly limit a state’s ability to maintain full
control over its domestic policies, which in essence translate into a loss of power. A few
researchers (e.g. Sand 1992) have stated that developing countries seem to prefer to participate
more in those conventions which have no binding commitments, and which are merely
declaratory. This may likely be true since developing countries are still lagging behind the
developed countries in terms of their economic and industrial development, and may therefore
not welcome constraints of their development processes. In this context, a weak IEA may indeed
seem more preferable than a strong one. The following hypotheses will test the influence of IEA
strength on participation levels.
H1e1: The stronger the IEA is, the lower the level of participation.
H1e2: The stronger the IEA is, the lower the level of participation from developing
countries.
Game theorists often claim that the nature of information available to countries is of
fundamental importance for the latter to determine their costs and benefits for engaging in IEC. It
can therefore be assumed that mechanisms which help to reduce uncertainties and increase
transparency are bound to favor IEC. Accordingly, several researchers have stated that reporting
requirements, by increasing transparency on implementation, help to reduce fears about other
parties’ free-riding and thereby increase the possibility of cooperation (Chayes and Chayes 1991;
Chayes and Chayes 1995; Victor 1994). An increasing number of IEAs now include provisions
for observership, either by NGOs or by other interested parties (e.g. other non-member states or
United Nations (UN) agencies). I thus propose the following hypothesis to test the influence of
transparency mechanisms on participation levels.
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H1f: Presence of transparency requirements tends to increase the level of participation in
the IEA.
4.2.2 Analysis of state characteristics
(i) Model II: The Power-Interest Model
Realist theory subscribes to the Hobbesian understanding of human nature, implying that
human nature is evil, with a “lust to dominate” and driven by power motivations and security
concerns (Kegley 1995 p.5; Smith 1986). With its state-centric focus on sovereignty, national
security and power maximization, Realism considers that nation-states, viewed as unitary actors,
are always struggling for power in an anarchic international system (e.g. Carr 1946; Morgenthau
1948 p. 28). World order is maintained through a perpetual quest for power balancing (Rengger
2000 p. 38). In this framework, therefore, states are concerned with ‘relative gains.’
The Power-Interest model captures the major influence of Realist considerations on state
participation in IEAs. Applying the Realist thesis to the field of participation in IEAs, I argue
that states participate in IEAs only if the latter serve their national interests or enhance their
power potential. In this model, national self-interests are to be understood as endeavors aimed at
reducing environmental vulnerability and preventing negative economic impacts on the
countries. I also use this model to test whether power, a core concept in Realist thought, has any
influence on countries’ levels of participation in IEAs. Traditionally, the following has been
considered as basic sources of power: geographic size and position, natural resources,
population, raw materials, military power, and industrial capacity (Mingst 2001 p. 106;
Morgenthau 1948). I analyze some of these sources of power to determine their influence, if any,
on participation level.
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Hypotheses
A country which is strong militarily can be assumed to be able to impose its wishes on its
neighbors and, in cases where the international community is involved, on the international
community as well. Military power ensures that the state will be better able to safeguard its
national security and its national self-interests. Thus, a country with great military power will be
able to ward off international pressure for international environmental protection. It will
participate only in those IEAs which do not pose any threat to its national security and selfinterests and will shun those which do not benefit it. Also, it will not be too much concerned with
international environmental standard-setting as it can easily dictate its needs to relevant countries
through bilateral agreements. Hence, all things being equal, it is likely that substantial military
power, or the desire to become more powerful militarily, will be positively related to a low level
of participation in IEAs. This argument leads to my first hypothesis:
H2a: The greater the military power of a country, the lower its level of participation in
IEAs.
However, the power of a state is not the exclusive domain of the military arena. It is
generally acknowledged that high economic development enhances the power potential of a
state. Apart from the fact that an economic hegemon can easily impose its wishes on the
international community, developed countries also have to contend with domestic demands.
Developed countries generally tend to have a more environmentally aware population and
greater local environmental activism. Starting from the general premise that the catering to
domestic public opinion is a strategy to maintain power and political stability, I expect that
developed countries will be engaging more strongly in environmental protection in order to
appease domestic public pressure. This higher level of domestic environmental regulation,
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however, may negatively impact the competitiveness of the developed countries in the
international market. As noted by several analysts, in view of the possibility of other countries
‘free-riding’ as well as producing pollution havens for industrial production, there is a possibility
that the developed countries may suffer loss of their competitive advantage if environmental
standards are not implemented globally (Congleton 1992 p. 412; Sage 1996). Relying on the
general observation that developed countries are concerned with domestic environmental
pressure and with the need to maintain economic and industrial power by deterring free-riding, I
argue that developed countries will participate extensively in IEAs. This argument leads to my
second hypothesis:
H2b: The higher the level of economic and industrial development of a country, the
higher its level of participation in IEAs.
Closely linked to the notion of environmental security is the concept of environmental
vulnerability. A state with a high degree of environmental vulnerability will face increased risk
to its national security and hence will make increased efforts to engage in enhancing
environmental protection. When threats to national security emanate from outside the territories
of the state, the latter will make efforts to secure adherence to international norms and standards
and to assurance mechanisms which provide security to its citizens. Environmentalists
commonly consider high population density as aggravating a state’s environmental vulnerability
in view of the pressure exerted on the environment by the sheer number of people. Thus, states
with high population density will feel the need to implement environmental measures to reduce
their vulnerability, and in the process, will favor internationalization of environmental norms in
order not to be at a competitive disadvantage globally.
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Moreover, geographic contiguity, which in routine conflict studies tends to be correlated,
together with military capability, with conflict-prone behavior and war-proneness (Doyle 1983 p.
878; Maoz and Russett 1993 p. 902; Vasquez 1993), takes on added importance in the field of
IEC. Geographic contiguity, by virtue of its ability to render a state vulnerable (e.g. through the
transboundary flows of pollutants) and thus less powerful, becomes a crucial variable potentially
influencing states’ participation in IEAs. A state which has a greater number of contiguous
neighbors is more vulnerable to cross-border transport of environmental pollution than a state
with a smaller number of such neighbors. Thus, to reduce its environmental vulnerability, the
state will be more open to international standards. Based on these arguments, I formulate the
next two hypotheses as follows:
H2c: A state with a high population density will participate in more IEAs than one with a
low population density.
H2d: A state with a higher number of contiguous neighbors will participate in more IEAs
than a state with a smaller number of contiguous neighbors.
Since Realist thought is preponderantly premised on the concept of national security, it
can be stated that environmental protection, especially international environmental protection,
will always take second place to national security. When there are issues related to domestic
political destabilization, environmental protection will in fact become ‘low politics’50 and take
the back seat. I therefore propose that countries with political instability will participate less in
IEAs than those with political stability.
H2e: A politically stable country will participate in more IEAs than one with political
instability.
50

Researchers have traditionally made the distinction between the “low politics” of the environment as compared to
the “high politics” of military and security issues (Keohane and Nye 1997 p.718; List and Rittberger 1998 p. 68;
Schmidt 2002 p. 11).
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It is also acknowledged that the scarcity of environmental resources has the potential of
destabilizing internal security by giving rise to “internal decay and collapse” (Homer-Dixon
1991; Kaplan 1994). In order to avoid these threats to national security, states with access to
limited resources will therefore try to regulate the environment both nationally and
internationally in order to prevent internal destabilization. On the other hand, states with
extensive natural resource bases, and with greater extent of raw materials, do not have to factor
struggles over access to these resources within their short-term political decision-making. They
will be able to exploit these resources unhampered and will not welcome extensive
environmental regulations which may limit the use of these resources and thereby result in
decreased economic, industrial and technological power. Hence, these states will not favor
extensive participation in IEAs. This argument leads to the following hypothesis:
H2f: The larger the natural resource base of a country, the lower its level of participation
in IEAs.
(ii) Model III: The Liberal-Interdependent Model
Liberalism is generally associated with the freedom of the individual and the attendant
rights and institutions (Doyle 1983 p. 871), a belief in the superiority of markets as compared to
state regulation (Fukuyama 1992 p.44; Keohane 1989 pp. 10, 11), minimal government, and a
liberty to participate in public affairs (Rosenau and Durfee 2000 p. 34). Institutions are deemed
to change the payoff structure and catalyze cooperation though processes of iteration, the
enhancement of transparency, the monitoring of violators’ actions, and through the creation of a
long ‘shadow of the future’ (Keohane 1984; Oye 1986).
In contrast with Realism, the Liberal school of thought considers states to be concerned
with the maximization of ‘absolute gains’ as opposed to ‘relative gains.’ However, states are not

75
central to international politics. Also important are transnational and non-state actors. Keohane
and Nye’s (1997 p.718) concept of “complex interdependence” challenges Realism’s core
assumptions about the primacy of force in an international system characterized by state actors
struggling for the maximization of power (also Keohane 1984). Complex interdependence is
about a world in which non-state and transnational actors have a role to play in world politics,
acting as “transmission belts” between governments (Keohane and Nye 1997 pp. 719, 720).
Complex interdependence is also characterized by the absence of a “clear hierarchy of issues,”
such that there is no perpetual dominance of military security concerns (Keohane and Nye 1997
p. 719). Moreover, military force is often seen as an “ineffective instrument of policy,” not
always relevant for the resolution of disagreements (Keohane and Nye 1997 p. 719).
The Liberal-Interdependent model relies on the general propositions of the Liberal
paradigm to arrive at possible determinants of state participation in IEAs. This model is a pure
“second image” model in view of the fact that the premise of liberalism is grounded in domestic
and transnational parameters. As stated by Legro (1999 p.10), “liberal assumptions underlie most
of what are referred to as “second image” and many “second-image reversed” theories.” This
model tests hypotheses relating global trade flows, the role of civic organizations, and the
domestic political and institutional structures of countries as variables influencing their levels of
participation in IEAs. The specific hypotheses proposed are given hereunder.
Hypotheses
The ‘Democratic Peace Theory’ posits that liberal democratic states cooperate more
easily with liberal democracies than with non-democracies (Chander and Tulkens 1997; Russett
et al. 1993). This means that a liberal democratic state will tend to be more inclined to
international cooperation than a non-democratic one, provided there is an international
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preference for democracy, as is the case presently. Applying this premise for international
cooperation to the field of international environment, I propose that liberal democracies will be
desirous to cooperate more with each other to ensure international environmental protection than
with non-democracies. An IEA being an instrument of international environmental cooperation, I
thus expect that democratic countries will tend to participate more in IEAs than non-democratic
ones (which is a general statement also made by Congleton 1992, among others; Neumayer
2002a; Sand 1992).
H3a: Countries which have a democratic political system tend to participate more in
IEAs than those which have non-democratic political structures.
Moreover, strong and effective domestic governmental institutions can be considered as a
prime element in ensuring meaningful commitment to international environmental protection.
Without the necessary institutional framework, participation in IEAs can pose structural and
logistic challenges. To capture this line of thought, I propose the second hypothesis for this
model:
H3b: Countries with strong governmental institutions tend to participate in more IEAs
than those with weak institutions
A state’s level of participation in international environmental institutions may render that
state more amenable to accepting international standards and obligations embodied within treaty
texts by virtue of the state’s higher exposure to international norms, principles and standards than
another state which shies away from the international institutions. Thus, countries which are
more densely involved in international environmental institutions can be assumed to be more
likely to participate in IEAs in view of their greater acculturation to international environmental
norms and standards. I propose the following hypothesis:
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H3c: Countries which participate in international environmental institutions tend to
participate in a greater number of IEAs than countries which do not participate in such
institutions.
Analysts have shown that liberal economies tend to be typified by high levels of
privatization and a good quality of life (e.g. Asthana and Shukla 2002). Moreover, liberal
economies can also be characterized by economic freedom and high volumes of trade. If we
consider that liberal states tend to participate in more IEAs than non-liberal ones, the following
hypotheses can be postulated:
H3d: Countries with a higher quality of life will participate in a greater number of IEAs
than those with a lower quality of life.
H3e: Countries with a liberal economy will participate in more IEAs than those with
lesser economic freedom.
H3f: Countries with high volumes of trade will participate in more IEAs than those with
low volumes of trade.
Under the liberal framework, citizens are deemed to be free to participate in national
policy-making and in organizing based on their interests. Agenda 21 includes several sections
dealing with the strengthening of civil society in order to facilitate citizens’ participation in
policy formulation for sustainable development (OECD 2001 p.109). Thus, for sound
environmental policies, it can be deemed that citizens who are environmentally aware will
organize better to strengthen the civil society as well as to promote environmental protection
than those who are illiterate and unaware of the issues. I thus argue that local civic
environmentalism will foster greater participation in IEAs.
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H3g: Countries with a greater extent of civic environmentalism will participate in a
greater number of IEAs than one with low civil society engagement.
(iii) Model IV: The Developing-Logistics Model
Prior to the Rio Conference, the Forum of International Law of the Environment, which
was convened in Siena from 17-21 April 1990, considered the issue of IEA participation and the
means of widening such participation, with particular emphasis on overcoming the difficulties
met by developing countries in ratifying such treaties (Maffei et al. 1996). The desirability of
securing the participation of developing countries in treaties has also been recognized in Agenda
21.51 However, securing commitment from developing countries needs to overhaul many of the
traditional N-S acrimonies which have typified international debates for decades.
Developing countries view the developed world’s call for greater environmental
protection with distrust, equating it with attempts to subvert their economic development or trade
(Springer 1988 p.51; Wells 1996 p.6), while at the same time enhancing their own economic
interests (Harvard Law Review 1992). The North, on the other hand, believes that the South only
indulges in “pressure tactics” to obtain foreign aid (Najam 1993). Issues on which there has
always been discord are the seemingly diverging goals of environmental protection and the need
for development. While the North focuses on measures to protect the environment, the
developing countries tend to be concerned with “market access, investment, access to
technology, and financing” (Rosenberg 1994).
The fourth model of this study, the developing-logistics model, aims to provide a means
of assessing determinants of developing country participation in IEAs. Variables which will be
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Agenda 21. Chapter 39.1(c). Available at the web page of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
Division for Sustainable Development.
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm
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analyzed are those that bear special significance to developing countries – for example, foreign
aid dependency, corruption, poor sanitation, malnutrition, and high rates of infant mortality, inter
alia. The hypotheses for this model are given below.
Hypotheses
For successful formulation and implementation of environmental policies, a state needs to
benefit from political stability and a well-functioning government system (Brinkerhoff and Gage
2002; Cowhey 1993), low levels of corruption (Morrell and Poznanski 1985), a strong civil
society, an environmentally aware population, and good economy (Evans 2000; Von Prittwitz
1990). These influences seem to be more decisive for developing countries as they seem to be
more prone to problems associated with corruption, high levels of debt, unstable governing
structures, and poor quality of life, inter alia.
High poverty levels within the developing world cannot be dissociated from the latter’s
high debt burdens and high dependency on foreign aid. Debt servicing allocates much needed
resources away from programs to improve citizens’ quality of life, with the result that there is no
social and environmental improvement. Poverty thus establishes a vicious circle, where poverty,
combined with other stressors such as population growth, perpetuates a deterioration of
environmental and social living conditions. The scourge of poverty is also often compounded by
internal problems associated with political corruption and drug trafficking. Marshall J. (1991)
has documented extensively the corruption of political leaders and their connection with or their
protection of major drug traffickers in third world countries such as Mexico, Bolivia, Colombia,
Thailand, and Peru, among others. Unfortunately, few studies have elaborated on the degree of
corruption and no empirically validated links have been established between corruption levels
and participation in IEAs.
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Assuming that commitment to domestic environmental protection also leads to
international environmental commitment, I argue that developing countries’ participation in
IEAs is determined by factors such as malnutrition, high rates of infant mortality, poor
sanitation, corruption, and foreign aid dependency, inter alia. These social challenges are
deemed to erode the capacity of the developing countries to commit to international
environmental protection measures. I thus formulate the following hypotheses to test the
influence of these parameters on the participation of developing countries in IEAs:
H4a: A developing country with a greater control on corruption will tend to participate
in more IEAs than one with a lower level of such control.
H4b: A developing country with a higher level of undernutrition will participate in fewer
IEAs than a developing country with a lower level of undernutrition.
H4c: A developing country with a higher level of infant mortality will participate in fewer
IEAs than a developing country with a lower level of infant mortality.
H4d: A developing country with a higher level of sanitation will participate in a greater
number of IEAs than a developing country with a lower level of sanitation.
H4e: A developing country with a greater extent of foreign aid dependency will
participate in fewer IEAs than one with a smaller dependence of foreign aid.
Developing countries are typically not empowered to produce military equipment. They
rely mostly on arms imports from other countries to build their military arsenal. It is quite a
paradox that while many developing countries cannot allocate much scarce resources for the
improvement of their citizens’ quality of life, they nevertheless spend enormous amounts of
economic resources on empowering their military divisions. This state of affairs can sometimes
be related to problems of civil war, or to insecurities elicited by neighboring hostile countries or
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external powers exerting their military prowess in an international structure governed by anarchy
and concerns with relative power gains. It can thus be assumed that developing countries which
are investing heavily in empowering their military divisions through massive arms imports will
be less likely to be concerned with the international environmental protection. This leads to the
following hypothesis:
H4f: Countries which are engaged in higher levels of arms imports will tend to
participate less in IEAs than countries which do not import high amounts of arms.
On the more positive side, it may be expected that developing countries which exhibit
greater economic development or which are more open to trade may likely be more willing to
participate in more IEAs than those which do not exhibit such tendencies.
H4g: Developing countries which exhibit greater economic development or which are
more open to trade tend will participate in more IEAs than those which have lower
economic development or trade transactions.
Finally, it can be hypothesized that developing countries which benefit from greater
levels of democracy and greater levels of local environmental activism will participate more in
IEAs in view of the positive role that democracy plays in empowering the population and in
opening up national debates on environmental protection.
H4h: Developing countries which are more democratic will participate in more IEAs
than those which are less democratic.
H4i: Developing countries with a higher level of civic environmentalism will participate
in more IEAs than their counterparts with a lower level of such civic activism.
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(v) The Interactive Model
While models II-IV above provide a snapshot of potential determinants of participation,
they nevertheless provide only a partial understanding of participation. It is not likely that a
‘pure’ Realist or a ‘pure’ Liberal explanation of participation can provide a true picture of how
decisions are made by national leaders. While the dichotomization of theorizing on IEA
participation provided by Models II and III above provide a parsimonious understanding of
potential determinants of participation, there is a need to test the independent effect of each of
the crucial variables of each model, while holding constant the variables of all the other
competing models. This is the purport of this fifth model, the interactive model.
The interactive model posits that both Realist and Liberal considerations may likely play
a role in influencing state participation in IEAs. While a state may participate in more IEAs if it
faces a greater level of environmental vulnerability, that state may also be less likely to
participate in IEAs if it has weak governmental institutions, if it has low density of interaction in
international environmental institutions, or if it is simply logistically constrained by endemic
factors such as poverty and corruption. Similarly, even if a state is powerful militarily, it may
still be open to participation in IEAs in view of pressures placed on its decision-making
mechanisms by civic environmentalism or a democratic political system which opens up avenues
for citizens’ contest of the decisions of political figures. It is also possible for a state with a high
participation in international environmental institutions or with high levels of economic freedom
and high volumes of trade to resist participation in IEAs because of concerns with the negative
impacts on those of its industries which are heavily reliant on natural resource exploitation.
Which of the above scenarios actually play out in real policy-making? It is likely that
environmental vulnerability may play an important part in a nation’s decision to participate in an
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IEA, irrespective of its level of economic or political development. Thus, variables such as
contiguity and population may matter in the overall decision-making process. Further, concerns
with maintaining power cannot be overruled in political calculations. This means that we need to
include military expenditures and the extent of natural resource base of a state to control for this
concern with power enhancement and sustenance. Apart from these Realist variables, it is likely
that the political system is also open to Liberal considerations in national policy-making. The
nature of the political regime certainly matters as it acts as the basic source of all national and
international policies. The permeability of the state to the influence of international
environmental institutions will also likely influence the propensity of the state to participate in
IEAs. Finally, the influence of inherent domestic constraints such as poverty and corruption need
to be considered in tandem with the other variables.
4.3 Conclusion
As I have presented in the conceptual model (Figure 1) in Chapter One, participation in
IEAs can be considered to be influenced parsimoniously by: (i) IEA characteristics; and (ii) state
characteristics. The various models proposed in this study test various treaty and state
characteristics which may potentially impact a state’s decision to participate in an IEA or not.
Model I focuses on specific treaty variables such as strength, flexibility, and threshold number.
Models II and III test variables that matter in the Realist and Liberal schools of thought. Model
IV analyzes endemic structural constraints of the developing world. Finally, to provide an
integrated understanding of state participation in IEAs, Model V tests the independent effect of
the crucial variables of Models II-IV, with all the other predictors being held constant.
In the next Chapter, I establish the research design for the study and present the results of
the analysis.

5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
The previous chapter delineated the hypotheses to be tested in this study. In the present
Chapter, I specify the research design for the analysis and provide the results of the study. I
conclude this chapter with a general discussion of the findings of the study.
5.1 Research Design
In this study, the dependence of IEA participation on specific country and treaty
characteristics is investigated using multiple linear regression analysis. For the analysis of IEA
design, the dependent variable is the total number of countries that are participants to each
specific treaty. For the analysis of state characteristics, the dependent variable, IEA participation
(P), is the total number of global IEAs ratified by any specific country. The general formula
summarizing this study can be given as:
P = F {f1(IEA characteristics), f2(state characteristics)}
This analysis is divided into two parts:
(i)

analysis of the influence of IEA characteristics on state participation in IEAs; and

(ii)

analysis of the influence of state characteristics on state participation in IEAs.

5.2 Model Building
5.2.1 Model I: Influence of IEA design on IEA participation
This section of the study uses the legal provisions of IEA texts as the unit of analysis. The
analysis therefore relies on extensive content analysis with appropriate coding of the IEAs based
on variables of interest. Thirty-one treaties (as given at Annex 3) were selected so as to have
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roughly the same number of IEAs from various issue areas. The IEAs were selected as follows:
10 IEAs dealing with natural resources and nature conservation; 7 IEAs dealing with the
atmosphere; 6 IEAs dealing with hazardous substances and nuclear radiation; and 8 IEAs dealing
with marine waters and marine resources. Moreover, eight of the IEAs were framework
conventions and six were protocols.
The dependent variable, participation, was compiled based on membership data obtained
from the ENTRI database of SEDAC/CIESIN. For this model, three dependent variables are
used: (i) total participation, PT, calculated as a percentage of total allowable parties; (ii)
developed country participation, PDD, calculated by dividing the total number of developed
country members by the total number of developed countries allowed to participate; and (iii)
developing country participation, PDG, obtained by dividing the total number of developing party
members by the total number of developing countries allowed to participate.52
This part of the analysis relies on the hypotheses formulated in Section 4.3.4 and the
main themes to be examined pertain to treaty provisions relating to strength, flexibility,
transparency, financial transfers, capacity building, and threshold number.
The following equation summarizes the investigation:
PT/DD/DG = α+ ß1(strength) + ß2(transparency) + ß3(financial mechanism) + ß4(threshold
number) + ß5(capacity-building) + ß6(flexibility) + ξ
Operationalization of variables
A strong IEA characteristically embodies clear quantitative targets, implementation
deadlines, requirements for enactment of legislation, review and verification mechanisms, and
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All the IEAs considered in the analysis were global IEAs. The total number of countries included in the dataset is
196, with 44 developed and 152 developing states. Thus, for total participation, PT, actual participation level was
divided by 196, and by 44 and 152 to yield the percentages for developed and developing country participation
respectively.
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membership or trade sanctions, among others. To construct the ‘strength’ variable, the total score
of the IEAs was calculated based on the presence (or absence) of each of these measures for
‘strength.’ Transparency was obtained by adding the score for: whether the IEA allows NGOs
and other organizations to act as observers in the proceedings of the treaty affairs; the
requirement to prepare yearly reports either by the parties or by the treaty bodies; and the
requirements for parties to report on their implementation measures. Capacity-building relates to
whether the IEA allows for education, training or specifically refers to the term ‘capacitybuilding’ in its provisions. Flexibility of the IEA is determined by whether the agreement allows
individual party to propose amendments and whether the IEA allows parties to settle disputes
through negotiations first. The threshold number is obtained direct from the IEA text which
normally specifies the minimum number of ratifications required before the IEA can enter into
force. Similarly, the text also normally specifies whether financial transfers can occur.
Presence of specific treaty provisions was coded as 1; absence was coded as 0. The coding
template is provided in Table 1 below and the full dataset is as given at Table 16 at Annex 4.
Table 17 at Annex 5 summarizes the descriptives of the dependent and independent variables for
Model I.
Table 1: Operationalization of variables for Model 1
MODEL IV
Legal-Incentives
CODE
Strength

Transparency

Legal provisions analyzed
Presence of:
(i)
legislative requirements [1,0];
(ii)
review [1,0] and verification mechanisms [1,0];
(iii)
target deadlines [1,0];
(iv)
trade [1,0] or membership sanctions [1,0];
(v)
requirement for participation for specific
countries (or group of countries) before into
force [1,0]
Presence of:
(i)
observership by NGOs [1,0] and other
interested parties [1,0];
(ii)
presence of reporting requirements [1,0];
(iii)
requirements for submission of yearly reports

VALUES
Maximum possible
value of 7;
minimum 0.

Maximum possible
value of 5;
minimum 0.
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by parties [1,0] and by treaty bodies [1,0]
Threshold

Minimum participation requirement

As stipulated in
treaty text:
minimum value of
3; maximum of 60

Dispneg

Provisions for dispute resolution by negotiation first

Minimum of 0;
maximum of 1.

Amendpty

Provision for any party to propose amendments to the treaty

Minimum of 0;
maximum of 1.

Fintransfers

Provisions for financial transfers among parties

Minimum of 0;
maximum of 1.

Capacity

(i)
(ii)
(iii)

Provisions for education, training, or capacitybuilding [1,0]
Provisions for technical and scientific
cooperation [1,0]
Provisions for cooperation on Research and
Development [1,0]

Minimum of 0;
maximum of 3.

5.2.2 Models II, III, IV and V: Influence of country characteristics on IEA participation
The unit of analysis for this portion of the research template is the ‘sovereign state.’ This
analysis relates selected country variables to their total level of participation in IEAs. The
participation of 196 nations in 110 global IEAs (as at Annex 2) is analyzed. The dependent
variable, P, was compiled based on participation data obtained from the ENTRI database of
SEDAC/CIESIN. The total number of global IEAs to which a specific country is a party member
was totaled to give that country’s level of participation, P. Details on each of the models for this
part of the analysis are provided below.
(i) Model II: Power-Interest Model
To establish the relationship between P and characteristics governing Model II (PowerInterest model), the following equation is used:
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P = α + ß1 (industrial development) + ß2(economic development) + ß3(political stability)
+ ß4 (natural resources) + ß5 (raw materials) + ß6(population density) + ß7(contiguity)
ß8(military power) + ξ
Operationalization of the independent variables
Industrial and economic development can be obtained fairly accurately from the level of
industrial and economic growth sustained by the relevant states. Thus, industrial development is
operationalized by using the average annual percentage industrial growth and economic
development was operationalized through use of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita.
A direct measure of political stability is not readily available. To operationalize ‘political
stability,’ I have coded the countries dichotomously: countries which have experienced a military
coup from 1945 onwards or which are presently engaged in civil wars have been coded as 1;
those which have been free from such political turmoil have been coded as 0.
There is no single measure for the full natural resource base of a state. To operationalize
this variable, I have considered the extent of forest resources and the extent of raw materials as
proxies for the natural resources of the state. Within the context of global environmental
protection, forest resources are highly prized in view of their various functions in maintaining
ecological stability and protecting against global warming. Raw materials are also important in
view of their association with pollutant loads, mostly through extractive processes, and with the
concept of power. An overall index for the complete set of raw materials of countries could not
be identified. As a proxy for the extent of raw materials, I have therefore used the total value of
mineral production, relying on the assumption that states with a higher extent of mineral resource
production (as deduced from the value of mineral production) will likely be the depositories of a
large extent of such raw materials.
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An overall index of environmental vulnerability is non-existent. To capture the variable
‘environmental vulnerability,’ I have used the proxies of population density and contiguity. It is
widely acknowledged in the literature of environmental management that high population
density exerts a pressure on the environment by either causing greater environmental degradation
or greater depletion of the environmental resources. Thus, high population density results in
enhanced environmental vulnerability in view of the greater scarcity of resources, as well as the
greater level of environmental deterioration engendered by the higher numbers of people per unit
area. Contiguity also enhances a state’s environmental vulnerability as it makes the state more
susceptible to cross-border transport of pollutants. A nation with a high density of contiguous
neighbors will have porous international borders in terms of diffusion of pollutants. The state
will thus be vulnerable to any possible laxity in environmental measures present in the
neighboring states since pollution transfers do not respect geographical or jurisdictional
boundaries.
(ii) Model III: Liberal-Interdependent Model
To establish the relationship between P and characteristics governing Model II (LiberalInterdependent model), the following equation is used:
P = α + ß1 (democracy) + ß2(quality of life) + ß3(liberal economy) + ß4(strong
governmental institutions) + ß5(trade volume) + ß6(participation in international
environmental institutions) + ß7 (local environmental activism) + ξ
Operationalization of the independent variables
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The level of democracy is given by the Polity score obtained from the 2005
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) database,53 which is an average of the Polity scores for
1993-2002. To measure the strength of governmental institutions, World Bank’s measure of
governmental effectiveness is used. This measure assesses the “quality of public service
provision, the quality of bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of civil
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies”
(ESI, 2005). The Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) is used to provide an indication of the quality of life in a country. HDI is a
composite measure of the level of achievement of a country in three areas: longevity (measured
by the life expectancy at birth), knowledge (measured by a combination of the adult literacy rate
and the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio), and the standard of
living (GDP per capita, PPP $US).54
To operationalize ‘liberal economy,’ the proxy of ‘economic freedom’ is used, based on
the argument that all liberal economies can be characterized by a certain degree of economic
freedom. An index of economic freedom is available from the dataset provided in the 2002
World Rankings database. Volumes of trade are measured directly by the total volumes of trade
carried out in the state, and this is available from the World Development Indicators database.
Civic environmentalism is generated by the local involvement of civic groups in environmental
governance issues. UNCED’s Agenda 21 promotes the development of local development
initiatives within communities worldwide to promote environmental sustainability. As a proxy
for civic engagement, the total number of such local Agenda 21 initiatives in a particular country
is used. As a measure of the level of state participation in international environmental
53

Accessible online at http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/ ; full dataset available at
http://www.yale.edu/esi/
54
More details on the calculation of the HDI are provided at http://www.undp.org/.
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institutions, the participation of states in environmental intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
is used.
(iii) Model IV: The Developing-Logistics Model
To establish the relationship between P and characteristics governing Model IV
(Developing-Logistics Model), the following equation is proposed:
P = α + ß1(corruption) + ß2(foreign aid dependence) + ß3(undernourishment) +
ß4(infant mortality) + ß5(access to proper sanitation) + ß6(democracy)+ ß7(arms imports)
+ ß8(volume of trade) + ß9(civic engagement) + ß10(economic development) + ξ
Operationalization of the independent variables
Many of the variables for model IV can be measured directly by existing data. For
example, undernutrition, infant mortality, access to proper sanitation facilities, trade volume, and
arms imports can be directly operationalized, respectively, by the percentage of population
suffering from malnutrition, the rate of infant mortality, the percentage of population with access
to proper sanitation facilities, the trade in goods as a percentage of GDP, and arms imports as a
percentage of total trade. Corruption is operationalized through a measure obtained from the
2005 ESI database, which provides an indication of the level of control on corruption within
states. This measure (GRAFT) is based on surveys of households, firms and public officials.
Foreign aid dependence is proxied by the level of official development assistance (ODA)
received by a state per capita, relying on the presumption that the more ODA received by a state
per capita, the greater the reliance of the state on foreign aid. This measure is directly available
from the Human Development Report (HDR) of the UNDP. Finally, democracy, civic
environmentalism and economic development are measured in the same way as detailed for
Model III above.
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Model V: The Interactive Model
Based on Section 4.3.2 (v), the following equation is proposed to capture the independent
influence of variables from Models II, III and IV above.
P = α + ß1(corruption) + ß2(foreign aid dependence) + ß3(contiguity) + ß4(volume
of trade)+ ß5(military power) + ß6(democracy)+ ß7(participation in international
environmental institutions) + ß8(mineral resources) + ß9(civic engagement) + ß10(quality
of life) + ß11(HDI)+ ξ
The operationalization of these variables has already been described in the relevant
sections above. Tables 5, 6 and 7 provide a summary of the independent variables for the various
models as well as the sources of data.55 Table 18 at Annex 6 summarizes the descriptives of the
dependent and independent variables for Models II, III and IV (and therefore V).
Table 2: Independent variables for Model II
POWER-INTEREST MODEL
Dependent variable: Participation, P
Independent Variables
Gdpcap1

Description
GDP per capita, 1999
(PPP $US)

Source
Human
Development
Report (HDR),
2001,56 Table 1

Measure of
Economic
development

Indgth

Average annual
percentage industrial
growth, 1990-2000

Industrial
development

Milcoup

Political stability57

World
Development
Indicators
(WDI), 2002
Table 4.1
Countries of the
world and their
leaders yearbook,
1993; Wikipedia
online
encyclopedia58

55

Political stability

Model V is not included in the tables as the independent variables are the same as those from Models II, III and
IV.
56
Accessible online from http://hdr.undp.org/
57
Countries which have experienced military coups from 1945 onwards or which are presently engaged in civil wars
are coded as 1; the remaining countries are coded as 0.
58
Accessible through www.wikipedia.org/
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Forest

Forest area, as a
percentage of total
land area, 2000

Mineral

Mineral Production
Value in US$(m),
2001
Population density,
people/km2, 2000

Popdens
Contiguity
Milexp

Total number of
contiguous
neighbors60
Military
expenditures, % of
central government
expenditures, 1999

World
Development
Indicators
(WDI), 2002
Table 3.4
World Rankings,
2001,59 Table
12.3
WDI, 2002
Tables 1.1 and
1.6
Wikipedia online
encyclopedia
WDI, 2002 Table
5.7

Extent of natural
resources

Extent of raw
materials
Environmental
vulnerability
Environmental
vulnerability
Power

Table 3: Independent variables for Model III
LIBERAL-INTERDEPENDENT MODEL
Dependent variable: Participation, P
Independent Variables
Polity

HDI
Ecofree

Goveff
Tgoods
Eionum

59

Description
Democracy measure (high
values correspond to high
levels of democratic
institutions); Average of
1993-2002 Polity.61
Human Development
Index, 1999
Economic Freedom Index,
2001 (lower values
correspond to greater
economic freedom)
Strong governmental
institutions, 2002
Trade in goods, % of
GDP, 2000
Number of memberships
in environmental
intergovernmental
organizations (out of 100),
2003-2004

Source
Environmental
Sustainability Index
(ESI)62 2005;

Measure of
Democratic governance

HDR, 2001

Quality of life

World Rankings, 2001,
Table 8.12

Liberal economy

World Bank63; also
available from ESI 2005
WDI 2002, Table 6.1

Strength of governmental
institutions
Volume of trade

ESI 2005

International acculturation
to environmental norms
and standards

Kurian, George Thomas. 2001. The Illustrated Book of World Rankings. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe Reference.
The total number of contiguous neighbors for each country was totaled, based on information provided on each
country as provided by the Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia.
61
Also available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/#exec
62
Accessible online at http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/ ; full dataset available at
http://www.yale.edu/esi/
63
Data available from http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/index.html
60
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Agenda21

Number of Local Agenda
21 initiatives per million
population, 2001

ESI, 2005

Civil society engagement
in environmental
governance

Table 4: Independent Variable for Model IV
DEVELOPING-LOGISTICS MODEL
Dependent Variable: Participation, P
Variable Code
Graft

Undernutrition

Sanitation
Imortality
Odacap
Arms
Gdpcap1
Tgoods
Polity

Agenda21

Description
Corruption measure
(high scores
correspond to
effective control of
corruption), 2002
Prevalence of
undernourishment, %
of population, 19961998
Access to sanitation
facilities, % of
population, 2000
Under five mortality
rate per 1000 live
births, 1999
ODA received per
capita , US$, 1999

Source
ESI 2005

Measure of
Corruption

WDI 2002,
Table 2.18

Quality of life

WDI 2002,
Table 1.3

Quality of life

HDI 2001,
Table 8

Quality of life

HDR, 2001
Table 15

Foreign aid
dependency

Arms trade, Imports
as % of total imports,
1999
GDP per capita, 1999

WDI, 2002
Table 5.7

Arms imports

HDI 2001,
Table 1
WDI, 2002,
Table 6.1
Environmental
Sustainability
Index (ESI)65
2005;

Economic
development
Volume of trade

ESI, 2005

Civil society
engagement in
environmental
governance

Trade in goods, % of
GDP, 2000
Democracy measure
(high values
correspond to high
levels of democratic
institutions), average
of 1993-2002.64
Number of Local
Agenda 21 initiatives
per million
population, 2001

Democratic
governance

The variables for Model V are extracted from Models II-IV and these have already been
described above.
64
65

Also available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/#exec
Accessible online at http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/
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5.3 ANALYSIS
The various models have been analyzed through multiple linear regression analysis with
Stata 8.0. Preliminary analyses of Pearson’s correlation coefficients do not show any strong
correlations among the independent variables (Tables 9-13 at Annex 7). For Model I, the highest
correlation is between threshold number and provisions for financial transfers (fintransfers), with
a correlation of 0.821. For Model II, the highest correlation is between GDP per capita (gdpcap1)
and mineral production value in its natural log form (mineral_t), being of a value of 0.387. For
Model III, the highest correlation of 0.686 is between local Agenda 21 initiatives in its natural
log form (agenda21_t) and governmental effectiveness (goveff). The highest correlation in
Model IV is of 0.652 between infant mortality (mort) and the population’s access to sanitation
facilities (sanitation). For Model V, mineral production value, in its natural log form, shows a
correlation of 0.6291 with HDI, the highest for the model.
The high correlation of 0.821 in Model I does not seem to constiture a collinearity problem
for Model I. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the different regressors of Model I all range
below 5, showing that collinearity is not affecting the regression coefficients. Models II, III, IV
and V also do not depict collinearity problems, as shown by their low VIF values (see Annex 8).
Two-way scatter plots between the dependent and independent variables show that some of
the relationships are not linear. For example, the graph of participation and ODA/capita, or of
participation and population density are not linear. For multiple linear regression to provide
unbiased estimates of the parameters, variables can be transformed to establish a linear
relationship where such is not apparent. Using the ‘ladder’ function in Stata 8.0, the best
transformation for the non-linear variables was obtained based on the chi-square value of the
transformation. For the non-linear variables of population density, mineral value production,
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number of Agenda 21 initiatives, ODA/capita, and population suffering from undernutrition, the
natural log transformations were the best, with the smallest chi-square. These transformations
were further checked for linearity by their partial plots.
A preliminary analysis was done for all the models and the plots of residuals versus
predicted values were analyzed to detect any patterns in the plots. Though there was no definite
pattern in the plots, which hints at lack of heteroscedasticity, the regressions were rerun with
robust standard errors to control for any non-visual heteroscedasticity that may be present in the
data. Moreover, to test the normality assumptions underlying the multiple linear regression
analyses, I made use of the Jarque-Bera (JB) test, which provides a test for any non-normality in
the residuals. The hypotheses for the JB test are as follows:
Ho: The residuals are normally distributed
Ha: The residuals are not normally distributed
For all models, the JB test fails to reject the null hypothesis of the distribution being normal
at a significance level of 0.05. In other words, the JB test shows that no statistically significant
claim can be made that the distribution is not normal.66
The results of the regression analyses are presented in Tables 5-11 below.
5.4 RESULTS
5.4.1 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MODEL I
Table 5: Regression Results for Model I
Model I
Total
Participation
66

Unstandardized

Standardized

For Model I, the probability that the JB statistic of 1.41 would exceed the critical value is 0.4929 for the first
regression; for the second regression, the JB is 2.24 and the prob > chi2 is 0.3263; for the third regression, the JB
statistic is 0.29 and prob >chi2 is 0.8640. For Model II, the JB statistic is 0.87 and prob > chi2 is 0.6484; for Model
III, JB = 0.66, and prob >chi2 is 0.7176; for Model IV, the JB statistic is 0.01 and prob >chi2 is 0.9970. For Model
V, the JB statistic is 0.50 and prob >chi2 is 0.7791.

97
PT

coefficients
B

Constant
Strength
Transparency
Threshold
Dispneg
Amendpty
Fintransfers
Capacity

19.381
-12.247
7.728
0.291
19.404
6.334
2.488
-1.085

Robust
Standard
Error
8.376
5.370
3.273
0.441
10.650
9.946
15.463
5.707

coefficients
Beta

t

Significance

-0.453
0.441
0.155
0.331
0.095
0.036
-0.043

2.31
-2.28
2.36
0.66
1.82
0.64
0.16
-0.19

0.030
0.032**
0.027**
0.515
0.081*
0.531
0.874
0.851

N
31
2
R
0.5009
F-statistic(7, 23)
8.47***
***
significant at the 0.005 level
**
significant at the 0.05 level
*
significant at the 0.1 level

For the above model, the F-value of 8.47 is statistically significant at p < 0.005, showing
good model fit. In line with theoretical expectations, stronger agreements show a negative
association with participation, and flexible provisions such as emphasizing negotiations as a
means of dispute settlement or allowing any party to propose amendments to the IEA texts, show
a positive relationship with participation. The variable ‘capacity’ is showing a negative
relationship with participation, implying that there is a tendency among states to view provisions
for capacity-building in an unfavorable light.
Variables which are statistically significant at the 5% level are ‘strength’ and
‘transparency’, while ‘dispneg’ (dispute settlement through negotiation) is statistically significant
at the 10% level. The threshold number, together with ‘amendpty’ (amendment by party),
‘fintransfers’ (financial transfers), and ‘capacity’ are not statistically significant.
From these results we can conclude that IEAs which have strong clauses tend to elicit
lower participation rates, while IEAs which favor dispute resolution through negotiation tend to
sustain higher levels of participation from the international community. Further, IEAs which
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include transparency measures, such as allowing NGOs and other interested parties to act as
observers, or requiring parties to report on their implementation, tend to elicit higher
participation rates from the international community.
With all other variables held constant, the incorporation of an additional clause for
strengthening an IEA will result in a loss of participation from 12 states, while the inclusion of
an additional clause for increasing the transparency of an IEA will cause the IEA to sustain
participation from 7 additional states. The legal possibility of resolving disputes through
negotiations first will tend to increase participation in an IEA by 19 more states.
From the beta weights of the variables, the strength of an IEA seems to exert the greatest
influence on total participation, followed very closely by the transparency provisions of the IEA.
With all other variables held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in the strength of an
IEA will result in a decrease of 0.45 standard deviation in total participation, while an increase of
one standard deviation in the transparency of the IEA will result in an increase of 0.44 standard
deviation in total participation. Similarly, with all other variables held constant, an increase of
one standard deviation in the variable ‘dispneg’ (dispute resolution through negotiation) will
cause an increase of 0.33 standard deviation in participation.

Table 6: Regression Results for Model I - Developed Countries
Model I
Participation
from developed
countries
PDD

Unstandardized
coefficients
B

Constant
Strength
Transparency
Threshold
Dispneg
Amendpty
Fintransfers
Capacity

35.584
-12.336
7.767
0.044
20.639
-1.990
-4.652
2.261

Robust
standard
error
12.820
5.515
3.860
0.520
10.862
13.004
14.626
6.654

Standardized
coefficients
Beta

T

Significance

-0.472
0.458
0.024
0.364
-0.031
-0.069
0.093

2.78
-2.24
2.01
0.08
1.90
-0.15
-0.32
0.34

0.011
0.035**
0.056*
0.933
0.070*
0.880
0.753
0.737
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N
31
R2
0.4178
F-statistic(7, 23)
4.21***
***
significant at the 0.005 level
**
significant at the 0.05 level
*
significant at the 0.1 level

The F-statistic (value of 4.21) is significant at p < 0.005, attesting to good model fit.
Strong clauses within an IEA seem to detract from high participation from developed countries,
while transparency provisions seem to attract more developed states to participate in the IEA.
Moreover, developed countries seem not to favor clauses allowing any party to propose
amendments to the treaty text, as well as clauses allowing financial transfers to take place among
parties. On the other hand, developed countries seem to favor measures for capacity-building.
Variable ‘strength’ is statistically significant at the 5% level, while ‘transparency’ and
‘dispneg’ (dispute settlement through negotiation) are statistically significant at the 10% level.
Variables ‘threshold’, ‘amendpty’, ‘fintransfers’ and ‘capacity’ do not show any statistical
significance with participation from developed countries.
The results show that developed countries tend to participate less in stronger agreements,
and more in those agreements which include provisions enhancing transparency or favoring
dispute settlement through negotiations. With all other variables held constant, the inclusion of
one additional clause for strengthening an IEA will cause a decrease in participation from 12
developed countries. One additional clause for enhancing the transparency of an IEA will result
in an increase in participation from 7 more developed nations. Presence of a clause allowing
dispute resolution through negotiation will result in an increase in participation from 20
developed countries.
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From the beta weights, the strength of an IEA seems to exert the greatest influence on
participation from developed countries, followed by the presence of transparency clauses. With
all other variables held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in the strength of an IEA
will result in a decrease of 0.47 standard deviation in participation from developed countries,
while an increase of one standard deviation in the transparency of an IEA will result in an
increase of 0.46 standard deviation in participation from developed countries. Though not
statistically significant, the presence of a clause allowing for financial transfers seems to have an
adverse impact on participation from developed countries, as does a clause allowing parties to
bring amendments to the IEA texts.

Table 7: Regression Results for Model I - Developing Countries
Model IV
Participation
from
developing
countries
PDG
Constant
Strength
Transparency
Threshold
Dispneg
Amendpty
Fintransfers
Capacity

Unstandardized
coefficients
B
14.746
-12.042
7.791
0.328
19.016
8.383
4.509
-1.875

Robust
Standard
Error
7.610
5.442
3.258
0.438
11.017
9.526
16.527
5.739

Standardized
coefficients
Beta

T

Significance

-0.433
0.432
0.170
0.316
0.122
0.063
-0.073

1.94
-2.21
2.39
0.75
1.73
0.88
0.27
-0.33

0.065
0.037**
0.025**
0.461
0.098*
0.388
0.787
0.747

N
31
R2
0.504
F-statistic(7, 23)
9.22***
***
significant at the 0.005 level
**
significant at the 0.05 level
*
significant at the 0.1 level

The F-statistic (value of 9.22) is statistically significant at a p-value of less than 0.005
level. The direction of the regression coefficients show that developing countries tend not to
favor strong IEAs and those which have provisions for capacity-building, and to prefer IEAs
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which are transparent, include provisions for amendments by any party, allow for dispute
resolution through negotiations first, and include mechanisms for financial transfers.
The variable ‘Strength’ and ‘transparency’ are both statistically significant at the 5%
level, while ‘dispneg’ (dispute settlement through negotiation) is statistically significant at the
10% level. The variables threshold, ‘amendpty’ (any party to bring amendment to IEA text),
‘fintransfers’ (provisions for financial transfers) and ‘capacity’ do not depict statistical
significance with participation from developing countries.
The results show that developing countries tend to participate less in stronger IEAs than
in weaker ones, and that they favor IEAs which enhance transparency and favor flexibility. With
all other variables held constant, an additional clause meant to strengthen an IEA will result in a
loss of participation from 12 developing countries, while an increase of an additional clause on
transparency will result in an increase in participation from 7 developing nations. The possibility
of resolving disputes through negotiation causes an increase in participation from 19 developing
countries, if all other variables are held constant.
Both the strength and transparency provisions of IEAs seem to exert the same level of
influence on participation from developing countries. If there is an increase of one standard
deviation in the strength of an IEA, participation from developing countries will decrease by 0.43
standard deviation, while all other variables are held constant. Similarly, if transparency of the
IEA increases by one standard deviation, participation from developing countries increases by
0.43 standard deviation, when all other variables are held constant.
5.4.2 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MODELS II, III, IV and V
(i)

MODEL II: Power-Interest

Table 8: Regression Results for Model II
Model II

Unstandardized

Standardized
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coefficients
B
Constant
Gdpcap1
Indgth
Forest
Mineral_t67
Contiguity
Popdens_t68
Milexp
Milcoup

12.874
0.0015
0.018
-0.046
1.862
0.881
1.380
-0.439
-2.910

Robust
Standard
Error
5.362
0.0002
0.196
0.050
0.419
0.418
0.925
0.130
2.150

coefficients
Beta

t

Significance

0.600
0.004
-0.049
0.270
0.119
0.102
-0.200
-0.078

2.40
6.74
0.09
-0.93
4.44
2.11
1.49
-3.38
-1.35

0.018
0.000***
0.926
0.355
0.000***
0.038**
0.139
0.001***
0.179

N
108
R2
0.7469
F-statistic(8,99)
41.58***
***
significant at less than 0.005 level
**
significant at less than 0.05 level

The F-statistisc of 41.58 is statistically significant at p < 0.005 level, showing that Model
II has statistically significant predictive capability. The signs of the estimated coefficients for
economic and industrial development, and environmental vulnerability (population density and
contiguity) depict a positive association between the predictors and the criterion, thus being in
line with theoretical expectations. For natural resources, the proxy of forest area shows a
negative relationship with participation, while the proxy of mineral resource production value
associates positively with the independent variable. Political instability and military expenditures
show a negative relationship with participation.
From Model II, the following variables show statistical significance at the 0.5% level:
gdpcap1 (GDP per capita), mineral_t (transformed mineral production value), contiguity, and
milexp (military expenditures). Industrial growth, forest areas, population density and political
instability are not statistically significant. Based on these results, we can argue that countries
which are more closely surrounded by contiguous neighbors, which produce more mineral

67
68

Mineral_t stands for the natural log transformation of the variable mineral i.e. Mineral_t = ln(mineral).
Similarly, popdens_t = ln(popdens).
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resources for commercial exploitation, and which have high economic growth tend to participate
in more IEAs than countries which are less vulnerable environmentally, are less involved in
mineral resource production, or which have lower levels of economic development. The results
also show that countries which spend a higher percentage of their national budget on military
expenditures tend to participate in IEAs to a lesser extent than countries which spend a smaller
percentage of their national budget on such military expenditures.
With all other variables held constant, an increase in military expenditures by 1% of the
central government expenditures in a state will cause a decrease in the state participation by 0.44
IEAs. Similarly, with all other variables held constant, an increase of $US 1 in the GDP per
capita of a state will result in an increase in state participation by 0.001 IEAs, and an increase in
the number of contiguous neighbors by one will result in an increase in participation by 0.88
IEAs.
If we compare the beta weights for the independent variables, we can state the GDP per
capita seems to have the greatest influence on participation, followed by the mineral production
value (in its natural logarithmic form), expenditures on military, and the contiguity score. With
all other independent variables held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in GDP per
capita causes an increase of 0.6 standard deviation in participation. Similarly, with all other
variables held constant, an increase of 1 standard deviation in the mineral production value (in its
natural logarithmic form) will result in an increase of 0.27 standard deviation in participation,
and an increase of 1 standard deviation in the expenditures on military, when calculated as a
percentage of total government expenditures, will result in a decrease of 0.20 standard deviation
in participation. Countries which have a contiguity score 1 standard deviation higher than
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another country will have a participation which is 0.12 standard deviation higher, with all other
variables held constant.
(ii)

MODEL III: Liberal-Interdependent

Table 9: Regression Results for Model III
Model III

Constant
HDI
Eionum
Ecofree
Goveff
Tgoods
Polity
Agenda21_t69

Unstandardized
coefficients
B
-23.174
22.954
1.326
12.163
9.127
-0.084
0.247
1.680

Robust
standard error
15.643
13.130
0.220
4.401
2.847
0.026
0.212
0.920

Standardized
coefficients
Beta

t

Significance

0.185
0.412
0.248
0.455
-0.163
0.075
0.170

-1.48
1.75
6.02
2.76
3.21
-3.23
1.16
1.83

0.144
0.086*
0.000***
0.008**
0.002***
0.002***
0.250
0.073*

N
64
R2
0.824
F-statistic(7,56)
45.11***
***
significant at the 0.005 level
**
significant at the 0.05 level
*
significant at the 0.1 level

The F-statistic (45.11) is statistically significant at p< 0.005 level, demonstrating good
model fit. The signs of all the regression coefficients meet theoretical expectations, except for the
variable measuring volumes of trade (tgoods) and economic freedom (ecofree), which depict
negative associations with participation. Higher values of ‘ecofree’ signify lower levels of
economic freedom. Hence, the results show that lower degrees of economic freedom (i.e. higher
values of ‘ecofree’) tend to be positively associated with higher levels of participation, which is
in antithesis to the posited relationship.
Variables which are statistically significant at the 0.5% level are ‘eionum’ (participation
in environmental IGOs), volumes of trade (tgoods), and governmental effectiveness (goveff).
Economic freedom is statistically significant at the 5% level, while HDI and local Agenda 21
69

Agenda21_t = ln (Agenda21).
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initiatives (in its natural logarithmic form) are statistically significant at the 10% level. The
variable ‘polity’ does not show any statistical significance with participation in IEAs.
The results show that countries which have higher levels of human development, have
higher density of interaction in international environmental institutions, have stronger
governmental institutions, and higher levels of civic environmentalism tend to participate in
IEAs to a greater extent than countries which have lower degrees of each of the mentioned
parameters. The results also show that countries which are involved in higher volumes of trading
and which have a higher level of economic freedom tend to participate less in IEAs than
countries with lower trade openness and lower levels of economic freedom.
With all other independent variables held constant, an increase in governmental
effectiveness by one score will cause a state to participate in 9 additional IEAs, and an increase
of one unit in the HDI score will result in the state participating in 22 more states. Similarly,
when other variables are held constant, an increase of one unit in membership in environmental
IGOs will result in an increase in participation by 1 IEA. On the other hand, a decrease in
economic freedom by one score will result in an increase in participation by 12 IEAs, while an
increase in the amount of trade by 1% of GDP will result in a decrease in participation by 0.08
IEAs, with all other variables held constant. If the number of local Agenda 21 initiatives
increases by 1%, this will result in an increase in participation by 0.02 IEAs.70
If we compare the beta weights of the independent variables, we can state that
governmental effectiveness and membership in environmental IGOs seem to exert the greatest
influence on participation. With all other variables held constant, an increase of one standard
deviation in governmental effectiveness will result in an increase of 0.45 standard deviation in
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Because of the natural log transformation, a change of 1% in X is associated with a change of 0.01b1 in Y. This is
because Y + δY = b0 + b1ln(1.01X), which makes δY = b1ln(1.01) i.e. δY = 0.01b1.
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participation, while an increase of one standard deviation in membership in environmental IGOs
will result in an increase of 0.41 standard deviation in participation. Similarly, with all other
variables are held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in the amount of trade (when
calculated as a percentage of GDP) will result in a decrease of 0.16 standard deviation in
participation; an increase of one standard deviation in HDI will result in an increase of 0.19
standard deviation in participation; and an increase of 1 standard deviation in ‘ecofree’ will result
in an increase of 0.25 standard deviation in participation.
(iii)

MODEL IV

Table 10: Regression Results for Model IV
Model IV

Constant
Graft
Sanitation
Undernutrition_t71
Imortality
Odacap_t72
Polity
Arms
Tgoods
Agenda21_t
Gdpcap1

Unstandardized
coefficients
B
67.764
6.221
0.037
-5.955
-0.029
-3.791
0.231
-0.722
-0.061
0.651
-0.0007

Robust
Standard
Error
8.547
2.305
0.048
1.690
0.019
0.922
0.211
0.307
0.040
1.009
0.0007

Standardized
coefficients
Beta

t

Significance

0.293
0.077
-0.414
-0.160
-0.449
0.113
-0.270
-0.143
0.088
-0.161

7.93
2.70
0.77
-3.52
-1.56
-4.11
1.09
-2.36
-1.51
0.64
-0.97

0.000
0.010**
0.447
0.001***
0.127
0.000***
0.280
0.023**
0.138
0.523
0.339

N
52
R2
0.649
F-statistic(10, 41)
15.44***
***
Significant at the 0.005 level
**
Significant at the 0.05 level

The F-statistic (value of 15.44) is statistically significant at the 0.5% level, thereby
demonstrating good model fit. Except for the variables ‘tgoods’ (volumes of trade) and

71
72

Undernutrition_t = ln(undernutrition)
Odacap_t = ln(odacap)
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‘gdpcap1’ (level of economic development), the signs of the regression coefficients all tally with
theoretical expectations.
Undernutrition and foreign aid dependency are statistically significant at the 0.5% level.
Control on corruption (variable graft) and arms imports are statistically significant at the 5%
level. The variables sanitation, infant mortality, polity, volumes of trade, Agenda 21 initiatives
and GDP/capita do not show any statistical significance with participation from developing
countries.
From these results, we can state that developing countries which have better control on
corruption, have lower dependence on foreign aid, have lower percentage of the population
suffering from undernourishment, and which have lower volumes of arms imports tend to
participate in IEAs to a greater extent than developing countries which exhibit the opposite
trends in these domestic components. With all other variables held constant, an increase of one
unit in the control on corruption in a developing country will result in that state participating in
6.2 additional IEAs, while an increase in arms imports by 1% of the total imports will result in a
decrease of developing country participation by 0.7 IEAs. An increase in foreign aid dependency
by 1% in a developing country will result in that country reducing its participation by 0.04
IEAs73.
If we compare the beta weights, foreign aid dependence seems to exert the greatest
impact on participation from developing countries, followed by the percentage of population
suffering from malnutrition, the control on corruption, and the extent of arms imports, in that
order. With all other variables held constant, an increase of 1 standard deviation in foreign aid
dependence (in its natural logarithmic form) will result in a decrease of 0.45 standard deviation
in participation from developing countries. Similarly, with all other variables held constant, an
73

Because of the ln transformation, a 1% increase in Odacap results in 0.01*(-3.79) = 0.038
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increase of 1standard deviation in the level of undernutrition (in its natural logarithm) will result
in a decrease of 0.41 standard deviation in participation from developing countries; an increase
of 1 standard deviation in the control of corruption will result in an increase of 0.29 standard
deviation in participation from developing countries; and an increase of 1 standard deviation in
arms imports will result in a decrease of 0.27 standard deviation in participation from developing
countries.
Model V
Table 11: Regression Results for Model V
Model V

Constant
Contiguity
Milexp
Graft
Polity
Eionum
Mineral_t
Odacap_t
Agenda21_t
Popdens_t
HDI
Tgoods

Unstandardized
coefficients
B
8.687
0.966
-0.393
6.385
0.229
0.997
0.477
-1.599
0.342
1.418
22.685
-0.051

Robust
Standard
Error
9.355
0.420
0.130
2.207
0.253
0.278
0.669
1.064
1.078
0.915
12.055
0.034

Standardized
coefficients
Beta

t

Significance

0.181
-0.300
0.334
0.109
0.309
0.095
-0.165
0.041
0.132
0.279
-0.137

0.93
2.30
-3.03
2.89
0.90
3.59
0.71
-1.50
0.32
1.55
1.88
-1.52

0.357
0.025**
0.004***
0.005***
0.369
0.001***
0.479
0.139
0.753
0.127
0.065*
0.135

N
67
R2
0.6650
F-statistic(11, 55)
12.23***
***
Significant at the 0.005 level
**
Significant at the 0.05 level
*
Significant at the 0.1 level

The F-statistic of 12.23 is statistically significant at p <0.005 level, showing that Model V
as a whole has statistically significant predictive capability. All the regression coefficients
demonstrate an association with participation which is in line with theoretical expectations,
expect for the variable ‘tgoods’ (volume of trade), which is showing a negative relationship with
participation.
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Military expenditures, control on corruption, and participation in international
environmental IGOs are statistically significant at the 0.5% level. Contiguity is statistically
significant at the 5% level, while HDI is statistically significant at the 10% level. The variables
polity, mineral value production, foreign aid dependency, Agenda 21 initiatives, population
density and trade volumes are not statistically significant.
These results show that states which invest more heavily in their military empowerment
are less likely to participate in IEAs than those which do not devote as much resources for their
military build-up. Moreover, states which have better control on corruption and which participate
in environmental IGOs are more likely to participate in IEAs than states which suffer from high
degrees of corruption or which shy away from participation in international environmental
institutions. Further, a state which is surrounded by a great number of contiguous neighbors is
more likely to participate in IEAs than one which is more isolated. Also, it seems that states
which have a high quality of life, as denoted by their high HDI scores, tend to participate in IEAs
to a greater extent than states with lower levels of human development.
With all other variables held constant, an increase of 1% in the military expenditures of a
state will cause that state to be less likely to participate in 0.39 IEAs. On the other hand, with all
other variables held constant, an increase of one unit in corruption control will likely increase
participation by 6 IEAs. A state which participates in one additional environmental IGO is more
likely to participate in one additional IEA, when all other variables are held constant. A state
which has one contiguous neighbor more than another state will be more likely to participate in
approximately one IEA more than the other state, keeping constant all other variables. Moreover,
with all other variables held constant, a one unit increase in the HDI of a state will make that
state more likely to participate in 22 additional IEAs.
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Looking at the beta weights, corruption control seems to exert the greatest influence on
participation in IEAs, and contiguity seems to exert the least influence. The influence of military
expenditures is almost at par with that of participation in environmental IGOs. When all other
variables are held constant, an increase of one standard deviation in the variable ‘graft’ will
result in an increase of 0.33 standard deviation in participation. An increase of one standard
deviation in the level of a state’s participation in environmental IGOs will result in an increase of
0.31 standard deviation in participation; an increase of one standard deviation in military
expenditures will result in a decrease of 0.30 standard deviation in participation; an increase of
one standard deviation in HDI will result in an increase of 0.28 standard deviation in
participation; and an increase of one standard deviation in contiguity will result in an increase of
0.18 standard deviation in participation, when all other variables are held constant.
5.5 Discussion of Findings
Treaty Provisions
Model I shows that participation in IEAs tends to be negatively impacted by strong and
binding provisions and seems to be enhanced by provisions which promote transparency and
flexible means of dispute settlement. Contrary to expectations, Model I shows that both
developed and developing countries seem to disfavor IEAs which have requirements for
enactment of domestic legislation for treaty implementation, which specify quantitative targets
and implementation deadlines, which include verification and review mechanisms, which include
sanctions, or which require a specific group of countries to participate for entry into force of the
treaty. Model I thus disproves the common statement made by several researchers alleging that
developing countries tend to prefer weaker IEAs, with the underlying assumption that developed
countries exhibit contrary tendencies. I suspect that statements referring to the preference of

111
developed countries for stringent environmental measures may fit the regional landscape better
than the global one. While developed countries may be highly committed to strong regional
environmental measures, perhaps because they are directly impacted by the environmental
externalities, their preference for weak global IEAs is at par with that of the developing nations.
The natural predilection on the part of both the developed and developing countries for
transparent measures within IEA texts and for flexibility to resolve potential disputes through
negotiations first can be understood in terms of states’ concerns with satisfying themselves that
other party members are not free-riding and that they can maintain some level of control on the
treaty implementation process. Clauses enhancing transparency will likely make the processes of
treaty implementation more open to international scrutiny and any potential opt-outs or freeriders can be easily identified and dealt with, such that the costs of implementation do not fall
disproportionately on any particular group of states. Transparency also increases the likelihood
that the IEA will be effective by shedding light on various management problems such as misuse
of funds transferred for treaty implementation, or inadequate domestic efforts to fully comply
and implement the IEA provisions.
Control over dispute resolution is crucial in international relations among states. Loss of
such control can potentially be viewed as an erosion of national sovereignty, and thus less
palatable to a state concerned with the maintenance or increase in its power potential. The
general preference for negotiations as the first means of addressing conflicts points to the fact
that, at least in the international environmental domain, countries are interested in avoiding
protracted tensions in their relationships and believe that they can arrive at mutually agreeable
positions through the processes of negotiations. This is an important finding as it holds promise
for peace. A preference for negotiations is a potential harbinger of friendly debates and an open
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and frank atmosphere to resolve conflicting interests and establish mutually recognized rights
and obligations.
The variable ‘threshold’ does not show any direct impact on total participation, as well as
on participation from the developed or developing nations. This is antithetic to the increasing
economic exposés which posit that IEC tends to increase when there is a minimum ratification
clause embedded in the treaty text. While economic analysis seems to argue that making
participation contingent on that of other states will likely increase overall participation, in real
policy-making contexts, this need not be an automatic outcome. Overall, a ratification threshold
does not inevitably translate into higher levels of participation. It is likely that countries may not
be concerned so much about the number of required ratifications, as about the nature of
participation. In other words, while countries may not care about how many other states have
already ratified a particular treaty, they may nevertheless be interested in whether a particular
country or a particular group of countries are ratifying or not. This would explain why the
majority of ratifications for the KP, especially from the OECD countries, occurred in 2002 and
not before. It is quite likely that before US’s decision to withdraw completely from the treaty, the
majority of OECD countries were potentially holding out until US, the major emitter, commit to
GHG reduction targets mandated by the KP. Only after it became clear that such would not occur
did the majority of states ratify the KP in 2002 to signify their decision to go ahead with the KP,
even without the participation of the US. It is interesting to point out also that the KP does not
merely include a simple ratification threshold. As present in other IEAs such as MARPOL 73/78,
the KP includes a minimum ratification threshold as well as the requirement for ratification from
major GHG emitters, which would ensure that a minimum percentage of emissions is covered by
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the ratifications. This added requirement is meant to strengthen the treaty and ensure its
effectiveness.
Though the variables ‘threshold’, ‘amendtpty’ (amendment by any party), ‘fintransfers’
(financial transfers), and capacity-building do not depict any statistical significance, they depict
different directions of causation for the developed and developing countries. The results show a
tendency among developing countries to favor provisions facilitating financial transfers as well
as provisions allowing any party to propose amendments to the treaty. Moreover, developing
countries seem not to prefer measures for capacity-building. Developed countries, on the other
hand, show a tendency to favor the absence of clauses allowing amendment propositions from
any party member, the absence of requirements for financial transfers, and a positive legal
requirement for capacity-building measures (see Table 12).
Table 12: Differences of IEA Preferences for Developed and Developing Countries

Treaty Characteristics
Capacity-building provisions
Amendment by any party
Financial mechanism

Preference
Developing
No
Yes
Yes

Developed
Yes
No
No

The low preference from developed countries for provisions for financial transfers
probably stems from the fact that they will, in all probability, be the ones responsible for
disbursing funds for the financial transfers. Developed countries often resent the fact they are
being called to disburse valuable financial resources to fund development projects within
developing countries, which in many cases, often misuse or misappropriate the transferred funds.
The fact that corruption within the developing world (as shown in Models IV and V) seems to
detract from participation attests to the lack of commitment to international environmental
protection on the part of corrupt political figures within the developing world. The concerns of
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the developed world may thus not be misguided. This may explain why developed countries
seem to prefer to invest in measures for capacity-building (such as training, technology transfers,
and R&D cooperation) rather than on direct monetary transfers.
On the other hand, it may seem unfair and inequitable to request developing countries to
implement treaty provisions with their own scarce resources for the protection of the global
environment - an environment which has been spoilt mostly by the development processes of
the developed world. The preference of developing nations for financial transfers may thus be
understood in terms of their perceptions that they are “entitled” to such disbursements since they
were not responsible in creating the environmental problems in the first place. This goes to the
heart of the underlying rift between the North and the South: developing countries fear that they
will lose their freedom to follow their desired development paths by participating in strong IEAs
which place all sorts of restrictions on their development processes, without however providing
any compensation to them to meet their development needs; and the developed North viewing
the developing south as a world of corruption and inefficiencies. Developing countries often
argue that global environmental problems such as global warming and ozone depletion have
been caused by the developed nations and thus it is only fitting that they share the higher burden
of abatement and mitigation.
In one sense, however, allowing financial transfers makes sense if the goal is to increase
international commitment to the protection of the global environment. Model IV provides some
light into why this is so. Based on Model IV, low participation among developing countries can
be attributed to their endemic socio-economic constraints. The fact that developing nations are
often heavily dependent on foreign aid and face high levels of various social ills (such as
undernutrition) makes their demands for financial transfers legitimate. This line of argument has
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found its place within the texts of recent IEAs (e.g. the UNFCCC, the MP, and the KP) which
specifically includes provisions acknowledging the special conditions of developing nations and
provides special mechanisms for financial transfers. The low preference of developing countries
for measures geared towards capacity-building only strengthen the finding that financial transfers
seem to be a better strategy to attract developing nations to participate in IEAs. Developing
nations’ low preference for capacity-building provisions may stem from the fact that such
measures often do not have concrete plans of action and no concrete outcomes. Moreover, the
promise of capacity-building may not materialize in the short-time frame, as opposed to financial
transfers, which have clearly specified modus operandi and which occur within clearly
demarcated time-frames.
The difference in preference between developed and developing nations in so far as
amendment clauses are concerned can also be understood in terms of the different concerns and
priorities of the two groups. Developed nations do not prefer the ability for any party member to
bring amendments to the treaty texts, most likely because they are the ones who have been
responsible for the drafting and finalizing of the treaty texts. It is no surprise that they will try to
restrict the freedom of other party members to bring changes to compromises which have been
reached after innumerable sessions of negotiations and bargaining. Moreover, allowing
amendments by any party member will likely alter the structure of the calculations of costs and
benefits which the developed nations relied on to participate in the IEAs in the first place.
Suddenly, the IEAs may not seem beneficial at all. Given the fact that withdrawing from IEAs is
not without costs itself, amendments can only be a trigger of additional costs rather than benefits
for the developed world.
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On the other hand, the fact the developing nations prefer to be able to bring amendments
to IEA provisions may merely reflect their desire to safeguard their national interests and
concerns in a process which did not involve them significantly in the initial phases. Though IEA
negotiations are more open to participation from developing countries nowadays, in the past,
most of the IEAs were sponsored by the developed world. It is thus likely that the developing
nations may not find all aspects of the IEA to be in their favor and they may desire to have the
freedom to request for a modification of the status quo if need be.
State Characteristics
The power-interest model illustrates that power considerations do matter in a state’s
decision to participate in IEAs. For example, a desire to reduce its level of environmental
vulnerability will make a state more likely to agree to the international norms and standards
embodied within treaty texts. Thus, a nation which has a higher number of contiguous neighbors
will tend to participate in more IEAs than another state with a lower level of contiguity.
Similarly, a state with a greater amount of economic power will participate in more IEAs than
one with a lower level of economic development, probably to safeguard its competitive
advantage in the international market.
Military power stands as an opposing force to participation. The power-interest model
establishes that a state is more likely to participate in an IEA if it is less invested in enhancing its
military potential. It is well-known that the military is often responsible for a high level of
environmental pollution, either through its routine practice sessions, or in real deployment. In
both cases, the military makes use of munitions which have been proven to be harmful to the
environment and to life. A state interested in empowering its military on in investing larger
portions of its national budget on military expenditures will likely invest less resources and
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attention to global environmental protection. Such a state will thus tend to participate less in
IEAs than another state not so bent on military empowerment. The negative association of the
variable ‘milexp’ (military expenditures) with participation thus reflects an inherent tension
between the military and the environment, as well as the conflicting priorities brought to bear on
policy-makers by the need to build up the military arsenal and the need to commit to global
environmental protection.
The positive association of mineral production value with participation negates
hypothesis H2f, which postulated a negative association. This result, as compared to the negative
impact on participation depicted by the variable ‘forest’ (forest resources as % of land area),
shows that the influence of natural resource endowment on participation may be highly
dependent on which type of resources we are including in the model – i.e. whether we are
considering renewable or non-renewable resources. Since mineral resources are non-renewable
resources, thus necessitating prudent management strategies for their long-lasting benefits, it is
likely that a certain element of caution and environmental prudence may be motivating decisionmakers, thereby accounting for the positive association of the variable with participation (this
positive association is also maintained in Model V). Forest resources, on the other hand, are very
heavily exploited in most parts of the world, and are more amenable to renewal strategies than
mineral resources. The negative association may reflect the unwillingness of states which are
heavily reliant on their forestry industries to agree to lower economic returns, as well as the
tendency to rely on reforestation and other forestry management strategies to address any
depletion of the forest resources that may be occurring due to timber exports or consumption.
The liberal-interdependent model, true to its purported objective, attests to the fact that
institutions (whether domestic or international) have an impact on participation. High levels of
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participation in environmental IGOs make a state more likely to participate in IEAs. This is
probably due to the fact that the state undergoes a process of international acculturation to
environmental norms and standards, and the mechanisms of the IGOs may exert a pressure on
the state to commit to the legal norms and standards in IEAs. It is not likely that the variable
‘eionum’ (participation in environmental IGOs) merely reflects an underlying commitment by
the state for international environmental protection and does not therefore provide an
independent explanation for participation. Participation in environmental IGOs and participation
in IEAs are different processes and involve different actors and calculations. IEAs, by their very
nature, are legally binding, subject to International Law, and subject to the principle of pacta
sunt servanda.
Moreover, participation in IEAs is a more serious business than participating in an
environmental IGO: the former often requires binding commitments to arrest or alter national
development priorities, to adopt new production processes, to disburse funds, or to reallocate
much scarce national resources; the latter, on the other hand, often does not require such wideranging policy shifts and are more open to flexible means of enforcement. It is likely therefore
that the significant positive relationship between ‘eionum’ and participation illustrates the
independent influence of environmental IGOs on participation. Participation in environmental
IGOs may provide a learning experience for the states, where they get to be familiar with the
nature of the global environmental problems and are sensitized to the need for international
cooperation on the subject. Further, it is likely that members of the IGOs may act to exert a
pressure on other members who have not yet ratified a particular treaty to do so. It is also quite
possible that membership in the environmental IGOs may require adoption or commitment of
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specific measures detailed in IEAs, which will make participation in those IEAs an attractive
feature in terms of integrating policies and strategies.
On the domestic front, the strength of governmental institutions seems to exert a positive
influence on participation. For a state to eventually participate in an IEA, lots of background
work need to be conducted: first, in anticipation of the international negotiations to take place for
the adoption of the draft treaty text; and second, for the processes of treaty ratification within the
domestic political structure. Delegates to the international conferences need to be well-versed in
the treaty processes and in the treaty stipulations, which often require close collaboration among
various branches of the government. Further, the attractiveness or unattractiveness of a particular
IEA is subject to the stance of domestic agencies bestowed with the mandate of dealing with the
theme dealt with by the treaty. Bureaucrats who deal with the specific issues on a daily basis
therefore have an important role to play in determining the position of the country vis-à-vis the
treaty. Thus, calculations of costs and benefits occur at various levels of the political machine,
which render participation in IEAs vulnerable to how well that machine functions. Weak
governmental institutions may not grasp the essential thesis of a particular IEA or may simply be
too lax in ensuring that ratification processes go smoothly. Hence, strong governmental
institutions may likely be a crucial factor in explaining state participation in IEAs. This is indeed
validated by the beta weight of the variable ‘goveff’ in Model III.
The results from Model III specifically negate hypotheses H3e and H3f. Contrary to the
hypothesized relationships, both economic freedom and high volumes of trade seem to exert a
negative impact on participation. One possible explanation for this finding is that trade
provisions often run counter to environmental policies. States which are involved in high levels
of international trading will likely desire to maximize their economic gains and minimize
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potential losses. In view of the inherent tensions that exist between the trade-environment
interface, high volumes of trade may run counter to international environmental goals. In this
conflict, trade almost always wins. Thus, a state with high volumes of trade, and for that matter,
a high level of economic freedom, will be less desirous of curbing its international trade policies
to participate in IEAs. The goals of free trade often stand in opposition to global environmental
protection, causing states favoring free trade through their liberal economic policies to shy away
from the global norms and standards codified in IEAs.
The positive association between HDI and participation shows that states with high
quality of life invest in or commit to more in global environmental protection. High values of
HDI reflect both economic and human development. With improvements in the quality of life of
its citizens, national leaders face less constraints to devote resources for meeting urgent domestic
priorities. There is scope therefore for concentrating on the international forum. Moreover,
countries with high human development tend to have a well-educated population. Environmental
awareness among the population may likely trigger processes for placing the country on the
international front for global environmental protection. This tends to be strengthened by the
positive impact of local Agenda 21 initiatives on state participation in IEAs. A higher number of
local initiatives reflect the level of environmental awareness of the population and their
commitment to environmental protection. Popular movements often compel national leaders to
alter their projected paths and to implement measures supported by the people. Even if local
Agenda 21 initiatives do not automatically translate into a direct pressure for national policymakers to participate in IEAs, the fact that the population has demonstrated a willingness to
strive for environmental protection may suggest to the leaders that non-participation may be a
costly enterprise.
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The significance of HDI has to be understood in light of the various endemic constraints
highlighted in Model IV. Indeed, the developing-logistics model suggests that developing nations
face certain socio-economic and political challenges which render them less amenable to
participating in IEAs. In Model IV, foreign aid dependency seems to exert the greatest negative
impact on participation. Foreign aid dependency in a sense suggests that poverty acts as a
constraining determinant of participation. Poor nations typically lack adequate resources to meet
basic survival needs. In such a context, commitment to global environmental protection cannot
become a national objective. The need to feed the population cannot be overridden by global
environmental concerns.
Thus, states with high dependency on foreign aid and with high levels of undernutrition
are, not surprisingly, less likely to participate in IEAs. Economic development, likely to be low,
therefore does not seem to exert any statistically significant on participation. Though not
statistically significant, the negative correlation between GDP/capita and participation in Model
IV hints at the fact that developing nations are concerned with achieving higher standards of
living and economic development through industrial production and technological development.
In this quest for rapid industrial progress, concerns with environmental protection are dampened
within the national policy debate as the goals of environmental protection and unhampered
industrial development often clash with each other. In any case, endemic social challenges
relating to survival issues and high levels of poverty seem to act as major constraining forces on
any positive impact on participation that might be accrued from a certain level of economic
progress and civic environmentalism. Further, while strong governmental institutions seem to
catalyze participation in IEAs, Model IV shows that lack of control on corruption is detrimental
to participation. Corruption entails mismanagement of public funds, public distrust in the
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political process, and lack of commitment to the improvement of the citizens’ quality of life.
Within such a framework, participation in IEAs may be seen merely as a cost.
In tandem with the finding regarding military expenditures in Model II, developing
nations which invest heavily in arms imports tend to be less likely to participate in IEAs. Apart
from the inherent incompatibility between military and environmental goals, as discussed
already, another plausible explanation for the limiting impact of military build-up on
participation is that, and especially so within the context of developing countries, scarcity of
resources may dictate the relegation of environmental concerns as a non-priority. If scarce funds
and other resources are earmarked for military arsenal build up, there is not much left over for
global environmental protection.
This raises the question as to why nations, especially those which are poor, invest so
heavily in arsenal build-up? Plausible explanations may be found within the literature dealing
with the role of ideational factors in global politics. The way that national leaders perceive their
roles and functions, and their own understandings of their identities, in concert with those of
their counterparts in the international system, may generate a commitment to military
empowerment, at the expense of other more laudable goals. On the other hand, the desire (and
perhaps the need) to invest in military empowerment may merely reflect the current structure of
the international and domestic system. In the international field, concerns with relative power
may compel leaders to engage in perpetual military empowerment. Within the domestic arena,
the high arms imports of developing countries may merely reflect ethnic tensions, propensity to
suffer from civil wars, or insecurity concerns due to their strategic positions.
What is the impact on participation of military empowerment when we factor in the
positive impact of participation in environmental IGOs? What is the independent impact of the
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Realist variables when they are juxtaposed with the Liberal variables? The Integrative Model
attempts to present an integrated understanding of the determinants of participation. It tests for
the independent impact of each variable from one school of thought, when the variables from the
competing theory is held constant. Model V shows that both power concerns and
institutionalization matter when we consider state participation in IEAs. Contiguity still
maintains its positive influence on participation, and military expenditures its negative impact.
Moreover, participation in environmental IGOs is conducive to participation in IEAs, as is a high
level of human development.
A variable which has not been discussed so far, but which is important in view of its
statistical non-significance in Models II-V is the variable ‘polity.’ It seems that the level of
democracy within states does not act as a direct determinant of that state’s participation in IEAs.
This is contrary to arguments made by researchers such as Neumayer or Congleton, but more in
line with Midlarsky’s observation that the association between democracy and participation may
not be that straightforward. When considered in concert with the statistical non-significance of
political stability in Model II, it is possible to argue that the exact placement of states on their
paths of democratization, if such is occurring at all, or their level of domestic political instability,
does not seem to impact states’ participation in IEAs.
While this may seem counter-intuitive at first sight, deeper probing shows that it is quite
likely that domestic political instability may not adversely impact state participation in IEAs. The
two processes can be easily compartmentalized in a rarefied fashion by the national leaders, who
often associate participation in IEAs as a statement of their belonging to the ‘international
community,’ and as an avenue for national prestige building and for deflecting, even if in a very
small measure, international criticism on their domestic policies. There are indeed several
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instances of states which are facing great political instability or which are famous for nondemocratic ventures, but which do in fact participate in IEAs. Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Croatia, for example, have each become parties to 19 and 46 IEAs respectively since their
formation in 1992. Moreover, Cuba is party to 34 IEAs, comparable to the participation of Israel,
which is party to 33 IEAs.
Whatever the exact motivations of the leaders, the finding that domestic political
complexities associated with non-democratic tendencies or instabilities do not exert constraining
forces on participation is welcome as it shows that there are prospects for enhanced international
environmental cooperation, irrespective of the domestic political idiosyncrasies.
Notwithstanding, it is legitimate however to wonder how meaningful such participation is.
Participation may have been intended, right from the start, as a political statement rather than as
a commitment to global environmental protection. Even if such be the case, participation is still
to be preferred over non-participation, as participation will likely involve the party member in a
process of international acculturation to environmental norms and standards. Regular COP
meetings and regular dissemination or reports on treaty implementation can spike interest in the
policy measures incorporated within the treaty provisions and may incite otherwise recalcitrant
parties to comply. Finally, participation subjects the party member to potential international
“shaming mechanisms,” which might ‘compel’ the member to enunciate policies to implement
the treaty provisions.
5.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to test if participation in IEAs is determined by country
characteristics and IEA characteristics. Each model of this study provides some insight into
participation. The legal-incentives model, for example, highlights the fact that strong and binding
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provisions within treaty texts seem to be viewed unfavorably by both the developed and
developing world. The power-interest model has emphasized the role of power and
environmental vulnerability, while the liberal-interdependent model has highlighted the role of
institutions and good governance. Issues which are prominent in the developing logistics model
relate to poverty, low quality of life, and corruption. The integrative model provides a synopsis
of Models II-IV, and show that both power concerns and institutions matter in determining state
participation in IEAs. Furthermore, human development seems to be a good precursor of higher
levels of state participation in IEAs.
These findings have important policy implications for international environmental
governance. In the next Chapter, I address these briefly and provide suggestions for future
research.

6. CONCLUSION
“…this world of nations has certainly been made by
men, and its guise must therefore be found within the
modifications of our own human mind.”
- Vico, 1744, from Cox,(1986).

International environmental governance presupposes a strong framework of international
cooperation which clearly sets out rights, obligations and liabilities. IEAs often manage to
provide such a structure for international environmental cooperation. However, for IEAs to be
effective in improving the global environment, the participation of the whole international
community is warranted. Since some countries are more prone to participating in IEAs than
others, and since some IEAs manage to sustain higher rates of participation than others, it
becomes an interesting undertaking to try and understand which underlying factors tend to
account for such differential levels of participation in the IEAs. The desire to investigate causal
factors for states’ varying participation in IEAs was the motivating idea behind this research.
In the following section I summarize the findings of this study and thereafter address
their implications for international environmental policies. I finally propose some suggestions for
future research in the field.
6.1 Overview of the research findings
This research set out to analyze the influence of country and IEA characteristics on
participation levels in IEAs. The basic research question governing this study is as follows:
which country and treaty characteristics determine a country’s participation in IEAs? This study
relies on the dominant theories governing IR, namely, Realism and Liberalism. These theories
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have been integrated into the field of IEC through the development of the (i) the power-interest
model, which emphasizes military and economic power; and (ii) the liberal-interdependent
model, which considers the role of international institutions and civic engagement. Moreover, to
take account of the differing socio-economic realities of developing countries, the developinglogistics model has been proposed to capture the influence of conditions endemic to the
developing world on their level of participation in IEAs. In an attempt to provide an integrated
understanding of the determinants of participation, the integrative model is developed to consider
the independent impact on one set of variables, while maintaining constant the competing set of
variables. Further, to capture the influence of treaty design variations on participation levels, the
legal-incentives model has been developed, which emphasizes variations in treaty clauses on
IEA participation.
This study has employed multiple linear regression analysis to establish statistical
dependence of IEA participation on specific treaty and country variables. Where treaty
characteristics are concerned, the analysis shows that IEAs which appear to be more attractive to
the international community are those which are flexible and transparent. IEAs which embody
requirements for enactment of legislation, which enunciate quantitative deadlines, which
stipulate sanctions for non-compliance, or which mandate ratification from specific groups of
countries for entry into force, tend to secure lower levels of participation than weaker IEAs.
Contrary to some researchers’ claim, both the developed and developing countries seem to favor
weaker IEAs over stronger ones.
The empirical tests also show that countries which tend to participate to a greater extent
in IEAs are those that have high levels of economic and human development, high involvement
in environmental IGOs, strong governmental institutions, good quality of life, strong civic
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engagement, and high levels of environmental vulnerability. On the other hand, domestic
conditions which tend to detract from high participation in IEAs involve high military
expenditures, high volumes of trade transactions, economic freedom, high levels of corruption,
social challenges associated with survival issues and mismanagement of national resources. The
various profiles for a potential participant in IEAs, as obtained from the regression models, are
provided in Table 13.

Table 13: Profile of Likely Participants in IEAs
Model II
High economic
development
High mineral
production
value
State
profile

High number
of contiguous
neighbors
Low military
expenditures

Model III
Low volumes of
trade
High
participation in
environmental
IGOs
Low economic
freedom

Model IV
Low levels of
corruption
Low levels of
population
undernutrition

Model V
Low levels of
corruption
High participation
in environmental
IGOs

Low foreign aid
dependency

Strong
governmental
institutions
High human
development
High levels of
civic
environmentalism

Low arms imports

High number of
contiguous
neighbors
Low military
expenditures
High human
development

From the above results, we can conclude that different socio-economic conditions
generate different levels of international environmental commitments: poor countries which rely
on foreign aid are less amenable to participating in IEAs than other countries benefiting from
high levels of human and economic development. The overriding concerns with military
empowerment also seem to be a major factor detracting from wide participation in IEAs. Based
on the above results, we can now understand why Angola and Eritrea participate in IEAs to a
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lesser extent than developed nations such as US or Finland, as well as other developing countries
such as Brazil or Chile.
As shown in Table 14 below, Angola and Eritrea’s domestic conditions reflect severe
incapacities related to low levels of human development, low GDP/capita, high levels of
malnutrition, and high foreign aid dependency. Moreover, both Angola and Eritrea spend a huge
proportion of their national budget for military matters, and their arms imports share a higher
percentage of their total imports as compared to the other countries listed in Table 14. Moreover,
the USA, despite its status as a highly developed economy, participates in less IEAs than other
developed nations such as Germany or Finland due to its higher levels of military expenditures,
its lower vulnerability to transboundary pollution (due to its low contiguity score), its lower
population density, its lower level of civic engagement, its greater economic freedom, its lower
control on corruption, its weaker governmental institutions, and its lower participation in
environmental IGOs.

Table 14: Summary of Data for Selected Countries
US

France

Germany

Finland

Chile

Brazil

Angola

Eritrea

Participation

55

76

78

75

57

54

8

8

HDI, 1999

0.934

0.924

0.921

0.925

0.825

0.750

0.422

0.416

GDP per capita,
1999 (PPP US$)
Military
expenditures, as
% govt.
expenditures,
1999
Arms imports, as
% of total
imports, 1999
Population
density
(peope/km2,
2000)

31872

23742

23096

8652

7037

3179

880

22897

15.7

5.9

4.7

4.5

12.3

5.5

41.1

51.1

0.2

0.3

0.3

1.3

0.7

0.3

7.3

33.5

31

107

230

17

20

20

11

41
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Malnutrition (%
population),
1996-98
Corruption score,
2002
Government
effectiveness,
2002
Contiguity
Foreign aid
dependence
(ODA/capita),
US$, 1999
Number of
memberships in
environmental
IGOs, 2003-2004
Local Agenda 21
initiatives (per
million
population),
2001
Mineral
production value
(US$ m), 2001
Economic
freedom

-

-

-

-

4

10

43

65

1.77

1.45

1.82

2.39

1.55

-0.05

-1.12

-

1.70

1.67

1.76

2.01

1.19

-0.22

-1.16

-

2
-

8
-

9
-

3
-

3
4.6

10
1.1

4
31.4

3
37.2

21

29

28

20

12

19

9

-

0.3

1.16

24.75

58.28

0.96

0.21

-

-

89400

11521

11803

424

2440

7171

2610

0.3

1.9

2.5

2.3

2.25

2.15

-

-

-

Overall, the five models show that the determinants of state participation in IEAs can be
conceptualized as being dichotomously influenced by a set of ‘enablers’ and a competing set of
‘limitors.’ Typical ‘enablers’ relate to economic and human development, high returns from
mineral production, sensitization to environmental vulnerability, good domestic governance,
openness to international acculturation of environmental norms and standards, and civic
engagement. ‘Limitors’ are in the form of military objectives, corruption, and poverty. The
integrative approach supported by Model V identifies three ‘enablers’, viz. human development,
environmental vulnerability, and international environmental acculturation, and two ‘limitors’,
namely, corruption and military design.
What do the above results imply for international environmental protection? How can
policies be geared towards enhancing participation in IEAs? How can treaties be designed to
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sustain high participation levels? The next section focuses briefly on the policy implications of
the research findings.
6.2 Policy implications of research findings
An integrated understanding of participation, based on Model V and Model I, shows that
participation can be understood in terms of the following four major determinants: (i) impact of
domestic and international institutions (ii) human development; (iii) power motivations; and (iv)
IEA design. Policies proposed to increase participation in IEAs therefore have to enhance any
positive influence exerted by these parameters, and mitigate their negative influences, if any.
If we start with the impact of domestic and international institutions, policies meant to
address government inefficiencies, its corruptive practices if known, and laxity in reform can
play a positive role in strengthening the state’s willingness to participate in IEAs. After all, the
bureaucrats are the primary responders to international calls for participation in IEAs: they are
the ones who prepare scientific and technical documents, and who steer the state in its policy
response. Very rarely does the head of a state participate in international environmental
negotiations, and more strange will be his or her participation in preparatory meetings and
conferences in preparation for the final conference for adoption of a treaty text.
The heavy involvement of these bureaucrats and technocrats in churning out policy and
technical papers with regard to a specific environmental issue suggests that a good starting point
for enhancing IEC may be placing emphasis on these actors. Strategies for building IEC may
have to start with programs to sensitize domestic bureaucrats and, whenever necessary, to
educate them on the relevant themes being placed on the international agenda. This sensitization
and involvement of domestic actors will likely entail disbursing funds for attracting actors from
the developing nations to participate in international seminars and workshops for committing of
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resources for capacity-building. Promoting state participation in environmental IGOs will also
likely result in greater participation in IEAs. As discussed previously, such participation may
make the state more open to accepting new international norms and standards, as codified in the
IEAs, and to agree to implement them.
On the human development front, policies geared towards enhancing citizens’ quality of
life may empower the population as well allow political leaders the freedom to address concerns
other than survival and development imperatives. A focus on human development will diminish
the impact of limitors such as poverty and corruption, and will enhance enablers such as civic
environmentalism. These issues are especially important for developing nations which are often
mired deep in social challenges associated with poor sanitation, low levels of nutrition or high
rates of infant mortality. As long as international environmental policies are developed in
isolation from measures meant to address human development, it is likely that participation in
IEAs will not only be less than optimal, but may also not be meaningful. The finding that trade
openness and economic freedom tend to act as disincentives for high participation in IEAs shows
perhaps that the principle of sustainable development is still not a cornerstone of international
trading. Trade and the environment still sit on opposite ends of human development, and treaty
negotiators and drafters need to find avenues for bringing trade provisions more in line with
environmental sustainability. While IEAs may allow for market mechanisms in order to make
participation more conducive to countries able and willing to effect such transactions, such
mechanisms however need to be made operative with the ultimate goal of achieving sustainable
development.
On the whole, international environmental protection needs to be addressed from a
holistic perspective, whereby all aspects of human development are taken into account. To
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secure wide participation in IEAs and strengthen IEC, policies will have to be devised to cater to
the following: (i) integrate international endeavors for global environmental protection with
measures to eradicate poverty, to improve the conditions of life in the developing world, and to
promote human development; (ii) design strategies to make trade provisions environmentally
sustainable; (iii) reduce foreign aid dependence of developing countries; (iv) empower local
communities to be more involved in domestic environmental protection initiatives; (v) promote
membership in international environmental institutions; and (vi) facilitate strong domestic
governance.
In terms of IEA design, it seems that IEAs will have to be engineered such that they
succeed in striking the right balance between flexibility and strength. One possible starting point
is to build on the preference of states for the inclusion of transparency measures within IEA
texts. Thus, strengthening reporting requirements and allowing non-state actors to act as
observers within the treaty proceedings can potentially improve participation rates as well as
promote IEA effectiveness. There has indeed been a definite trend towards the inclusion of such
parameters in the most recent IEAs (e.g. the UNFCCC, the CBD, the CCD, the MP and the KP,
inter alia). On the other hand, strength and flexibility need not be in competition with each other.
IEAs can be built such that binding clauses are viewed separately from specific mechanisms
allowing parties to implement the treaties in a flexible but effective approach. Flexibility in this
sense may further empower participating states in their goals of abiding by the mandated targets
and deadlines.
Treaty drafters also need to be sensitive to the reasonable needs and concerns of potential
participants. On the one hand, developing countries’ inherent logistical constraints (such as low
levels of economic development, poverty, and low quality of life) will have to be met with
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special provisions to allow them to benefit from much needed financial transfers and capacitybuilding. On the other hand, developed countries need to be allowed to conduct international
market transactions without fear of losing their competitive advantage or of suffering from losses
of funds transferred due to corruption in the recipient countries. Moreover, package for capacitybuilding may be made more enticing and more effective by incorporating results-oriented
strategies and programs.
The case of the MP may shed some light on the delicate balance that needs to be achieved
to sustain participation from both the developed and developing nations. While the success of the
MP has been imputed to a host of factors by various researchers, it is certainly true that the
design of the MP was geared towards achieving both strength and flexibility. While the MP
established clear targets and deadlines for the control and phasing out of specific ODS, the treaty
also allowed developing countries a grace period of ten years to implement the treaty provisions.
Moreover, the treaty established the Ozone Fund to meet the incremental costs associated with
developing countries’ switching to new technology which was ODS-free, and also established
trade restrictions for non-parties. These measures ensured that the needs of developing countries
were met, while at the same time securing wide participation in a global phase-out and control of
ODS.
As mentioned in Chapter One, the KP also includes several mechanisms to increase its
flexibility as well as to entice both the developed and developing countries to participate. The KP
includes three key measures, commonly termed as the “flexibility mechanisms,” to lower overall
costs of participation and to make participation attractive to both the developed and developing
world. As detailed previously, these measures include the clean development mechanism
(CDM), joint implementation (JI) and emissions trading. Moreover, the KP, in its Article 10, also
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includes special provisions for developing nations, as well as the recognition of the principle of
“common but differentiated responsibilities” and the “specific regional and development
priorities” of countries. Further, the KP (through Article 11) requires that developed countries
meet the full costs incurred by developing nations in implementing the protocol and that
adequate financial and technological transfer take place for that purpose.
While the mechanisms of the MP and the KP need certainly to be replicated in other
IEAs, provisions for technology transfer and financial assistance are unfortunately not tied to the
recipients demonstrating a clean record free from corruptive practices. In view of the negative
impact of ineffective control of corruption on participation, IEAs may wisely be tied to reducing
corruption, at least in regard to environmental policies. Funds to be transferred may potentially
be made subject to clean bills of record or clear implementation plans on the part of the recipient
countries.
The statistical insignificance of the variable measuring democracy, coupled with the
statistical significance of measures for corruption and poor quality of life (as indicated by
undernutrition), reflect perhaps the fact that the ‘empowering factors’ required to make
democracy work are not present in many societies. The finding that states which participate in
more environmental IGOs tend to participate in a higher number of IEAs shows the impact of
international acculturation to environmental norms that possibly ensues from the density of
interaction occasioned by membership in these organizations. To secure a meaningful level of
participation in IEAs, therefore, there need to be a focus on opening up international dialogue,
while at the same time addressing the empowerment of local groups and communities to take
part in their domestic policy-making processes. This empowerment will require the eradication
of problems associated with basic survival issues. Addressing problems of poverty, poor
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nutrition, and corruption, among others, has to be the first priority of international environmental
policies. There is thus a very close link between the environment and human development.
The positive association between contiguity and participation suggests that there is much
scope for regional set-ups to address and strengthen global environmental problems. Countries in
a particular region may be encouraged to form coalitions to bear pressure on unwilling states to
participate in IEAs. However, the most difficult perhaps remains the issue of military buildup,
especially in those countries suffering from lack of resources for meeting even the bare
necessities of life. The preponderance of military concerns, as inferred from Models II, III and
IV, reflects the present international structure where military prowess equates to survival. In a
structure where a nation can perpetually face military attacks from a stronger state, it cannot be
expected that leaders will not ardently wish to strengthen their military power. Efforts to get
leaders to use scarce resources for empowering their people rather than build their military
arsenal have to tackle the root of the problem viz. the international structure as it currently
stands. This links to the subject of IR theorizing, which I briefly discuss below.
In traditional IR literature, there is certainly a bifurcation between the Realist and
Liberalist schools of thought, and between the domestic and the international. While the latter
compartmentalization is being increasingly challenged by researchers, the dichotomizing of the
two schools of thought remains as such. Based on the results of this research, the differentiation
between the domestic and international cannot be substantiated, as also is the division between
Realism and Liberalism. Model V, the integrative model, points towards the fact that the
domestic and the international, as well as the Realist and Liberal concerns can be merged in a
holistic template which provides a better understanding of IR than mere focus on either the
Realist or Liberal thought.
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This study has shown that participation in IEAs can be successfully explained by both the
Realist and Liberal understanding of IR. Power considerations interact with institutional
concerns, and the domestic parameters influence, and are in turn determined, by international
factors. In a sense this study substantiates claims already made by several researchers that there
cannot be a clean compartmentalization of the field of IR. It is obvious therefore that there is no
one theory of IR. The existence of the various theories can be partially ascribed to the
compartmentalized and unbalanced nature in which global politics is approached and analyzed.
For example, while Realism focuses solely on the base side of human nature, with total discard
of the ‘good’ part, Liberalism focuses solely on the ‘good’ part, while overlooking any evil
tendencies in human nature. Such unbalanced view of human nature necessarily results in a
framework which is not all-embracing and which is ‘extreme’ in its explanatory power.
One cannot therefore speak of the theory of IR, essentially because the subject is
broached from various different angles, depending on the needs and interests of the researcher.
While one theory may shed light on some aspects of IR, another contending theory cannot aspire
to replace the previous one. Each theory can only aspire to enlighten those aspects cast off by
another competing theory, without any one theory possibly aspiring to represent the whole gamut
of strategic international interaction. Each approach and method of analysis provides only a
snapshot of the whole picture of IEC, without any one single approach providing a wholesome
understanding of all the processes and underpinnings of IEC. As stated by Ruggie (1998 p.882),
“no approach [of IR] can sustain claims to monopoly on truth.” Thus, Realism, Liberalism, and
Constructivism (with all of the variants) all contribute something to our understanding of IEC,
without any one theory being utterly irrelevant in enlightening international politics. In the words
of Jervis (1998 pp.971-972):
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[E]ach school of thought enriches others as powerful research of one kind strengthens, not weakens, the
alternatives. No one approach consistently maintains a leading position: each of them catches important
elements of international politics, and many of our arguments are about the relative importance of and the
interrelationships among various factors.

The current state of IR theorizing takes the structure as given. Realism posits that leaders
are always concerned about security gains, a statement which is reflected in the influence of
military expenditures and arms imports in Models II and II. However, the question of how the
leaders get to that point is not asked. It is assumed that the evil side of human nature
predominates. Also not asked are the following questions: If Realism is so predominant, is it
because it reflects reality, or because we are taught to behave in a way which makes the
assumptions of Realism become a reality? Under what conditions will Realism predominantly
prevail over Liberalism, and vice versa? Is there a ‘tipping point’ or is it based on the nature of
issue areas? In Model V above, under what conditions will military expenditures take overriding
importance over participation in environmental IGOs?
Submitting without reservation to any one particular paradigm, with complete shunning
of alternative explanations, is tantamount to being inside Plato’s Cave. The importance of
determining which theory informs political decision-making and why cannot be taken
nonchalantly, in view of the wide repercussions on the quality of human life and what it means
for humanity to progress. Going along this path opens the space for a constructivist contribution
to understanding IR and to re-analyzing the basic assumptions of inter-state interaction. As
pointed out by Wendt (1992 pp. 617, 628), Realism can be a “self-fulfilling prophecy” and
anarchy may merely be “what states make of it.” There is certainly much scope for integrating
the theories and analyzing under what conditions one takes the upper hand, and why.
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6.3 Suggestions for further research
This research has focused on the determinants of overall participation in global IEAs by
focusing on specific treaty and state variables. One first scope for further research therefore
relates to expanding the research template by (i) categorizing state participation through an
analysis of states’ participation in specific groups of treaties; (ii) expanding the set of IEAs
considered in Model I; and (iii) including regional IEAs in the analysis.
It is likely that states may be participating more in one group of IEAs than another, or
more in regional IEAs than global ones. Differentiating the analysis based on types of IEAs
ratified may therefore promote greater understanding into the patterns of state participation in
global and regional IEAs. Moreover, it is likely that states who take part in the international
negotiations preceding the adoption of the treaty text may be more open to participation in the
relevant treaty. The influence of having states take part in the treaty drafting phase can therefore
be studied and the implications, either in terms of ratification times or implementation success,
can be studied.
The number of IEAs in Model I can be increased, which would permit the analysis of a
greater number of variables. For example, the individual influence of the various variables
incorporating the variable ‘strength’ can be analyzed to delineate the influence of each
component separately. Also promising is an analysis of the influence of various environmental
norms and principles on state participation.
An undertaking which relates states’ levels of participation in IEAs to their domestic
environmental quality, assessed on those parameters which matter most for the specific IEAs,
can enlighten us on the effectiveness of the IEAs. There is no clear link established yet in the
literature on participation in IEAs and environmental quality.
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Finally, the development of an integrated and coherent theory on IEC presents promise
for intellectual development. There is no reason why the development of such a theory cannot
occur within the current scope of IR theorizing. What is needed perhaps is a new outlook which
brings the parts together to make a coherent whole. As suggested by this research, an integrated
approach may present a more realistic understanding of what actually motivates national leaders.
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Annex 1 – VCLT ARTICLES
Table 15: Articles of VCLT
ARTICLES
2

TEXT
1. For the purposes of the present Convention:
(a) “treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written
form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or
more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation;
(b) “ratification”, “acceptance”, “approval” and “accession” mean in each case the
international
act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be
bound by a
treaty;

6

Article 6: Capacity of States to conclude treaties
Every State possesses capacity to conclude treaties.

9

Article 9: Adoption of the text
1. The adoption of the text of a treaty takes place by the consent of all the States
participating in its
drawing up except as provided in paragraph 2.
2. The adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes place by the
vote of two-thirds
of the States present and voting, unless by the same majority they shall decide to
apply a different rule.

11

Article 11: Means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature,
exchange of instruments
constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other
means if so agreed.

12

Article 12: Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by signature
1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by the signature of its
representative when:
(a) the treaty provides that signature shall have that effect;
(b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that signature
should have
that effect; or
(c) the intention of the State to give that effect to the signature appears from the full
powers of its
representative or was expressed during the negotiation.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1:
(a) the initialing of a text constitutes a signature of the treaty when it is established
that the
negotiating States so agreed;
(b) the signature ad referendum of a treaty by a representative, if confirmed by his
State,
constitutes a full signature of the treaty.

13

Article 13: Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by an exchange of instruments
constituting a treaty

160
The consent of States to be bound by a treaty constituted by instruments exchanged
between them is
expressed by that exchange when:
(a) the instruments provide that their exchange shall have that effect; or
(b) it is otherwise established that those States were agreed that the exchange of
instruments
should have that effect.
14

Article 14: Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by ratification, acceptance or
approval
1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when:
(a) the treaty provides for such consent to be expressed by means of ratification;
(b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that ratification
should be
required;
(c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification; or
(d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the
full powers
of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation.
2. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by acceptance or
approval under conditions
similar to those which apply to ratification.

15

Article 15: Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by accession
The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by accession when:
(a) the treaty provides that such consent may be expressed by that State by means of
accession;
(b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that such
consent may be
expressed by that State by means of accession; or
(c) all the parties have subsequently agreed that such consent may be expressed by
that State by
means of accession.

16

Article 16: Exchange or deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession
Unless the treaty otherwise provides, instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession
establish the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty upon:
(a) their exchange between the contracting States;
(b) their deposit with the depositary; or
(c) their notification to the contracting States or to the depositary, if so agreed.

18

Article 18: Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its
entry into force
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject
to
ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to
become a
party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force
of the treaty
and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.
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24

Article 24: Entry into force
1. A treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it may provide or
as the negotiating
States may agree.
2. Failing any such provision or agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon as
consent to be bound by
the treaty has been established for all the negotiating States.
3. When the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is established on a date after
the treaty has come
into force, the treaty enters into force for that State on that date, unless the treaty
otherwise provides.
4. The provisions of a treaty regulating the authentication of its text, the establishment
of the consent of
States to be bound by the treaty, the manner or date of its entry into force,
reservations, the functions of
the depositary and other matters arising necessarily before the entry into force of the
treaty apply from the
time of the adoption of its text.

25

Article 25: Provisional application
1. A treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry into force if:
(a) the treaty itself so provides; or
(b) the negotiating States have in some other manner so agreed.
2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the negotiating States have otherwise
agreed, the provisional
application of a treaty or a part of a treaty with respect to a State shall be terminated if
that State notifies
the other States between which the treaty is being applied provisionally of its
intention not to become a
party to the treaty.

26

Article 26: Pacta sunt servanda
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith.

27

Article 27: Internal law and observance of treaties
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure
to perform a treaty.
This rule is without prejudice to article 46.

28

Article 28: Non-retroactivity of treaties
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its
provisions do not bind
a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to
exist before the
date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.

34

Article 34: General rule regarding third States
A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its
consent.

35

Article 35: Treaties providing for obligations for third States
An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the
treaty intend the
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provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third State expressly
accepts that
obligation in writing.
36

Article 36: Treaties providing for rights for third States
1. A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty
intend the
provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group of States to which
it belongs, or to all
States, and the third State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the
contrary is not
indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides.
2. A State exercising a right in accordance with paragraph 1 shall comply with the
conditions for its
exercise provided for in the treaty or established in conformity with the treaty.

37

Article 37: Revocation or modification of obligations or rights of third States
1. When an obligation has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 35, the
obligation may be
revoked or modified only with the consent of the parties to the treaty and of the third
State, unless it is
established that they had otherwise agreed.
2. When a right has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 36, the right may
not be revoked or
modified by the parties if it is established that the right was intended not to be
revocable or subject to
modification without the consent of the third State.

39

Article 39: General rule regarding the amendment of treaties
A treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid down in
Part II apply to such
an agreement except in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide.

48

Article 48: Error
1. A State may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by
the treaty if the error
relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State to exist at the time when
the treaty was
concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if the State in question contributed by its own conduct
to the error or if the
circumstances were such as to put that State on notice of a possible error.
3. An error relating only to the wording of the text of a treaty does not affect its
validity; article 79 then
applies.

49

Article 49: Fraud
If a State has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another
negotiating State, the
State may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.

50

Article 50: Corruption of a representative of a State
If the expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty has been procured
through the corruption of
its representative directly or indirectly by another negotiating State, the State may
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invoke such corruption
as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty.
51

Article 51: Coercion of a representative of a State
The expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured
by the coercion of its
representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal
effect.

52

Article 52: Coercion of a State by the threat or use of force
A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in
violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

53

Article 53: Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law
(jus cogens)
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of
general international
law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.

56

Article 56: Denunciation of or withdrawal from a treaty containing
no provision regarding termination, denunciation or withdrawal
1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not
provide for
denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless:
(a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or
withdrawal; or
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.
2. A party shall give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to denounce
or withdraw from a
treaty under paragraph 1.

60

Article 60: Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of
its breach
1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to
invoke the breach as a
ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.
2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:
(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in
whole or in
part or to terminate it either:
(i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State, or
(ii) as between all the parties;
(b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the
operation
of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State;
(c) any party other than the defaulting State to invoke the breach as a ground for
suspending the
operation of the treaty in whole or in part with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a
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character
that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of
every party
with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the treaty.
3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in:
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or
purpose of the
treaty.
4. The foregoing paragraphs are without prejudice to any provision in the treaty
applicable in the event of
a breach.
5. Paragraphs 1 to 3 do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the human
person contained in
treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibiting any form
of reprisals against
persons protected by such treaties.
77

Article 77: Functions of depositaries
1. The functions of a depositary, unless otherwise provided in the treaty or agreed by
the contracting
States, comprise in particular:
(a) keeping custody of the original text of the treaty and of any full powers delivered
to the
depositary;
(b) preparing certified copies of the original text and preparing any further text of the
treaty in
such additional languages as may be required by the treaty and transmitting them to
the parties
and to the States entitled to become parties to the treaty;
(c) receiving any signatures to the treaty and receiving and keeping custody of any
instruments,
notifications and communications relating to it;
(d) examining whether the signature or any instrument, notification or communication
relating to
the treaty is in due and proper form and, if need be, bringing the matter to the
attention of the
State in question;
(e) informing the parties and the States entitled to become parties to the treaty of acts,
notifications and communications relating to the treaty;
(f) informing the States entitled to become parties to the treaty when the number of
signatures or
of instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession required for the entry
into force
of the treaty has been received or deposited;
(g) registering the treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations;
(h) performing the functions specified in other provisions of the present Convention.
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Annex 2 – List of IEAs (1921 – 1998)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Convention Concerning the Use of White Lead in Painting, 1921
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Washington (as amended), 1946
General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean, Rome, 1949
International Convention for the Protection of Birds, Paris, 1950
International Plant Protection convention, Rome, 1951
Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Washington, 1956
Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva, 1958
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Geneva, 1958
Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 1958
Convention on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Geneva, 1958
The Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1959
Agreement concerning Co-operation in the Quarantine of Plants and their Protection against Pests and Diseases,
Sofia, 1959
Protection of Workers Against Ionizing Radiations, Geneva, 1960
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Paris, 1960
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Geneva, 1961
Convention on the African Migratory Locust, Kano, 1962
Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (as
amended in 1964 and 1982), Brussels, 1963
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1963
Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1963
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Washington, 1963
Agreement for the Establishment of a Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Eastern Region of its
Distribution Area in South-West Asia, Rome, 1963

22

Additional Protocol to the Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy as amended in 1963, Paris, 1964

23

Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, Copenhagen, 1964
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, Brussels, 1964
Agreement for the Establishment of a Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Near East, Rome,
1965
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Rio de Janeiro, 1966
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, London, 1967
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels, 1969
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Brussels,
1969
Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material, Brussels, 1971
Convention Concerning Protection against Hazards of Poisoning arising from Benzene (ILO No. 136), Geneva,
1971
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Ramsar, 1971
Treaty on Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, Washington, 1971

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

34

Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Washington, 1972
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35

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Washington, 1972

36

Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, London, 1972
Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects, Washington, 1972
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 1972
Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances other than Oil,
London, 1973 (parent:1969)
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Washington, 1973
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) - Annex V (Optional)=Garbage,
London, 1973
Convention Concerning the Prevention and Control of Occupational Hazards Caused by Carcinogenic Substances
and Agents(ILO No. 139), Geneva, 1974
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), London, 1974
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques,
Geneva, 1976
Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund of Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage, London, 1976
Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, London, 1976
Convention concerning the Protection of Workers against Occupational Hazards in the Working Environment
Due to Air Pollution, Geneva, 1977
International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, Torremolinos, 1977
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as modified by the Protocol of 1978, London,
1978
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships: Annex III - Hazardous substances carried in
packaged form, London, 1978
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) - Annex IV (Optional): Sewage,
London, 1978
Amendment to Annexes to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
other Matter concerning Incineration at Sea, Torremolinos, 1978

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

53

Amendments to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
concerning Settlement of Disputes, Torremolinos, 1978

54

International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants as amended on 23.10.1978, Geneva, 1978
Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Protocol), London, 1978
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn, 1979
Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Bern, 1979
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Vienna, 1979
Amendment to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Art. X1),
Bonn, 1979
Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, New York, 1979
International Plant Protection Convention (1979 Revised Text), Rome, 1979
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Canberra, 1980
Amendments to the Annexes to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, Colombo, 1980
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 1982
Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 1960 amended by
Additional Protocol of 1964, Paris, 1982
Protocol to amend the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat,
Paris, 1982

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
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67

International Tropical Timber Agreement, Geneva, 1983

68

Amendment to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Art.
XXI), Gaborone, 1983
Protocol to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, London, 1984
Protocol to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage, London, 1984
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985
Convention Concerning Safety in the Use of Asbestos, Geneva, 1986
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Vienna, 1986
Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Vienna, 1986
Protocol amending the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from land-based sources, Paris, 1986
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1987
Amendments to Article 6 & 7 of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as
Waterfowl Habitat, Regina - Canada, 1987
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and The Paris Convention, Vienna, 1988
Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Protocol 1988), London,
1988
Basel Convention On the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Basel,
1989
International Convention on Salvage, London, 1989
London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, London, 1990
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, London, 1990
Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection, Madrid, 1991
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (consolidated version), Geneva, 1991
Protocol to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, London, 1992
Protocol to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an international Fund for compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage, London, 1992
Amendment to Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Copenhagen, 1992
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 1992
Protocol to the International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, Torremolinos, 1993
Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing
Vessels on the High Seas, London, 1993
Convention on Nuclear Safety, Vienna, 1994
International Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and or
Desertification, Paris, 1994
International Tropical Timber Agreement, Geneva, 1994
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
1982, New York, 1994
Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Operations directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora, Lusaka,
1994
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New
York, 1995
Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, Hague, 1995
Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,
London, 1996

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

99
100
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101

International Convention on the Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, London, 1996

102

Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1997
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1997
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, New York, 1997
International Plant Protection Convention (1997 Revised Text), Rome, 1997
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management,
Vienna, 1997
Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1997
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, 1997
Convention on Access to Information Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matter, Aarhus, 1998
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides
in International Trade, Rotterdam, 1998

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
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Annex 3 – List of IEAs for Model I

1
2
3

Acronym
CBD
UNFCCC
KP

4
5
6

VIENCON
MP
MP-LON

7

MP-COPHG

8

MP-MREAL

9
10

ITTA
CCD

11

BASEL

12

WHALING

13
14
15

BIRDS
CONTSHLF
CITES

16

RAMSAR

17
18
19

SALVAGE
ERLYNOT
ASSITNUC

20
21
22

CIVLIABNU
UNCLOS
ENVMOD

23

CMS

24

ANTMRINE

25
26

ANTARCTC
QUARTINE

27
28

LOCUSTAF
WSTEDUMP

29
30

IPPA
NUCWEAP

IEAs
Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 1992
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, 1992
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Kyoto, 1997
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 1985
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 1987
London Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer, London, 1990
Amendment to Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Copenhagen, 1992
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Montreal, 1997
International Tropical Timber Agreement, Geneva, 1994
International Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and or Desertification, Paris, 1994
Basel Convention On the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, Basel, 1989
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Washington (as amended),
1946
International Convention for the Protection of Birds, Paris, 1950
Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva, 1958
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Washington, 1973
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl
Habitat, Ramsar, 1971
International Convention on Salvage, London, 1989
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Vienna, 1986
Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency, Vienna, 1986
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, 1963
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 1982
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, Geneva, 1976
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn,
1979
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Canberra,
1980
The Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1959
Agreement concerning Co-operation in the Quarantine of Plants and their
Protection against Pests and Diseases, Sofia, 1959
Convention on the African Migratory Locust, Kano, 1962
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, Washington, 1972
International Plant Protection Convention (1997 Revised Text), Rome, 1997
Treaty on Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons
of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof,
Washington, 1971
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31

MARPOL

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships as modified by
the Protocol of 1978, London, 1978
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Annex 4 – Full Dataset for Model I
Table 16: Full Dataset for Model I
TREATIES
CBD
UNFCCC
KP
VIENCON
MP
MP-LON
MP-COPHG
MP-MREAL
ITTA
CCD
BASEL
WHALING
BIRDS
CONTSHLF
CITES
RAMSAR
SALVAGE
ERLYNOT
ASSITNUC
CIVLIABNU
UNCLOS
ENVMOD
CMS
ANTMRINE
ANTARCTC
QUARTINE
LOCUSTAF
WSTEDUMP
IPPA
NUCWEAP
MARPOL

%
Total
89.29
93.72
7.33
87.24
86.73
66.33
48.47
8.67
17.86
81.68
66.84
19.39
5.10
29.84
75.51
60.73
13.27
40.82
37.76
15.71
65.82
33.67
30.10
14.29
22.51
4.08
7.14
39.29
3.57
63.27
48.98

%
dvg
91.45
92.11
7.89
88.16
87.50
62.50
41.45
5.26
13.82
81.58
63.16
13.16
1.32
25.66
76.32
55.92
8.55
32.89
32.24
19.08
65.13
28.95
25.66
7.24
15.13
5.26
9.21
31.58
3.29
61.84
42.76

%
dd
81.82
88.64
4.55
84.09
84.09
79.55
72.73
20.45
31.82
72.73
79.55
40.91
18.18
40.91
72.73
70.45
29.55
68.18
56.82
2.27
68.18
50.00
45.45
38.64
45.45
0.00
0.00
65.91
4.55
68.18
70.45

Strength

Transparency
0
0
4
0
3
2
1
1
2
0
2
2
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
2
0
1
1
2

3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
2
4
2
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
2
3
1
0
1
1
0
0
2

Threshold
30
50
55
20
11
20
20
20
28
50
20
6
6
22
10
10
15
3
3
5
60
20
15
8
12
5
6
15
3
3
15

dispneg
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1

amenddpty

fintransfers

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1

1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Capacity
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
3
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Annex 5 – Descriptives for Variables for Model I

Table 17: Descriptives for Variables for Model I
Variables

Mean

Standard deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Model I
Strength
Transparency
Threshold
Dispneg
Amendpty
Fintransfers
Capacity

1
1.87
18.26
0.55
0.74
0.23
1.26

1.095
1.688
15.792
0.506
0.445
0.425
1.18

0
0
3
0
0
0
0

4
5
60
1
1
1
3
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Annex 6 – Descriptives for Dependent and Independent Variables for Models II - V
Table 18: Descriptives of Variables for Model II - V
Variables
Dependent
Variables
Models II-V
Total participation,
P

Mean

Standard deviation

Minimum

Maximum

29.88

18.09

0

81

Independent
Variables
Model II
Gdpcap1

7903.67

8256.049

448

42769

Indgth

2.0952

5.22026

-16.65

13.97

Mineral_t
Contiguity

5.1307
3.13

3.10922
2.643

-2.30
0

11.40
14

Popdens_t

4.0983

1.43910

0.69

9.71

Milexp

10.8863

9.42320

0.90

51.10

Milcoup

0.35

0.478

0

1

Model III
HDI

0.6835

0.18181

0.26

0.94

Eionum

10.05

5.669

0

29

Ecofree

2.5584

0.41111

1.30

3.20

Goveff

-0.0810

0.99776

-1.78

2.26

Tgoods

67.9839

41.45934

14.72

295.30

Polity

3.1516

6.41911

-10.00

10.70

Agenda21_t

-0.4030

2.02491

-0.461

4.87

Model IV
Graft

-0.4870

0.61859

-1.70

1.55

Sanitation

67.31

27.651

8

100

Undernutrition_t

2.8423

0.84958

1.10

4.32

IMortality

82.71

68.389

5

316

Odacap_t

2.9975

1.23761

-0.92

5.76

174
Arms

1.9150

4.87090

0

33.50

Tgoods

64.2476

32.92279

14.72

201.26
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Annex 7 – Corelation Matrices for Models I - V
Table 19: Correlation Matrix for Model I Variables
Strength
1
0.241
0.068
0.215
0.487
0.191
0.489

Strength
Dispneg
Amendpty
Fintransfers
Transparency
Threshold
Capacity

Dispneg

Amendpty

Fintransfers

Transparency

Threshold

Capacity

1
0.353
0.335
0.398
0.311
0.368

1
0.142
0.354
0.024
0.258

1
0.414
0.821
0.544

1
0.426
0.685

1
0.616

1

Table 20: Correlation Matrix for Model II Variables
GDPCAP1

INDGTH

MILCOUP

MINERAL_
T

FORPERC_
T

POPDENS_
T

CONTIG

GDPCAP1

1

INDGTH

0.018

MILCOUP

-0.386

0.131

1

MINERAL_T

0.387

-0.075

-0.080

1

FORPERC_T

0.056

0.087

-0.116

0.024

POPDENS_T

0.127

0.105

-0.169

-0.188

-0.021

1

CONTIG

-0.162

-0.084

0.178

0.328

0.011

-0.268

1

MILGEXP

-0.154

0.131

0.202

-0.001

-0.324

-0.072

0.181

MILGEXP

1

1

1

Table 21: Correlation Matrix for Model III Variables
POLITY
GOVEFF
HDI
ECOFREE
EIONUM
TGOODS
AGENDA21_T

POLITY
1
0.544
0.474
-0.263
0.347
0.056
0.486

GOVEFF

HDI

ECOFREE

EIONUM

TGOODS

AGENDA21_T

1
0.736
-0.743
0.495
0.217
0.686

1
-0640
0.370
0.273
0.611

1
-0.378
-0.313
-0.492

1
-0.170
0.128

1
0.348

1

Table 22: Correlation Matrix for Model IV Variables

GRAFT
SANTN
POPUNDR_T
MORT
ODACAP_T
DEMRANK
AMTDIMP
TGOODS
AGENDA21_T
GDPCAP1

GRAFT

SANTN

1
0.270
-0.376
-0.400
0.077
-0.320
-0.001
0.273
0.418
0.635

1
-0.544
-0.652
-0.088
-0.191
-0.262
0.284
0.260
0.562

POPU
NDR_T

1
0.617
0.237
0.084
0.049
-0.207
-0.146
-0.667

MORT

1
0.115
0.322
0.157
-0.261
-0.336
-0.659

ODAC
AP_T

1
-0.099
-0.164
0.231
0.585
-0.212

DEMR
ANK

1
0.258
-0.085
-0.295
-0.337

AMTDI
MP

TGOO
DS

AGEN
DA21_
T

GDPCAP1
0.635
0.562
-0.667
-0.659
-0.212
-0.337

1
-0.140
-0.205
-0.065

1
0.484
0.296

1
0.312

0.296
0.312
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Table 23: Correlation Matrix for Model V Variables
Contiguity
Milexp
Graft
Polity
Eionum
Mineral_t
Odacap_t
Agenda21_t
Popdens_t
HDI
Tgoods

Contigu
ity
1
0.1766
-0.0964
-0.1243
0.1852
0.2003
-0.1984
-0.2682
-0.2282
-0.0441
-0.3307

Milexp

Graft

Polity

Eionum

1
0.1694
-0.6008
-0.0698
0.1400
-0.2523
-0.2216
-0.0971
-0.0452
-0.1358

1
0.0925
-0.1783
0.2877
-0.0186
0.4081
-0.0915
0.6041
0.4334

1
-0.0151
-0.1029
0.1270
0.2242
0.1706
0.2655
0.0997

1
0.3310
-0.3762
-0.4294
-0.0910
0.0167
-0.2482

Mineral
_t

1
-0.5570
-0.1551
-0.1800
0.6291
0.1790

Odacap_t

1
0.5060
-0.0704
-0.2076
0.1350

Agenda2
1_t

1
-0.1334
0.3446
0.4829

Popdens_t

HDI

1
0.0632
0.0464

1
0.4133

tgoods

1
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Annex 8 – Variance Inflation Factors for all Models
Table 24: Variance Inflation Factors for Models I - V74

Model I
3.93
3.25
2.79
2.22
1.50
1.37
1.35

74

Model II
1.71
1.44
1.39
1.30
1.18
1.17
1.12
1.08

Model III
5.83
3.57
2.65
2.26
1.70
1.54
1.29

Model IV
5.40
2.76
2.64
2.64
2.41
2.07
1.68
1.61
1.56
1.51

Model V
4.19
3.79
2.76
2.10
2.06
2.02
1.98
1.74
1.50
1.45
1.28

The VIF are for variables presented in the same order as they appear in the models.

